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4Abstract
Cultural production and labour have been the subject of considerable research
in recent years. But relatively little research has paid attention to workers in the
internet industries, especially the Chinese internet industries. This thesis uses
ethnographic research to examine the quality of the working life of Chinese
internet workers and asks: What is working life like in the Chinese internet
industries? And how do workers themselves understand and evaluate their
experiences of working life?
This thesis examines three main inter-related issues in order to answer these
questions. First, the work quality of these workers is evaluated via a framework
consisting of work effort or intensity, autonomy and security. Empirical data,
collected from three months’ covert observation in a Chinese internet company
and two periods of interviews in the industries, shows inequalities and
injustices in working life. Second, the social class of internet workers provides
a crucial context for understanding their working conditions. Chinese internet
workers are understood as part of the lower middle class in contemporary
Chinese society. They face ‘proletarianisation’: they suffer a worsening of their
working conditions and their collaborative acts of agency show close
relationships with those of the working class. Thirdly, the agency of these
workers is analysed, including their negotiation with, and resistance to, the
state and businesses. A key argument is that proletarianisation is the result of
exploitation, which is understood from a neo-Marxist perspective here: the
bureaucratic capitalist class appropriates the labour efforts of the working
class and skills of the middle class through ownership of means of production
and exercise of the political authority to allocate these resources. The notion of
exploitation is a fundamental mechanism to understand the quality of working
life in the industries, as it explains why workers suffer poor working conditions.
Workers’ acts of agency explain why workers still work in the industries,
despite such poor conditions, and how they strive to improve them. This
research also argues that such acts indicate a ‘bottom up’ force in
contemporary China, which suggests the potential to create better working
conditions and a better China.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, according to some media reports, the Chinese internet
industries have enabled thousands of individuals, especially ambitious young
people, to realise their dreams of being millionaires. For example, Peasant
Dai1 – an ordinary Chinese university graduate who successfully set up his
own business via the internet – was reported by Southern Weekly (one of
China’s most popular newspapers, owned by the independently minded
Southern Daily Group, China’s influential liberal newspaper) as a model of a
successful youth in the internet era. In 2006, when Peasant Dai was a fresh
university graduate, he worked for a small company to sell a local-made brand
of facial mask, which was rich in minerals, on Taobao, the most popular online
commerce website in China. This brand of facial mask soon became so
popular among online users that it enabled Peasant Dai to develop two
hundred franchisers. 2 After two years, Peasant Dai developed his own
company, which produced facial masks, based on his successful online sales
of the facial mask. At the time of my writing, Peasant Dai’s company is one of
the leading businesses in the Chinese facial mask market.
Likewise, Xinhua News reported that the listing of Baidu – the dominant
search engine company in China – in the USA NASDAQ stock market in 2005
enabled 400 workers in the company to become millionaires, because they
were given some stocks before the listing.3 Since then, a lot of media reports
have focused on the benefits of working in these internet companies. For
example, Figure 1.1-1.3 show the most popular pictures adopted by several
newspapers to show the benefits of working in Baidu. All these reports centred
on key words such as ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, ‘cool’, ‘enjoyable’, ‘prestige’ and
‘relaxed’. It seems that working in internet companies brings considerable
freedom and rewards.
1 Peasant Dai is the user name of the youth
2 Southern Weekly, 22nd October 2009
3 Xinhua News, 8th August 2005
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Figure 1.1: Working in Baidu
Source: Wenzhou Daily news, 2011
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Figure 1.2: Working in Baidu
Source: Wenzhou Daily news, 2011
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Figure 1.3: Working in Baidu
Source: Wenzhou Daily news, 2011
However, this is only one side of the story; some media also pay attention
to poor working conditions in the internet industries. For example, a few years
ago, there were two events reported by the Chinese media in Huawei
Technologies – one of the best known telecommunications companies in
China – concerning workers’ working experiences. In October 2007, the
company was reported to have bribed 7,000 full time employees to resign and
re-join the company signing short-term contracts. It aimed to avoid unlimited
contract provisions under the new Labour Contract Law – the primary source
of labour law in China, which was issued on 1st January 2008, in order to push
domestic companies that did not apply labour contracts to their workers to
comply with China’s labour law – which would benefit most workers in the
company.4 In March 2008, an employee was reported to have jumped to his
death because of high stress in his work. This was the sixth employee to
commit suicide or die from exhaustion in the company.5 Meanwhile, other
4 China Labour Bulletin, 27th May 2008
5 Ibid.
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media reports revealed a common phenomenon in the internet industries –
karoshi, a Japanese term meaning to die of exhaustion, which will be
explained in Chapter Six.
These different stories about the Chinese internet industries and Chinese
internet workers suggest the need to question working life in the industries:
what is working life like in the Chinese internet industries? What is the quality
of their working-life experiences? And how do internet workers themselves
understand these experiences?
In recent years, cultural production and labour have been the subject of
considerable research (Kennedy 2010, Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010,
Banks 2010, Terranova 2004, Barbrook 2005, Gill and Pratt 2008, Oakley
2011, Garnham 2005, O’Connor 2000). Internet workers, like workers in the
cultural industries, carry out meaningful activities such as programming and
coding, designing and promoting, and some unskilled administrative work.
Some research in the field of creative labour or cultural production has paid
attention to internet workers (Gill 2002, Kennedy 2012). However, relatively
little research has paid attention to workers in the Chinese internet industries:
how they work and live in the industries and how they themselves understand
and evaluate their working life experiences.
As I shall discuss in section 1.2.2, internet workers have joined a big and
growing set of industries, yet the vast numbers of people working here have
not been studied. As an important part of the contemporary Chinese middle
class, internet workers are particularly highlighted here. This is based on a
number of reasons.
First, these contradictory media messages make it necessary to explore
what these workers’ working life like. As I showed above, some media reports
appreciated benefits of working in the internet industries, such as freedom and
autonomy, as well as the enjoyable working environment. However, some
media messages showed the poor working conditions in the industries, such
as some suicide cased resulted by high stress from the work. These
contradictory media reports address a necessity to look at the internet
industries in order to discuss how workers are living and working there.
Second, internet workers form an increasingly significant proportion of
workers in China. For example, the number of Chinese internet workers had
increased to 12.3 million by the end of 2009.6 However, this big group of
workers has not been studied in the academic field – it is hard to find an
academic report investigating these internet workers, such as their education
background, wages and working hours, etc. I will discuss this issue later in
section 1.2.2.
6 Liaoning Research Institute of Industry and Information Sciences 2013
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Third, the fast growth of the internet industries, and therefore the growing
importance of the internet workers, in China, addresses the necessity to
explore the working life. For example, in 2012, the annual internet market
value had reached 385.04 billion RMB (£38.5 billion), and according to a report
from Xinhua News, internet-related consumption of information and services
would be one of the biggest drivers of China’s economic growth in the next ten
years.7 The fast-growing industries thus become a new field for research to
explore Chinese economy and high technology. The emerging internet content
market – the internet industries I focus on in this research, also becomes a
significant field to discover Chinese political dynamics and cultural
transformation, which I will discuss later in section 1.2.2. Therefore, I argue
that it is necessary to explore the group of workers – who contribute to this fast
growth of the industries – the Chinese internet workers. I will say more about
the significant of the internet industries in China later in section 1.2.2.
Forth, it is important to focus on the internet workers, because these
workers – a significant part of the lower middle class (I will further discuss their
class location in Chapter Two) – are different from other Chinese middle class
members. For example, some of their acts have political motivations, such as
acts of negotiation with and resistance to the state and internet companies
regarding the low quality of working life and the desire to create a better online
space for ordinary Chinese people to speak out in, which I will introduce with
empirical data in section 1.2.2 and in Chapters Seven and Eight. Such
differences thus suggest a necessity to look at these internet workers’ acts of
agency and to ask where these acts come from.
This research, therefore, is an ethnographic study, of an active group of
Chinese internet producers, aiming to distinguish these particular kinds of
professional workers from general cultural/knowledge workers in other
geographical and political contexts by highlighting their particular working-life
experiences.
In order to examine the quality of these internet workers’ working-life
experiences, I conducted covert participant observation in a large internet
company, Grand, which provides online entertainment services, such as online
gaming and online novels. I also conducted fourteen interviews in Grand and
another internet company, Campus, which provides social networking services
(SNS). I was able to invite one of the interviewees from Campus to keep a
self-observational diary, according to a check list I provided him with. In order
to protect these participants, I use pseudonyms to refer to all participants in
this thesis.
Based on the data I collected via the methods listed above, I argue that
working conditions in the Chinese internet industries are not as good as some
7 Ibid
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media reports suggest, compared to conditions in other industries, such as
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) – most internet companies in China are not
state-owned. The quality of working life in Chinese internet industries is poor,
but internet workers are able to exercise acts of agency, such as negotiation
with and resistance to the state and internet companies, in order to gain a
better working life. Both the quality of working life and acts of worker agency
are assessed via a discussion of class problems, such as inequalities and
injustice between classes in contemporary Chinese society. I consider this in
the next chapter and argue that such discussion of the class problem in China,
although complicated and contradictory, is fundamental to understanding
working life in the internet industries.
In the following section, I illustrate the contexts for evaluating internet
workers’ subjective experiences: Chinese society and the Chinese internet
industries. In section 1.2, I introduce theoretical discussions of contemporary
Chinese society and the Chinese class structure. I focus on the Chinese
internet industries, where I explain why the internet industries, in particular
workers in the industries, are an important case for concern. I point out that the
internet industries have become a field for the emergence of new political
dynamics in contemporary Chinese society. It is because of these emerging
dynamics that we should pay attention to these particular industries, I argue. In
section 1.3, I highlight my research aims. I stress that this research is an
ethnographic study of daily working life experiences that expands upon
existing research into creative labour in other geographical contexts. In section
1.4, I outline the research questions that the thesis seeks to address. In
section 1.5, I explain the main arguments in Chapters Two to Eight.
1.2 The context of the study
1.2.1 Contemporary Chinese society
David Harvey (2005) defines neoliberalism as ‘a theory of political
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free
markets, and free trade’ (p.2). Some consider this concept highly relevant to
the introduction of market principles into the Chinese economy in the 1980s.
Some economists, such as Huang (2008), approve of this change, because
they consider that it improved social welfare. Mok and Lo (2007) claim that
‘the policy of decentralization and marketization being adopted to reform the
social policy domain has significantly reduced the state provision and financing
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in social service and social provision’ (p.2). In short, neoliberals appreciate the
reform and opening up policy because they believe it emancipates the Chinese
market and develops the Chinese economy. Zhang (2001) introduces several
cultural and economic issues in Chinese society in the 1990s to explore the
impact of neoliberalism. For example, he regards the economic reform in 1992,
when Deng Xiaoping visited southern China and proclaimed ‘Let some people
get rich first’, as the resumption of neoliberalism after its first shock in the
crackdown that occurred after the Tian’anmen Square Protests (the
student-led demonstration, which took place in the spring of 1989 in Beijing’s
Tian’anmen Square. It received various support from different social classes at
the time, such as the working class. But it was forcibly suppressed by the Party
leader, who ordered the military to suppress the protests).
Wang Hui (2003) writes that neoliberalism is problematic in the context of
China because it denies ‘the close relationship between the market and the
political process’ (p.100). He claims that the state plays a significant role in the
Chinese economic system, since the political system in China is highly
centralised. As Wang Jing (2008) suggests, the Chinese market is still
controlled by the ‘party-state’. Wang Hui (2003) enriches the concept of
neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics: it is ‘a combination of notions of
market extremism, neo-conservatism, and neo-authoritarianism’ (p.81). Here,
neoliberalism is understood to accelerate the process of delegating economic
and political power from the central government to regional governments in a
stable manner, to build an authority to guarantee the process of marketization,
as well as to help the retreat of the state in the process of globalisation.
Some scholars use the concept ‘crony capitalism’ (Andres 2010) or ‘crony
communism’ (Dickson 2003, 2008) to understand the close relations between
the Chinese state and the market. Andreas (2010) claims that contemporary
Chinese society is a ‘state-led urban decade’ (p.65). Dickson (2003, 2008)
unpacks the reliance of a capitalist economy on close relationships between
business and the state by the concept of crony communism. He argues that
crony communism in China is different from other contexts, because the
political hierarchy is dominated by all levels of officials, rather than a ruling
family or central leader as in other East Asian countries, such as Burma. As a
result, he calls ruling officials ‘red capitalists’, as many of them are involved in
the economic system: ‘many of the most wealthy entrepreneurs formerly held
high-level party and government posts, and some are even the offspring of
China’s leaders; a far larger number of private entrepreneurs are former
mid-level officials, or simply rank-and-file party members who did not hold
formal posts but left their previous jobs to go into business…’ (Dickson 2003:
4-5). Chinese crony communism is also distinctive because capitalists emerge
from the bureaucracy: ‘those who were co-opted into the party after
demonstrating their entrepreneurial skills and business success’ (ibid.).
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Some theorists choose postmodernity and postsocialism, rather than
crony capitalism, as key concepts by which to understand contemporary
Chinese society. For example, Zhang (2008) argues that the theoretical
description of contemporary Chinese society could not neglect the ‘mutual
determination of the Chinese nation-state and the global capitalist economy in
the specific Chinese context’ (p.13). According to Zhang (2008), crony
capitalism is a good term for the entanglement of Chinese state and market;
but the concepts of postmodernism and postsocialism usefully supplement it
by focusing on the intimate connection between, on the one hand, the place of
the Chinese mixed economy in the global capitalist economy, and on the other,
social transformation and new cultural forms.
Such discussion of the Chinese context is helpful to grasp a sense of what
contemporary Chinese society looks like, and is a useful way to understand
the background to people’s working-life experiences. Some of the discussion
also has a bearing on the quality of working life. But, as I stressed earlier, it is
also important to discuss class structure as a fundamental issue in exploring
Chinese working life.
Some theorists (Andreas 2008, So 2003, Zhang 2000) argue that Chinese
class structure became complicated after 1992, because the middle class and
working class expanded and a new bureaucratic capitalist class emerged
based on the close relationships between cadres (party members who hold
managerial positions in party and government) and capitalists. Additionally,
present in the Chinese social hierarchy in the post-1992 period were various
other classes, ‘between’ these three classes (the working class, the middle
class, and the bureaucratic capitalist class), such as the petty bourgeoisie and
small employers. This very complex social class structure can only be
adequately understood in historical perspective; in Chapter Two, I attempt to
situate it in such a historical context.
In addition to a complex social structure, the Chinese context is also
special due to the particular importance of personalised networks (guanxi) in
society. Bian (2002: 107-108) claims that guanxi facilitate all aspects of
occupations in the Chinese context: from entry into a job to internal mobility at
work. He argues that guanxi benefit guanxi users by promoting job
opportunities to them, whilst constraining people who are ‘poorly positioned in
the networks of social relationships’ (p.107). Gold et al (2002: 3-20) argue that
guanxi is an essential factor of Chinese culture, which relates to some
important issues in Chinese society, such as ‘ganqing (sentiment), renqing
(human feelings), mianzi (face), and bao (reciprocity)’ (p.4). These issues are
indeed important for understanding guanxi. For example, Gold et al (2002)
argue that ganqing cultivates guanxi, which gives the intrinsic enjoyment of the
ongoing personal relationship to people and successfully ‘creates a basis of
trust in a relationship’ (p.8). Renqing refers to the exchange of favours (The
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word renqing is a Chinese term to refer to a good turn or a favour for someone,
rather than human feelings in the authors’ translation). Mianzi is an effective
result or ‘symbolic capital’ (p.7) of the successful practice of guanxi. Bao refers
to the return in social relations (The word bao in fact is huibao, if the authors
explains it as reciprocity). It is widely believed in China that it is necessary to
have relatives as officials in order to work in SOEs and civil services, as people
from ordinary families have fewer chances of promotion in these sectors.
However, according to my interviewees, workers in the Chinese internet
industries seem to have simpler social networks than those in other industries.
For example, it is not necessary for the workers to socialise with colleagues
and superiors after work, such as going to pubs or restaurants, in order to gain
the chance of promotion. Workers can get by with simpler and more limited
social networks in the industries. Technical workers (often known as geeks, in
China as in Britain and North America, a slang term used to describe people
heavily interested in technologies – prefer to focus on technological innovation
rather than socialising. Their simpler social networks are partly a result of the
intense and long working hours undergone by technical workers. There is little
time and energy for socialising.
This raises the question: are the growing Chinese industries less
influenced by guanxi than older industries? Do they provide more opportunities
for workers? Can internet workers with weak guanxi do as well as those with
strong guanxi? The answers to these questions are not as simple as yes or no.
I answer these questions with data from the two internet companies in Chapter
Five.
1.2.2 A field for the emergence of new political
dynamics
The internet market can be divided into four parts: the hardware market
(including companies producing computer hardware, such as Apple); the
software market – including companies producing computer software, such as
Microsoft; the service market – including companies providing internet services,
such as Google; and the content market – including companies producing
contents or converging contents provided by internet users, such as Facebook.
The internet industries I focus on in this research, are part of the emerging
content market, like Facebook and YouTube, and Chinese equivalents like
Weibo and Youku, which accumulate massive economic and cultural capital by
providing online content.
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Whilst there is clearly a close relationship between the hardware market,
software market, service market and the online content market, the online
content market differs from other parts of the internet market. The online
market is considered an important online field to discover social problems and
seek transformations in the Chinese context. The production and accumulation
of capital in the internet industries is similar to the cultural industries, such as
music, performing arts, TV, film, design and architecture: capital is produced
via artistic resources, knowledge, and skills, and it is accumulated via labour
efforts. But the internet industries are distinct in terms of production forms.
First, production in the internet industries is based on the integration of
information flows and social networks. Second, internet users—once
distinguished from internet workers and outside the production process—are
to some extent absorbed into the production process, by sharing and creating
online content. Third, the production process is not only based on artistic
resources and knowledge, but also on advanced technologies.
The Chinese internet content market has developed exponentially since
the end of 2002, when the market was revived from the dot-com crash in 2001.
At that time, some portals in the industries, such as Sina, Netease and Sohu
began to make profits and lead the market into a golden era. In 2003, the
market was developed with the blooming of varied content services, such as
search engines (Baidu), online gaming (SNDA), instant messaging (Tencent),
and online commerce (Alibaba). In 2012, the annual market value had reached
385.04 billion RMB (£38.5 billion), an increase of 54.1% from 2011 (iResearch
2013). By contrast, in 2012, the annual investment in Chinese real estate,
which was evaluated as an overheating industry by most Chinese media, was
7180.40 billion RMB (£718.04), only 18 times more than the internet industries
(Xinhua news 2013). Some indication of the size of the Chinese internet
industries is provided in Figure 1.4.
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Figure 1.4: What happens in Chinese internet industries in 60 seconds?
Source: translated from <What happens in Chinese internet industries
in 60 seconds>, http://it.sohu.com/20130322/n369907395.shtml
The capital accumulation enabled by this growth largely depends on the
labour efforts of internet workers, and huge numbers of workers are involved in
the production process. The number of Chinese internet workers had
increased to 12.3 million by the end of 2009.8 Little academic attention has
been paid to these workers. We know little about their practices and
experiences, or their educational background, socioeconomic status, and
social locations. In order to fill this gap, this thesis provides ethnographic
research on internet workers. However, before discussing the working lives of
internet workers, it is important to recognise that the internet industries have
become a field for the emergence of new political dynamics in contemporary
Chinese society, which influences the working life in certain ways.
The tendency to ‘learn from the West’ has been found in Chinese society
for more than a century. In the late Qing dynasty, an official, Wei Yuan, first
pointed out the idea of learning from the West, with a dictum ‘learn about the
8 Liaoning Research Institute of Industry and Information Sciences, 21st January 2013
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advantageous skills of the barbarians in order to deal with them’ (shi yi zhi
changji yi zhi yi) (Wang 2000: 34). But it was only in 1978, when Deng
Xiaoping, the leader of Chinese market reform, issued the reform and
opening-up policy, that China officially opened its door to the West, and the
West’s influence on Chinese society – such as the individualisation of culture –
deepened.
Influenced by the West in certain ways, the current Chinese
individualisation process is characterised by the ‘management of the
party-state’ (Yan 2009: 290) and ‘the absence of cultural democracy, a welfare
state regime and classic individualism’ (ibid.), yet the results of
individualisation are more or less the same in different geographical and
political contexts: individuals are living in a precarious and fluid environment
where they are encouraged to be self-reliant and able to deal with risks and
uncertainties. As some writers have suggested, this is part of a problematic set
of developments in modern societies. Ross (2005), for example, is critical of
how individuals are required to shoulder uncertainty, risk and precariousness
in post-industrial societies, such as the USA and China.
The individual shouldering of risk and precariousness has permeated
contemporary Chinese society: the government encourages rapid growth of
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) by reducing social benefits. As a result, there
has been a large-scale migration of peasants into cities. These peasant
workers survive without land, which historically supported their lives. Business
organisations seek economic profits at the expense of the environment;
universities are denigrated because of the low employment status of their
graduates, and, because of their low salaries, teachers in universities are
forced to take part in business rather than focus on research; and workers
have lost their iron rice bowl (tie fanwan) – a Chinese term to describe an
occupation with steady income and benefits, and guaranteed job security –
which had been guaranteed since Mao’s era, and now are pushed into the fluid
labour market with flexible work contracts and few social benefits. As Ross
(2005) points out, almost overnight, Chinese workers’ lives have suddenly
jumped from an iron rice bowl to an uncertain and precarious market.
Admittedly, the Chinese economy has seen rapid growth. Foreign
investors have rushed into the Chinese market since China’s accession to the
WTO (World Trade Organisation) in 2001. However, social problems and
tensions are generated from the ongoing economic reform: inequality between
the rich and poor has got worse, and there are more cases of injustice
between the bureaucratic capitalists and workers. Chun (2006) distinguishes
Chinese socialism from utopian socialism and Marxist socialism because of
the inequalities in contemporary Chinese society. These inequalities surround
issues of class location and regional economy: huge gaps exist between the
rich and the poor, between rural peasants and urban workers, and between
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the working class and bourgeoisie. Zhang (2001: 10-12) points out that the
distribution of wealth in contemporary Chinese society is unequal,
notwithstanding the rapid overall economic growth: ‘more than 80 percent of
national private savings are in the hands of a tiny nouveau riche class who
likely drive government-supplied cars, live in multiple, over-subsidised housing,
hold foreign bank accounts, and yet, despite their lavish spending, rarely help
the national economy’ (p.12), and, in contrast, ‘more and more urban dwellers
no longer can afford health care and education for their children, not to
mention rural dwellers — still comprising more than 70 percent of the Chinese
population — who are left to fend for themselves’ (ibid.). Compared with the
economic boom, politics, especially large-scale social movements, such as the
Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, and the Tian’anmen Square
Protests in 1989, seem to have exited from the stage of Chinese history.
The internet industries occupy a unique position in this new Chinese
context. They serve as an essential case study for understanding the rapid
economic development and the precarious work status in the economic boom,
and through which to discuss the new political dynamics in contemporary
China. The new political dynamics here are different to both the large-scale
social movements in Chinese history (the Cultural Revolution and the
Tian’anmen Square Protests) and the democratisation process in
contemporary Western countries (Europe and the USA). As Qiu (2009) points
out, the bottom-up techno-social dynamics under structural constraints are the
important political power in contemporary Chinese society, which has the
potential to initiate social changes in the future. He argues that the main
problem of studying contemporary Chinese society is to understand ‘class
formation, collective identity, and political power under the structural
parameters of a large, developing country’ (p.7). The bottom-up techno-social
dynamics show the emergence and formation of a new working class, which
consists of the subordinate people in society, who are named the ‘information
have-less’ (a term I will discuss in detail in the next chapter) in his work. This
new lower class mobilises low-cost ICTs (Information and Communications
Technologies) to exercise a bottom-up political power under the structural
constraints of society. Here, I argue that such bottom-up political power is
evident in the internet industries, as they serve as a space for ordinary
Chinese people to speak out against the contemporary structural constraints.
It has been widely acknowledged that the structural constraints in China
are a result of the strong power of the party-state. Ross (2005) shows the
various impacts of the Chinese state on the IT industries (the hardware
market). For example, he points out that Shanghai Pudong Software Park – a
national software base and software export base in Shanghai, which has a
large number of domestic and foreign software enterprises, such as Infosys
from India and SAP from Germany – is the result of the collaboration between
Shanghai local government and the information industries, as the local
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government attracts investments by tax exemptions and low rents. The same
collaboration can be found in the case of Beijing Zhongguancun Science Park
– a technology hub in Beijing, which is named ‘China’s Silicon Valley’ – where
similar policies were applied in the mid-1990s. Due to this, the Chinese state is
involved in the techno-social transformation process in varied ways: it modifies
the market by developing intellectual property rights and promoting technical
standards; it incubates new enterprises and attracts foreign investments by
issuing new policies; and it stimulates the labour market by connecting firms to
universities and training students.
Likewise, in the internet industries, the state intervenes with certain
policies, but it also intervenes by surveilling, censoring and controlling internet
users’ online speech and activities, in order to avoid any speech and practice
against the state and the Party. For example, at the end of 2011, the Beijing
government issued a policy entitled ‘Several Provisions of the Beijing
Municipality on the Administration and Development of Microblog in Beijing’
(Beijingshi weiboke fazhan guanli ruogan guiding)9 to force Internet users
registering for microblog platforms to use their real names and identity cards,
in order to control Internet users’ online activities. Such policies indicate strong
intervention by the state in the newly developing internet industries. However,
it is not simply the case that such policies operate without resistance and
negotiation from workers and citizens.
As the sector develops at high speed, the internet is increasingly
recognised as an important space for freedom and resistance in contemporary
Chinese society, because it permits certain kinds of autonomy for ordinary
Chinese people. Take microblogging services as an example: ordinary
Chinese people are given more chances to discuss public issues and push the
state to improve public services in this new space. For example, on the 23rd
July 2011, two high-speed trains collided in the suburb of Wenzhou, Zhejiang
Province, China. Several hundred people were injured or died in the accident
and it was the first high-speed train crash in China. Officials at the Ministry of
Railways blamed the crash on technological problems and hastily ordered the
derailed cars to be buried, which elicited strong criticism from Chinese people,
both online and offline. As a response, the government restricted media
coverage, but could not control the online forums where much debate was
taking place. Eventually, the online criticism, such as criticism in microblog
platforms, forced some officials in the Ministry of Railways to resign. Such
online practices have led to a change in government strategies. At the same
time, local governments have also been pushed to be transparent about
certain issues, with over 10,000 local government departments setting up
microblog accounts to make their services transparent.10 In such new media
9 Beijing Municipality, 16th December 2011
10 China National Information Infrastructure, 11th January 2011
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events, the internet industries open a new space and provide new chances for
ordinary Chinese people’s freedom of speech, which indicates a bottom-up
political power in the current structural constraints.
Indeed, the bottom-up political power in China centres on pursuing a
society with equal chances and just social benefits for ordinary Chinese people.
As Qiu (2009) concludes, the techno-social transformation in contemporary
Chinese society opens up the rare chance for people at the bottom to achieve
equality and justice. I argue that the internet workers play an important and
positive role in this transformation for ordinary Chinese people. I will further
discuss this potential in Chapter Eight.
In the special context of Chinese society, and more specifically, the
Chinese internet industries, this research has three main aims. First, I seek to
critically understand the Chinese internet industries by assessing the daily
working experiences and practices of the people who create the industries.
Second, I intend to expand the present discussions of creative labour and
cultural labour, especially surrounding internet workers (Gill 2002). The third
aim is to enrich present discussions by more fully recognising the agency of
internet workers. I discuss these three aims in more detail below.
1.3 Research aims
My first aim is to be concerned with the people who work in? the internet
industries, which have economically, culturally and politically changed Chinese
society. Compared to many everyday discussions of new media, which have
fetishized internet work as a cool, well paid and prestigious job, I seek to open
a space for these internet workers to talk about and evaluate their own
working-life experiences. I adopt a critical perspective to explore these
subjective experiences. I think that such critical discussion of the working life
can contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese internet
industries. The significant growth of the industries has not brought good
working conditions and justice to the people who created them. It is important
to recognise the quality of working life in the industries, because it relates to a
large number of people’s well-being.
As I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, much research pays
attention to cultural labour, and internet workers in particular (Kennedy 2012,
Leung 2008, Gill 2007, Christopherson 2004, Neff et al. 2005, Ross 2005), in
different geographical and political contexts, such as the UK (Kennedy 2012),
the USA (Christopherson 2004, Neff et al. 2005), the Netherlands (Gill 2007),
and China (Ross 2005). But existing research has not yet paid attention to
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workers in the Chinese internet content industries,11 who contribute to the
capital accumulation (both economic capital and cultural capital) in the internet
industries and in society. Therefore, this study of Chinese internet workers’
daily experiences and practices offers the possibility to expand the present
discussions of internet workers.
The Chinese internet workers’ experiences and practices are important,
because they suffer difficult working conditions. Although the internet
industries have experienced a rapid growth both economically and culturally,
little attention has been paid to the poor working conditions found there.
However, I recognise that Chinese internet workers show their negotiation and
resistance towards the difficult working conditions via their daily practices.
They also aspire to certain internet idealisms – such as benefiting vulnerable
communities via their products and opening new spaces for ordinary Chinese
people to speak out, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven – via their daily
practices of resistance and negotiation. These acts of agency expand the
present discussions of worker agency, by linking traditional perspectives
approaching worker agency (such as the sociological approach), to new media
workers’ practices that take place in both the workplace and in society.
1.4 Research questions
The main research question of this study is:
What is the quality of working life in the Chinese internet industries?
The subsidiary questions are as follows:
(1) What are the main features of working life in Chinese internet industries?
(2) What is internet workers’ class location in Chinese society?
(3) To what extent do internet workers suffer injustice and inequality in their
working lives, and why?
(4) How do the workers themselves understand these experiences?
(5) To what extent do the state and companies seek to control workers?
(6) To what extent can we describe workers’ experiences as exploitation?
(7) What are the responses of workers to the state and companies’ control?
(8) Why do workers work in the industries, despite the difficult working
conditions?
In order to answer these questions, I interviewed fourteen workers from
two internet companies, Campus and Grand. I also participated in the work in
Grand to observe how internet workers work and live. I was aware that it was
11 Ross deals with Chinese high-tech workers, rather than workers in the internet
content market, as this thesis focusing on.
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also important to observe workers’ daily working life in Campus, but due to the
difficulty of access and the limited budget and time of my research, I did not do
another participant observation there. As an alternative, I invited a worker in
Campus to conduct self-observation – he recorded his daily working life
according to a check list I provided him with.
1.5 Summary of the thesis
I divide the following seven chapters into four parts: Chapter Two will
provide a theoretical background, in which I locate internet workers in the
lower middle class, and build up a framework of understanding exploitation in
the Chinese context, especially in the internet industries. I argue that internet
workers, as part of the lower middle class in society, face the problem of
proletarianisation, which stresses their difficult working conditions. I also argue
that a neo-Marxian approach to exploitation, applied in such a way that takes
into account both economic factors and non-economic practices in the
production process, needs to be applied in order to understand the forces
behind the internet workers’ subjective experiences. Meanwhile, I also develop
a framework to discuss the agency of internet workers, in a way that in some
respects challenges or qualifies theories of exploitation. Chapter Three is the
methodological chapter, which explains how I designed and conducted my
research, and clarifies some ethical issues.
Chapters Four to Seven are the empirical chapters, which discuss
workers’ subjective experiences in the industries. In Chapter Four, I discuss
workers’ working hours and tensions to claim that most workers in the
industries are not well rewarded for their hard work. In Chapter Five, I talk
about workers’ subjective experiences of autonomy, in order to acknowledge
what autonomy means to them, and to what extent they pursue autonomy.
This chapter echoes some research concerning creative labour by discussing
whether such cultural-related work (work in the internet industries) is ‘good
work’ because it provides a certain space and freedom for creativity and
innovation. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) for example, define high levels of
autonomy as one characteristic of good work. In Chapter Six, I point out the
risks and precariousness of working life in the internet industries. I argue that
the rapid growth of the Chinese internet industries and the Chinese economy,
have led to an unsafe and precarious working life. Internet workers are
exploited by being forced to shoulder responsibilities, which had previously
belonged to companies and the state. Chapter Seven illustrates workers’
responses to this exploitation, which includes workers’ practices of negotiation
with and resistance to companies and the state. I argue that this indicates
certain agents initiated from the humanistic account of workers. Chapter Eight
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is the conclusion, where I discuss my findings in light of the debates about
Chinese social problems and tensions. I argue that there is the possibility that
workers’ practices in the internet industries are regarded as part of the
emerging bottom-up power in contemporary Chinese social hierarchy, which
has the potential to initiate social transformation in the future.
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Chapter Two: Framework for evaluating working life
2.1 Structure of this chapter
In the last chapter, I introduced the contexts for evaluating working life in
the Chinese internet industries, and highlighted my research aims. This
chapter now develops a theoretical and conceptual framework for examining
the empirical data discussed in Chapters Four to Eight. This framework begins
with a discussion of social class, in which I clarify the class analysis approach
adopted in this study, and provide a historical discussion of the Chinese class
structure, and an analysis of the Chinese middle class. I locate internet
workers in the lower middle class position, and point out that this class face the
problem of proletarianisation. I argue that the discussion of the class problem
in Chinese society is the basis of understanding important terms of exploring
the working life in Chinese internet industries, such as exploitation and
domination. Thus, in section 2.3, I introduce Marx, because of his fundamental
contribution to the understanding of labour and work. His concept of
exploitation directs my attention to the fact that the labour efforts of many
people in the Chinese internet industries are appropriated by the state and
firms – and therefore by the bureaucratic capitalist class. However, as
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) remind us, Marx was not a sociologist, and
his main concern was not analysing workers’ subjective experiences. Thus, a
Weberian approach and a neo-Marxist approach to analysing exploitation
follow in section 2.4, in order to develop my own approach to understanding
working life in the Chinese internet industries. In section 2.5, I specify how
exploitation might be understood in the Chinese context, aiming to build up my
normative framework for evaluating experiences of working life in the Chinese
internet industries. In section 2.6, this framework is developed by using the
following elements: work effort, security, and autonomy. In section 2.7, the
agency of internet workers, is explored as a part of working life. This
framework including work efforts, security, autonomy and agency, which I later
apply to my empirical findings, aiming to arrive at some conclusions about the
quality of working life of Chinese internet workers, and hopefully to recognise a
potential that might lead both to reform of the Chinese internet industries and a
better China; by this I mean improved working conditions in the internet
industries and the creation of a certain free space for ordinary Chinese people
to speak out via the internet.
As suggested above, the social class of the internet workers closely
relates to their quality of working life in the industries, because their class
location is the basis to understanding the notion of exploitation. Therefore,
below I introduce the Chinese class structure from a historical perspective.
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2.2 Social class
As Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 67-69) point out, it is complicated to
consider the class location of cultural producers, because of the complex
constitution of this group, which includes managers, professionals and
unskilled workers carrying out routine tasks. They suggest considering the
problem of creative workers’ class location via Erik Olin Wright’s work on ‘the
problem of the “middle class”— people who do not own their own means of
production, who sell their labour power on a labour market, and yet do not see
themselves as part of the “working class”’ (p.67). As with any cultural
industry, 12 there are different classes working together in the internet
industries, and these groups are likely to have very different working conditions
and experiences. Workers in the internet industries include managers (such as
executives), professionals (such as technical workers, HR (Human Resources),
and engineers) and unskilled workers (such as cleaners). Therefore, it is
necessary to clarify the approach I adopt to analyse the internet workers’ class
location.
2.2.1 The class analysis approach
Erik Olin Wright (2009) illustrates three approaches relevant to class
analysis: one is stratification research, which defines classes with ‘the
attributes and material life conditions of individuals’ (p.102); the Weberian
approach, which centres on ‘the ways in which social positions afford some
people control over economic resources while excluding others’ (ibid.); and the
Marxist approach, which regards classes as ‘being structured by mechanisms
of domination and exploitation, in which economic positions accord some
people power over the lives and activities of others’ (ibid.).
The stratification approach focuses on class background, which consists
of attributes such as sex, race, religion, age, education, and material life
conditions, which refers to adequate income, dire poverty, and pleasant
suburban houses. This approach identifies the middle class as people who
‘have enough education and money to participate fully in the vaguely defined
“mainstream” way of life (which might include particular consumption patterns,
for example)’ (p.103). But, as Wright acknowledges, this approach lacks
serious consideration of the injustice and inequalities between different social
positions, such as why some jobs are better than others.
12 Some may argue internet industries as the information technology industries, the
‘neighbouring industries’ of cultural industries.
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The Weberian approach focuses on the unequal ‘opportunity hoarding’
(p.104), which highlights the restricted access to certain positions. For
example, high levels of education are restricted to the upper classes, because
of the high tuition fees. Good education then further benefits the upper classes,
as it usually relates to good jobs. In other words, unequal locations within
market relations are causally connected to unjust opportunity hoarding among
different social positions. According to Wright (2009), this approach is usually
adopted by sociologists to analyse American society, where the middle class is
defined by ‘mechanisms of exclusion over the acquisition of education and
skills’ (p.106). In Wright’s discussion, the Weberian approach has a critical
difference to the stratification approach, as it indicates that ‘the economic
advantages gained from being in a privileged class position are causally
connected to the disadvantages of those excluded from such positions’ (ibid.).
Put simply, the upper class’s economic advantages are causally related to the
lower class’s disadvantages.
The Marxist approach focuses on mechanisms of exploitation and
domination. Unequal opportunity hoarding does not only involve restricted
access to certain positions and resources, but also depends on the ability of
the exploiting/dominating group to control the labour of the
exploited/dominated group. Put simply, this approach highlights ‘an ongoing
relationship between not only the conditions but also the activities of the
advantaged and disadvantaged’ (p.108). The traditional Marxist approach
distinguishes three class locations based on ownership of means of production:
the capitalist class, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class.
Some theorists have argued against this Marxist approach to class
locations, stating that the working class has diminished or even disappeared in
capitalism, especially the manual working class, which only occupies a small
part of the workforce, and that white-collar workers are already in the position
of the middle class. However, Callinicos (1983: 193-195) is among those who
claim that many people still occupy the position of the working class, even
though they are not engaged in manual labour in the way that most workers in
Marx’s industrial capitalism were. For example, because of the industrialisation
of office work, clerical workers are doing similar work to manual workers and
suffering from a similar working condition to manual workers, with the massive
introduction of new technologies. Therefore, they are in the same position as
the working class, as manual labourers, because they are ‘compelled to sell
their labour-power in order to live’ (p.193), even if they do non-manual work.
As a result, Callinicos argues that the change in class location and class
relations since Marx’s period is ‘a shift in the structure of the working class, not
its abolition’ (p.195). In later work, Callinicos (2004) introduces Wright’s work
on class to explain the fragmentation of class structure in contemporary
capitalism. As Wright (1985) argues, class locations in modern capitalism are
contradictory, as some positions share properties of both labour and capital,
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notably the middle class. For example, managers perform some functions of
capital by directing others’ work, but still sell their labour-power in order to live.
In his book Classes, Wright (1985) explicitly introduced his framework of
contradictory class locations and fragmented class structure. He argued that
Marxist criteria for class are an approximate framework for class structure in
capitalism, rather than an elaborated classification. He then develops a much
more complex typology of class in capitalism, but still based on ownership and
non-ownership of the means of production. Among these non-owners, their
locations are divided by organisation and skill/credential assets. The class
locations of wage labourers in a capitalist society are classified into expert
managers, non-managerial experts, and non-skilled managers, etc. Wright
(1996) further modified this typology of class locations in his later work by
specifying three dimensions that clarify class relations: property, authority, and
expertise/skill. The property dimension consists of employers, the petty
bourgeoisie, and employees; the authority dimension is divided into managers,
supervisors, and non-managerial employees; and the expertise/skill dimension
contains professionals, skilled employees, and non-skilled employees (p.704).
The latter is where questions of symbol making and manipulation, crucial to
understanding the information technology industries (and the cultural
industries) come in.
Wright (2009) aims to move beyond the traditional Marxist approach to
class analysis by developing a detailed typology of class locations. He
identifies certain key aspects that constitute the new class structure of his
model: the mechanism of exploitation and domination in the traditional Marxist
approach, the mechanisms that sustain the privileges of advantaged classes in
the Weberian approach, and the individuals’ class locations in the stratification
approach. He argues that a completely elaborated class analysis needs to
combine the ‘macro-model of conflict and transformation with the macro-micro,
multi-level model of class processes and individual lives’ (p.111) (see Figure
2.1). Put in another way, Wright argues that individuals’ lives depend not only
on the micro-model of attributes and material life conditions, but also on the
macro-model of social conflicts and transformations where their lives take
place.
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Figure 2.1: Combined class analysis: macro and micro processes
Source: Wright 2009, p.111
Wright’s work (2009) then suggests a necessity to analyse class locations
by locating individuals’ lived experiences, such as ‘class background’, in the
context of social conflicts and transformations. It is no longer the problem of
individuals who fill these positions, but rather, it is important to recognise the
mechanisms shaping the privilege of certain class positions. As Wright points
out, the middle class problem is not who is excluded from the position, but is
the fact that ‘there are mechanisms of exclusion that sustain the privileges of
those in middle-class positions’ (p.109). Likewise, I adopt an approach that is
similar to Wright’s, which combines both the macro model of transformation
and the macro-micro model of individual lives. It is not my interest to just
identify the scope of the Chinese middle class, by clarifying who is excluded
from the position; rather, my aim here is to recognise the important and unique
positions of internet workers in the general Chinese social structure, and to
clarify the mechanisms that sustain and change their unique positions
(probably privileged positions) in the Chinese context, by assessing workers’
subjective experiences.
As Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) point out, discussing the class
location of creative workers is quite complex, because of the varied
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occupations of these workers. Indeed it becomes more complicated to
consider the internet workers’ class location in the Chinese context, not only
because the workers occupy various locations, but also because of the
transformation of the Chinese social structure over the centuries. For this
reason, I discuss the historical changes of occupations and class locations in
Chinese society in the next section.
2.2.2 The Chinese class structure
As far back as the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BC), occupations in feudal
Chinese society were divided into four categories: gentry and scholars (shi),
peasants (nong), artisans and craftsmen (gong), and merchants and traders
(shang). This represents a hierarchical order in Chinese society, where certain
occupations have a higher social status than others, because unequal power
relations give some groups greater control over economic resources. The
gentry and scholars occupied the highest social status, with peasants, artisans
and craftsmen in the middle, and merchants at the bottom of the hierarchy. In
the four occupations, it was only the shi that were educated and controlled the
information of the imperial government, which enabled them to be the
bureaucratic stratum.
Globally, peasants are often regarded as the lowest class in the social
hierarchy, and this is reflected in contemporary Chinese society. But, in
ancient China, peasants were highly regarded because of their skills in
cultivating lands, which provided food to all other classes. However, most of
them did not own the lands. The artisans and craftsmen (gong) were regarded
as an important class in the hierarchy because they provided basic skills and
labour for production. Artisans and craftsmen were known for being
experienced in producing goods and crafts, which were essential for social
development. Merchants and traders (shang) were the lowest class in the
social hierarchy. Although the shang were an essential part of Chinese society,
they were distrusted and despised by the public, especially by the shi.
Put simply, in feudal Chinese society, social hierarchy was divided by the
ownership of certain property and skills. The shi occupied the top of the
hierarchy because they owned knowledge and land; the nong and the gong
were in the middle of the hierarchy because they owned basic skills, such as
being able to cultivate land produce crafts, and labour; and the shang were
despised because they lacked these basic skills and had no property. These
occupations were inherited from fathers to sons, which made it difficult for
individuals to move from one occupation to another. This stable, class-divided
society existed in China for around two thousand years, even though the
dynasties changed.
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Figure 2.2: Social hierarchy in feudal Chinese society
This social order remained largely unchanged until 1949, when Mao
announced that ‘The Chinese people have stood up’. Here, ‘the Chinese
people’ in Mao’s statement were ordinary Chinese people, especially the nong
and gong, who occupied the social location of the shi from 1949. As Mao
claimed, all Chinese labourers were proletariat, and faced exploitation from
‘the three big mountains’ (sanzuo dashan): the bureaucratic stratum – the shi;
capitalists – the shang; and imperialists – the Western invaders since the end
of the Qing Dynasty. In other words, at the beginning of Mao’s era, peasants
and manual workers became the most powerful class in the social hierarchy,
as they owned the essential skills for reconstructing a new China. Individuals’
class locations were still historically inherited: if a person’s father and
grandfather were manual workers, then he would be located in the ‘proletariat’,
with a job as a manual worker. This system of inherited individuals’ class
locations and occupations peaked in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),
when individuals were categorised based on their family backgrounds.
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Figure 2.3: Social hierarchy in Chinese society from 1949 to 1965
Bian (2002) summarises the Chinese social structure in the pre-reform
period (1949-1978) according to four characteristics: ‘(a) a rural-urban divide in
residential status, (b) a state-collective dualism in economic structure, (c) a
cadre-worker dichotomy in occupational classification, and (d) a
“revolution-antirevolution” split in political-characterisation’ (p.92-93). The
fourth point particularly refers to the special social hierarchy during the Cultural
Revolution, when all individuals were politically divided into Five Categories of
Red Elements (Hongwulei) and Five Categories of Black Elements (Heiwulei).
The former comprised workers (Gongren), poor peasants (Pinxia zhongnong),
revolutionary cadres (Gemin Ganbu), revolutionary soldiers (Gemin Junren)
and revolutionary martyrs (Geming Lieshi). The latter was comprised of
landlords (Dizhu), rich peasants (Funong), counterrevolutionists (Fangeming
Fenzi), bad elements (Huaifenzi) and rightists (Youpai Fenzi). Intellectuals and
artists were categorised into the Five Categories of Black Elements (Heiwulei),
and in comparison, the privileged position of manual workers meant they were
categorised into the Five Categories of Red Elements (Hongwulei). Millions of
individuals were located in these differently coloured class positions and were
allocated to the respective coloured occupations based on their inherited
38
family backgrounds: the workers’ offspring held the occupation of workers, and
occupied the position of Hongwulei; whilst the rich peasants’ offspring were
located in the position of Heiwulei, and suffered from public humiliation and
seizure of property.
Figure 2.4: Social hierarchy in Chinese society from 1966 to 1976
This coloured class structure has changed since the reform period, which
started in the 1980s, when Deng’s reform and opening up policy was issued.
As Bian (2002) points out, the most significant changes from Mao’s era to
Deng’s reform era were in manual workers and intellectuals’ class locations.
The working class was regarded as the leading class in Mao’s era, whilst it
was separated into several parts during the market reform: ‘private-sector
wage labour’ (p.96), who were not guaranteed definite working hours, social
insurance and labour contracts; ‘unprotected labour in the state sector’, who
regarded themselves as proletarians; ‘layoff’ labour struggling in finding a job;
‘migrant peasant-labour’, who moved to the cities in large numbers to search
for jobs; and a large number of ‘collective-sector labour’ and ‘retired labour’
(ibid.). Intellectuals, most conducting mental work, were called ‘stinky old
ninths’ (chou lao jiu) and ranked in the Heiwulei in Mao’s era, were recognised
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as the middle class by Deng in 1979, during the beginning of the reform, which
gave the intellectuals a privileged position.
Zhang (2000) further differentiates the intellectuals’ social status from that
of the manual workers: in the post-reform period, mental workers (including
intellectuals) occupied more privileged class locations than the manual
workers, who were generally recognised as the working class, whilst their
locations were still lower than the cadre, who later transferred to become the
bureaucratic capitalists. It seemed that mental workers had privileged positions,
and were likely to be in the middle class in post-reformed Chinese society. At
this stage, individuals’ class locations were less influenced by their family
backgrounds, and it was possible to have a different class location from family
members. There was more free space for individuals to change their class
locations via different ownerships of skills and property.
Andreas (2008) pays particular attention to the transformation of social
classes in the post-Mao society. He claims that the reform era needs to be
discussed by paying attention to two particular periods, 1978-1992 and
post-1992, in order to clarify the change of class structure in Chinese society.
Andreas entitles the period from 1978 to 1992 ‘non-capitalist market economy’
(p.127), because the public sector, which was based on socialist production
relations, still dominated the economy. The significant transformation
happened in 1992, when privatisation became the theme of society: large
numbers of SOEs were sold to private owners, and millions of SOE workers
were laid off. The whole country entered the global capitalist market as the
world’s workshop, by offering cheap labour and resources; large amounts of
private sector businesses bloomed, whilst millions of peasants lost their land
and jobs. But the CCP still controlled the main resources, such as banking, oil,
steel, telecommunications and armaments, despite the large number of
privatised SOEs. Workers in these party-controlled enterprises (the new SOEs
after reform) still benefitted from the stable and high valued jobs.
So (2003) points out that the middle class expanded during this period,
with new corporate professional members, such as ‘mid-level managers and
accounts’ (p.366), and service professionals, such as ‘teachers and journalists’
(ibid.). The working class also expanded, with an increasing number of
peasant workers and temporary migrant workers. By contrast, a new dominant
class emerged during the process of privatisation of SOEs: cadres set up their
own businesses, which at times cooperated with foreign capitalists, by
usurping resources from SOEs where they had executive positions. Capitalists
also joined the existing structure using bribery to access to the market and
gain resources. Since then, a new bureaucratic capitalist class has emerged.
The new partnerships between cadres and capitalists enabled the new private
sectors to ‘save on the additional costs of pension schemes, health and
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welfare insurance, environmental protection facilities’ (p.368), which ultimately
led to the deterioration of working conditions in these private enterprises.
Figure 2.5: Social hierarchy in Chinese society after 1980s
Put simply, in the post-1992 period, the middle class and working class
expanded, and a new bureaucratic capitalist class emerged based on the
close relationships between cadres and capitalists. This bureaucratic capitalist
class had a more privileged class location than others, because of its
ownership of economic resources and political authority. Also, present in the
Chinese social hierarchy in the post-1992 period were various other classes,
between these three classes, such as the petty bourgeoisie and small
employers. The class typology in the contemporary Chinese context is
complex, but the main social inequalities, one focus of this research, are
between the bureaucratic capitalist class, the middle class, and the working
class.
From a Weberian perspective, sociologists may state that unequal
opportunity hoarding – a social closure where the middle class have privileged
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access to economic resources – ultimately results in unequal locations within
market relations. However, in the Chinese context, the emergence of the new
bureaucratic capitalist class changes the argument: the huge wealth of this
class is not only based on the ownership of economic resources, but also
depends on control of others’ labour and skills; the political authority of this
class leads to its dominance over the middle class and the working class,
which enables its acquisition of economic benefits from the labour and skills of
others. For example, ‘joint enterprises’ (the association between officials and
capitalists), which are controlled by the bureaucratic capitalist class, benefit
from cheap labour and resources. This is the way the neo-Marxists approach
class and inequality: by not only focusing on the causal relationships between
unequal opportunity hoarding and unequal locations in the market, but also on
the domination and exploitation process. Here, I intend to focus on exploitation
and domination, as per the neo-Marxist approach, although I use some
Weberian concepts in the thesis.
This review of historical changes in the Chinese social structure
addresses some significant issues in discussing class locations in the Chinese
context: the influence of family background, the structural change of the middle
class and the working class, the emergence of the bureaucratic capitalist class,
and the privileged position of party-controlled enterprises. This then provides
the background to understand internet workers’ social class, and ultimately
leads to questions concerning the quality of their working life, based on a
neo-Marxist approach.
2.2.3 The Chinese middle class
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 68-69) place creative workers in a
middle class location, and reproduce the map of middle class locations based
on Wright’s work (see Figure 2.6), although they acknowledge that there are
various classes involved in creative labour. They claim that most creative
workers in the cultural industries occupy the lower-authority, higher-skilled
positions (such as skilled workers with little managerial powers).
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Figure 2.6: Elaborated class typology
Source: Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010, p.68
This map can only be partly applied to the Chinese case, because of the
specificity of Chinese class locations.
There is a debate amongst Chinese sociologists about the middle class in
China. Zhou (2008: 110-114) points out that such debate is due to a number of
factors. First, it is based on a misinterpretation by Chinese academia of the
English term ‘middle class’ – the Chinese translation of middle class
overemphasises the amount of assets owned and ignores the occupational
characteristics of middle class. Second, Chinese academia usually confuses
the term ‘middle class’ with ‘middle class society’. Zhou (2008: 114-117)
defines the modern Chinese middle class as a group of people with
middle-career positions,13 middle-incomes and middle-consumption practices.
According to these indexes of middle class, Zhou further claims that the
modern Chinese middle class includes ‘the owners of newly-born private and
township enterprises’; ‘other kinds of self-employed people like petty
proprietors and small trades people’; ‘some officials and intellectuals who
13 A term that is problematically used by the author refers to intellectual jobs.
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serve, directly or indirectly, the Party and the government, as well as the
leaders of state-owned enterprises’; ‘Chinese people who work in white-collar
and senior managerial occupations in joint ventures’; ‘managers of enterprises
and social organisations’; ‘high-income people working in the hi-tech
professions’ (p.115-116).
Zhou quotes a sample survey conducted in urban and rural China in 2003
to specify what is meant by middle-income in her definition, though she does
not give quantitative definitions of middle-consumption. In 2003, the annual
income of an individual in the middle class location was £1,000-£10,000. This
figure was updated by the famous business magazine, Forbes in 2010, when it
showed middle-income in Chinese society as £4,000- £40,000.14
Based on the large amount of research about Chinese middle class, Li
(2008) provides a table that includes the most significant research on the
modern Chinese middle class, as follows, which provides a context of
considering individuals’ position in the Chinese social hierarchy and the
population of Chinese middle class.
Year Author Publication Rate of
population
of middle
class in the
country
Index of
division
1997 Zhang
J., Hong
D. etc.
Zhongguo chengshi
zhongjian jieceng de
xianzhuang jiqi weilai
fazhan
- Education
level, income,
occupation
1999 Lu X. Shekeyuan xuezhe
chen 2020nian
zhongguo 1/3 shi
zhongchan
15% Occupation
2000 Xiao W. Zhongguo zhongjian
jieceng de xianzhuang
yu weilai fazhan
20-25% Income and
family-owned
properties
2001 Zhou X. Zhongguo zhongchan
jieji: xianzhuang yihuo
huanxiang
- Income,
occupation,
education
level
14 China Net, 2010
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2001 Li C. Duanlie yu suipian:
dangdai zhongguo
shehui jieceng fenhua
shizheng fenxi
4.1% Occupation,
income,
consumption,
identity
2003 Oxford
Analysis
Zhongguo: zhongchan
jieji
4.5% Income
2004 Liu Y. Zhongchan jieji de
jieding fangfa ji
shizheng cedu – yi
zhujiangsanjiaozhou
wei li
- Income,
occupation,
consumption
2005 Li Q. Guanyu zhongchan jieji
de lilun yu xianzhuang
15% Occupation
2006 Li P. Zhongguo zhongchan
jieji de guimo he renting
32.9% Occupation,
income,
education
level
2007 Lu X. Shekeyuan xuezhe
chen 2020nian
zhongguo 1/3 shi
zhongchan
22-23% Occupation
Table 2.1 Literature on modern Chinese middle class
Source: translated from Li 2008, p.3
Such figures provide some indices for considering Chinese internet
workers’ location in social hierarchy – for example, most internet workers have
good education background, occupy intellectual positions, and have
middle-level income, which fit most conditions in table 2.1 (I will say more
about internet workers’ job types and wages in section 2.2.4). However, Wang
(2006) points out that class in China does not rely on ownership of property
and means of production, but rather, is a political issue that depends on ‘the
revolutionary party’s appeal for mobilization and self-renewal’ (p.36). The
concept indicates ‘the attitudes of social or political forces toward revolutionary
politics’ (ibid.), instead of ‘the structural situation of social class’ (ibid.). This
approach is not adopted in this research; rather, as I stated earlier, I prefer an
approach which combines concepts drawn from Marxist, Weberian and
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stratification approaches. But Wang’s work is still helpful in drawing attention to
questions of political authority, such as the greater political authority held by
the bureaucratic capitalist class. Likewise, some occupations in the middle
class have greater political authority than others, which leads to their privileged
positions in the social hierarchy. For example, party members (most are in the
party-controlled SOEs, such as bank and oil industries) are in privileged
positions, unlike non-party members (most gather in private enterprises, such
as the internet industries) in the middle class locations.
Bian (2002) discusses the work unit (gongzuo danwei) – a Chinese term
to refer to the workplace in China, which was widely used in Mao’s era. It is still
used in contemporary Chinese society to distinguish different workplaces,
such as state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, as the key Chinese
measure of social status. Work units played a significant role in Chinese
people’s lives in Mao’s era, when people lived and worked in collective forms.
He points out that the state allocation of resources leads to important
differences between state and private work units: SOEs achieve greater
rewards, stability, than private enterprise workers. This indicates that workers
in SOEs have a privileged social status, which ultimately guarantees them a
better quality of working life. By contrast, most internet workers are in private
enterprises, rather than these privileged SOEs, therefore, are likely to be
marked by a lower quality of working life than SOEs’ workers.
The family background, which I explained earlier, also plays a significant
role in middle class locations. Although individuals’ class locations are less
influenced by their family backgrounds in the post-reform era than in Mao’s era,
the historical heritage of family background still has an impact upon social
class. Indeed, in the middle class sections of the ‘map’, certain family
backgrounds still influence individuals’ privileged positions. For example, the
offspring of private enterprise workers have limited chances to access SOEs
and civil servant positions, because they lack the necessary personal networks
(guanxi) in the field, which is quite important in the Chinese context as I will
explain in the latter chapter. This then contributes to the inferior social status of
these individuals. Even in the SOEs, workers who have family members as
cadres have more opportunities for promotion than those who do not.
Admittedly, individuals in contemporary Chinese society have greater
opportunities to change their class location, such as from the working class to
the middle class via access to higher education and better work units. But
family background still guarantees certain individuals’ privileged positions in
the social hierarchy, especially in the middle class. The family background
here is different from the one in the stratification approach, which focuses on
the education levels of parents. In fact, a key aspect of family background in
the Chinese context is political authority: whether family members are in the
bureaucratic capitalist class positions, such as cadres and capitalists (see
Figure 2.7). Workers with family members in low classes are likely to be
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excluded from certain privileged positions, due to lack of political authority.
This then becomes a force behind their subjective working-life experiences.
As Bian (2002) concludes, social status in contemporary Chinese society
is measured by three issues: the inherited family class background, party
authority (the membership of CCP), and the status of work units. Based on the
neo-Marxist approach (opportunity hoarding and relation to means of
production) and the Chinese context, I now develop a new map of the middle
class in Chinese society, as follows (Figure 2.7),
Figure 2.7: Typology of Chinese middle class
Family background, political authority and skills influence the positions of
workers in the work units and society: workers who have family members as
cadres, workers who are party members and workers with high skills have
more advantageous positions than others in the work units and society. These
three factors and work units generally decide individuals’ positions in the
middle class: workers in SOEs and civil servants have higher positions than
private enterprise workers; workers who have family members as cadres have
privileged positions; party members are more likely to be guaranteed stable
work and lives than others; and high-skilled workers have more possibility to
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have well-paid jobs than others. It is hard to quantitatively evaluate the
influence of these four factors on individuals’ locations in the middle class,
such as whether individuals who are not party members but have high skills
have higher positions than individuals who are party members but work in
private enterprise, and it is not my aim to do so here. Instead, I highlight these
issues to give a sense of the complexity of analysing Chinese internet workers’
social class. The framework above gives some idea of class location, but, like
Wright, I recognise that it is more complex than this. And I am trying to discuss
the complexity of the Chinese context and in particular the Chinese internet
workers below.
2.2.4 Chinese internet workers: the lower middle class
face proletarianisation
According to iResearch, a leading company focusing on in-depth research
on Chinese internet industries, all the top 21 internet companies in the Chinese
market (see figure 2.8) are privately owned. For example, the top 5 companies,
Tencent, Baidu, Netease, Sohu, and SNDA, are all owned by individuals, who
are widely portrayed as having pulled themselves up by their own bootstraps,
to use the English expression. So most internet workers in China are working
in private enterprises, and as established above, they are therefore excluded
from certain advantages available for employees of SOEs. In other words, the
work unit of most internet workers is private enterprises. Due to the inequality
between SOE workers and workers in private enterprises, which I will illustrate
in the empirical sections of the thesis, it is possible to say that large numbers of
internet workers do not have family members in the bureaucratic capitalist
class, who have priority to obtain beneficial jobs for their offspring, such as
SOE work and civil servant positions.
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Figure 2.8. Main players of the Chinese internet industries
Source: Translated from iResearch 2012
Most of these workers still conduct intellectual work, though based in
private enterprises, which are considered to be inferior to SOEs, due to their
limited access to certain advantageous resources. As I pointed out earlier, in
the existing media reports and academic research, there is no survey
conducted amongst internet workers to report their education background and
income. Instead, according to a sample survey conducted amongst IT workers
(workers in the hardware market) in some big cities (such as Shanghai, Beijing,
Wuhan and Dalian) in 2010, 97.13% workers were educated at college level
(Li 2010: 128). This figure enables us to deduce that a large number of internet
workers are also educated at colleges. Indeed, according to my qualitative
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research, all the participants and interviewees in my research are educated at
college level, which might help us recognise that generally most Chinese
internet workers are highly educated.
Likewise, as little research investigates internet workers’ income, it is hard
to provide authoritative figures concerning internet workers’ income – I will
show some relative figures from my fieldwork in Chapter Four. However,
according to an annual report about salary information in various industries,
which was conducted by a professional HR service company, PXC, in 2013,
the increase in salary rate in the internet industries was 16.2%, which was the
highest among all industries (excluding SOEs and civil servants’ positions).15
Meanwhile, according to Sina Economy, one of the largest portals, annual
salaries of fresh graduates who find jobs in the top 5 internet companies are
between £10,000 and £15,000, which is a middle-level salary for most jobs.16
This indicates that internet workers have a high-level salary among jobs in
private enterprises. But all these surveys did not include figures from SOEs
and civil servants, who have much higher salaries and better benefits than
private enterprises’ workers (I will discuss this comparison in details in Chapter
Four), such as internet workers here. Therefore, internet workers’ middle-level
income partly forms their middle class position.
Although CCP attempts to control big private enterprises via subsuming
employees there into its party system, as its managerial slogan in the cultural
industries indicates: ‘control the big, let go the small’ (O’Conner and Gu 2012:
4), it is hard to find large numbers of Party members in the internet industries.
For example, according to one of CCP’s official magazines Oriental Outlook,
only 9 internet companies in Beijing had organised Party Committees until
2011, and there were only 2,680 Party members in all internet companies in
Beijing, who were mostly in Baidu and Sina. Most of these members joined the
Party after 2010. 17 In other words, large numbers of internet workers are
non-Party members. As most internet workers are based in private enterprises,
they do not have family members in the bureaucratic capitalist class.
Just as many cultural workers have relatively high levels of education
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010), internet workers have high levels of
professional or technological skills. Most workers are college-educated with
low levels of political authority, as they are non-Party members. They earn
high salaries among people in the middle class location, as most of them are
highly skilled. As I stated earlier, it is hard to evaluate internet workers’ location
in the middle class with any sophistication using the very sparse data on
income. The data suggest that the internet workers occupy an inferior position
15 GRlib 2013
16 Sina Economy 2013
17 Oriental Outlook 2013
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to SOE workers and civil servants, but this does not indicate that these
workers have an inferior location in the Chinese social structure. Internet
workers still occupy more privileged locations than those in working class
locations. In other words, most internet workers tend to occupy the lower
position in the middle class.
The special location of the internet workers in the social hierarchy then
answers a question here: why focus on the internet workers when there are
others in the lower middle class and the working class? Some points were
addressed earlier to answer this question: the internet industries are a big and
growing set of industries, and the large group of people working there have not
been studied. Another point is addressed here: internet workers are different
from other Chinese middle class members. Both Chen (2002) and Anagnost
(2008) define the Chinese middle class as a group of people who have a high
educational level, receive good pay, have particular consumption habits, and
live comfortably. Some of these features are shared by many internet workers,
such as high educational level, but some of the internet workers do not have
comfortable lives. Bian (2002) suggests that the Chinese middle class do not
share a commonly recognised image of the middle classes in the advanced
capitalist societies – ‘a stable lifestyle, mainstream values, and active political
participation’ (p.97-98). Bian describes the Chinese middle class as a group of
people who have an unstable life; who are without the middle-class identity
and political motivations to fight for a civil society. This general characterisation
of the Chinese middle class is not entirely shared by internet workers: they do
have a political motivation to fight for a better China, although they suffer an
unstable life. I will explain this political motivation and activity later, in Chapter
Seven, where I discuss the internet workers’ acts of negotiation with and
resistance to the state and firms.
Put simply, internet workers are distinctive. They share common features
with other middle class workers in China, but they also have particular
characteristics. For example, most of them have good education, and some
receive good pay, as other people in the middle class do. However, some of
them have a consciousness and act relating to politics, through negotiation
with and resistance to the state and firms regarding the low quality of working
life. I will further explain this unique political motivation in Chapters Seven and
Eight. Here, the key point is that internet workers are an important part of the
Chinese lower middle class.
In the cultural industries, Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) point out that
the current ‘middle class problem’ of creative workers is their insecure and
unstable working conditions, such as dropping in and out of temporary and
permanent employment. This aspect of creative work has been conceptualised
as proletarianisation, which highlights the increasingly difficult working
conditions of the middle class. Cohen (1978) explicitly points out that a
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proletarian refers to a person who needs to obtain his means of living by
selling his labour power, rather than one who lacks the means of production. It
is possible for a proletarian to own certain means of production, but this
ownership is useful only when he places it in the capitalist’s service. Put in
another way, the proletarian still needs to sell his labour power in order to
support his life, even though he owns certain means of production. Wright
(1976) shows the proletarianisation process of white-collar workers, which
emphasises the deterioration of white-collar employees’ working conditions,
along with the expansion of the group. He interprets that the working
conditions of white-collar workers is deteriorating; that this group of people
tend to be classed as proletarian.
This is certainly true in the case of Chinese internet workers. As I
explained above, internet workers seem to be more privileged than most
workers in the working class, such as the large number of peasant workers,
because of their better education and higher skills. But they obviously do not
occupy powerful positions in contemporary Chinese society. The working
conditions in the industries, which I will illustrate in the empirical part of this
study, from Chapter Four to Chapter Six, show the deterioration of the quality
of their working lives. Internet workers own certain means of production, such
as professional and technical skills, but this ownership is only helpful when
they place it in the capitalists’ service. Ownership does not provide them with a
privileged position in the middle class; on the contrary, they face the same
poor working conditions as the working class.
Internet workers, like the middle class in most social hierarchies, suffer
precarious and uncertain work status. Most of them experience economic
pressure, because of their precarious work status, although their pay is higher
than that of people at the bottom of social hierarchies, such as peasants. Qiu
(2009) points out that since most necessities for Chinese urban life, such as
education, health care and housing, have become privatised and
commercialised, millions of workers from diverse backgrounds have to share
common experiences of precariousness and uncertainty. He marks the three
pillars of urban China: education, health care and housing, as the new ‘three
mountains’ (p.239) for millions of ordinary workers in contemporary Chinese
society.
The workers in this research also have the ‘three mountains’ on their
shoulders, as most of them live in big cities, where most internet companies
are based.18 It then becomes incredibly hard for these workers to buy houses,
18 Among the top ten internet companies in the Chinese market, seven of them are
based in Beijing (Baidu, Sohu, Ctrip, Dangdang, Sina, Changyou, Wanmei), one is
based in Shanghai (SNDA), one is based in Shenzhen (Tencent), and one is based in
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or guarantee their children’s education and families’ health care, because of
the household registration (hukou) in big cities. The household registration
(hukou) in China relates to people’s work and life in varied ways, such as
education, health care, housing, work and social benefits. For example, the
household registration in Beijing (Beijing hukou) is quite an attractive benefit
for all workers in Beijing, as it allows people to purchase houses in Beijing, to
drive cars with Beijing license plates, to have priority in terms of their children’s
education, to have enhanced pensions, etc. But as quotas are limited, millions
of workers, including some internet workers, do not have the household
registration in Beijing (Beijing hukou), which leads to a lower quality of life.
According to Wright (1997), this is the general problem of the middle class,
who sell their labour power as they lack the means of production, whilst they
do not regard themselves as the working class. Under the movement towards
globalisation, precarious and uncertain work and life status are shared by
workers in different social contexts, both in socialism and capitalism. The
severe economic pressure faced by Chinese internet workers is shared by
workers in Western societies, as it becomes a general problem of the middle
class, to use Wright’s terms. But the Chinese case is special because of the
exploitation issue in these precarious and risky experiences. Qiu (2009: 12-13)
argues that the neo-Weberian approach is the way to understand the lives of
Chinese workers at the lower end of the class spectrum, because it
conceptualises the differences between classes as ‘a stratified distribution of
life chances’ (p.13). Based on this Weberian understanding, I argue that the
neo-Marxian approach to exploitation, which combines both Weberian and
Marxian aspects, helps us to understand the inequalities between different
classes in the Chinese context in a better way, especially in terms of
understanding the workers’ severe economic pressures.
Both the Weberian and neo-Marxian approaches criticise the inequalities
between different classes, whilst the central difference between these
approaches is the neo-Marxian approach highlights the unequal ownership of
resources in the production process. In the Chinese internet industries,
because of the complicated relationships between the state, internet
companies and workers, the corruption problem and state allocation of
resources enable the bureaucratic capitalists’ well-being to be based on the
efforts of the middle class (including workers in the internet industries) and the
working class (including the low-end workers in Qiu’s research), which will be
explained in the empirical chapters in this thesis. Evidently, the debates of
exploitation, which are adopted in this research to explain the internet workers’
low quality of working life, need more sophisticated work, which will be carried
out in the next section. Thus, the internet industries become a useful field
Hangzhou (Netease). All of them have subsidiary companies in Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hangzhou.
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through which to discuss the exploitation of workers in a Chinese context, and
to apply the mechanistic concept of exploitation to understand the subjective
experiences of workers there. It is worth asking whether the Marxian concept
of exploitation, which was raised in relation to industrial capitalism, is still
valuable in the high-tech era, and to what extent we can use the concept to
understand subjective working life experiences.
However, proletarianisation of the lower middle class – ‘the problem of the
Chinese lower middle class’ in this research – does not only refer to the difficult
working conditions in the internet industries, but also the collaborative activities
between internet workers and people in the lower middle class and the working
class. Internet workers strive to open a free online space for ordinary Chinese
people to speak out with their productions, which I discuss in Chapter Seven.
Most of the ordinary Chinese people here are in the lower middle class and
working class, and need a free space to speak out, in order to protect
themselves from the inequalities and injustice in their work and lives. Internet
workers collaborate with these people in the form of initiating online activities
to protect them; surveilling the state by commenting on its acts; pushing the
state to pay attention to the inequalities and injustice in these people’s work
and lives; and even pushing the state to self-reform. These are acts of agency
which I talk about in Chapters Seven and Eight.
Because of the collaboration between internet workers and people in the
lower middle class and the working class, internet workers tend to stand much
closer with these ordinary Chinese people than those in the upper middle class
(such as workers in SOEs and civil servants) and the bureaucratic capitalist
class. Internet workers tend to stand with the working class as they suffer from
the same inequalities and injustice caused by the upper middle class and the
bureaucratic capitalist class. The activities which result in the inequalities and
injustice are understood from the neo-Marxist approach as the process of
exploitation, which will be explained later in the next section.
Here, by showing the collaboration between the internet workers and the
ordinary Chinese people, I intend to enrich the term of proletarianisation by
evaluating the agency of the lower middle class in a Chinese context. The
proletarianisation problem here does not only show the difficult working
conditions, which are nearly at the proletarian level, but also shows the
collaboration between the lower middle class and the working class in a
Chinese context. Put in another way, ‘the lower middle class problem’ in this
research, proletarianisation, refers to the difficult working conditions of the
internet workers (from Chapter Four to Chapter Six) on the one side, and acts
of agency of these workers (in Chapter Seven), which indicate the close
relationships between the lower middle class and the working class, on the
other.
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Therefore, the class problem of internet workers becomes an important
issue to be addressed in order to understand the quality of their working lives.
As I suggested earlier, the unique social class of internet workers indicates the
exploitation problem in this lower middle class and ultimately results in the
deteriorating working conditions of these workers, though there are other
mechanisms of power dynamics influencing these subjective experiences,
which I will discuss in the empirical section. This exploitation problem is
important for understanding the quality of working life in this research and I
explain it below.
2.3 Marx on work and exploitation
The core of Marx’s work on labour is the concept of exploitation. The
‘classical’ Marxist understanding of exploitation focuses on the surplus value
produced by one group, labourers, that is taken by another group, capitalists.
Marx argued that surplus value could be increased in two ways: by prolonging
the working day in order to create absolute surplus value, and by improving
technologies in the conditions of production in order to create relative surplus
value (Callinicos 1983:116-117). Absolute surplus value refers to the surplus
value accumulated via increasing the surplus labour time. And relative surplus
value refers to the surplus value accumulated via reducing labourers’
necessary labour time corresponding to the surplus value extracted. Cohen
(1995) argues the capitalist exploitation in Marxist understanding is rooted in
‘an unfair distribution of rights in external things’ (p.119). Workers’ labour
efforts are appropriated because they do not equally share the external world,
especially the means of production. Put in another way, Marx’s concept of
exploitation identifies ‘inequalities in material well-being that are generated by
inequalities in access to resources of various sorts’ (Wright 1996: 696). Wright
(1996) also points out that these inequalities in material well-being are not
simply generated by ‘what people have’ (p.696), but also by ‘what people do
with what they have’ (ibid.). Wright identifies further three conditions that
constitute Marx’s concept of exploitation:
‘(i) The material welfare of one group of people causally depends on the
material deprivations of another.
(ii) The causal relation in (i) involves the asymmetrical exclusion of the
exploited from access to certain productive resources.
(iii) The causal mechanism that translates exclusion (ii) into differential
welfare (i) involves the appropriation of the fruits of labour of the
exploited by those who control the relevant productive resources’ (ibid.).
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Thus, as Wright (1996) concludes, the distinctive issue in Marx’s analysis
of exploitation is that the welfare of one group of people, exploiters, depends
not simply on their control of assets and resources in (ii), but also upon the
appropriation of efforts of the exploited as (iii) indicates. Put simply,
exploitation as a traditional Marxist term does not only refer to the relations
between people and means of production, but also explores relations between
different groups of people and classes. There is a traditional Marxist term
relating to these class relations: alienation.19 Alienation refers to that a person
is alienates from his humanity because being a mechanistic part of a social
class. According to Marx, workers are separated from the products they
produce and lack the ability to determine their destinies, because they are
directed to goals that are set up by capitalists, who own the means of
production, in order to extract the maximal amount of surplus value from
workers. This concept implies not only that certain people’s labour efforts are
appropriated by others, but also that their lives are controlled by others
(Burawoy and Wright 2002: 472).
This could be related to other traditional Marxist terms, such as
domination and subordination. Burawoy and Wright (2002) explain domination
as a situation in which some people control the activities of others because
they own and control productive resources (p.472). Wright (2009) explains
domination as the ability to control others’ activities, such as the exploiter
controlling the activities of the exploited. He claims that all exploitation involves
certain kinds of domination, whereas not all domination involves exploitation.
Cohen (1978) explains the relation of subordination with three principles: ‘They
[Subordinate] all produce for others who do not produce for them; within the
production process they are commonly subject to the authority of the superior,
who is not subject to their authority; their livelihoods depend on their relations
with their superiors, they tend to be poorer than the latter’ (p.69).
On the one hand, all these terms surrounding Marx’s central work on
exploitation demonstrate the importance of examining class relations and class
locations; on the other hand, they lead to a question: did Marx think that
capitalist exploitation was unjust? Cohen (1995), Callinicos (1989) and
Roemer (1982) have answered this question by thoroughly examining Marx’s
19 According to Burawoy and Wright (2002), the concept of alienation has a much
broader sense. It often refers to a situation where one’s life is controlled by impersonal
forces, such as ‘market’. In this sense, capitalists could also be understood as being
alienated in capitalism since their lives maybe controlled by ‘alien’ forces, such as
market. See footnote on page 472. A sophisticated theoretical work on alienation and
creative workers’ experiences could be found in Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s book
‘Creative Labour’ (2010, chapter two). But the concept of alienation is not central to
my thesis. I put it here to further understand Marx’s explanation of exploitation,
especially exploitation in capitalism.
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work. Callinicos (1989), along with Marx, condemns capitalism for its
oppressions, unfreedom, and injustices. Referring to the central concern of the
Marxist term capitalist exploitation, he states that ‘the appearance of free
exchange between worker and employer is nullified by the unequal distribution
of the productive forces’ (2000: p.68). In other words, he regards all exchange
activities between workers and employers as unjust exploitation, even though
some exchange does not involve money, because of the unequal ownership of
productive forces.
Cohen (1995) explicitly claims that ‘Marx did think that capitalist
exploitation was unjust’ (p.195). He finds three issues in Marx’s work to imply
the unjustness of capitalist exploitation: ‘(1) workers are at the short end of an
unequal distribution of means of production. A second is that (2) they are
forced to work as others direct them to. And a third is that (3) they are forced to
yield surplus product to others’ (p.195-196). As quoted at the beginning of this
section, Cohen (1995) argues that the exploited suffer injustice and do not
have a fair share of the external world, because they are separated from
physical productive resources. Put simply, Marx thought capitalist exploitation
was unjust because of the unjust distribution of the means of production on the
one side and the unjust extraction of surplus value on the other.
However, Marx’s criticism of unjust capitalist exploitation does not go
without any critique. Cohen (1995) points out that Marxists wrongfully affirm
the thesis of self-ownership when representing exploitation as unjust. Instead,
he argues that it is necessary to reject the thesis of self-ownership in order to
represent exploitation as unjust.20 Moreover, Roemer (1982) points out that
Marxian exploitation mainly refers to capitalist exploitation; instead, he argues
that it is essential to apply various materialist definitions of exploitation to
different societies (see Roemer 1982, Chapter Seven). Thus, in the following
section, I will introduce Roemer’s argument that exploitation is unjust, based
on various materialist definitions of exploitation in different societies, as well as
introducing other sociologists’ work.
2.4 Debates about exploitation
Following Marx’s work, many theorists have realised the importance of
discussing injustice when considering exploitation, and regard injustice as
central to understanding Marxist ideas of exploitation (Callinicos 2000, Roemer
1982, Cohen 1985, Wright 1996). Roemer (1982) creates a new theoretical
device, the game-theoretic characterisation of capitalist exploitation, to clarify
his criteria for understanding economic inequality as exploitation.
20 See Cohen 1995, Chapters Five and Six
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According to Roemer (1982: 235-236), the game-theoretic
characterisation of capitalist exploitation is superior to the Marxian traditional
surplus value definition of exploitation. First, it specifies a new set of property
relations in the ‘alternative’ – an alternative space he assumed in the game
theory, that helps clarify exploitation. Second, it has an adequate
generalisation of cases of heterogeneous labour and some non-produced
factors. Third, it distinguishes between different kinds of exploitation, which is
not possible in the Marxian surplus value definition. Based on this theoretical
device, Roemer categorises different forms of exploitation in different systems
of societies: in a feudal society, exploitation is based on inequalities generated
by the unequal distribution of labour power assets; in a capitalist society, it is
based on inequalities generated by the unequal distribution of alienable assets,
such as the means of production; in a socialist society, exploitation is based on
inequalities generated by the unequal distribution of inalienable assets, such
as skills.21
Roemer (1982) pays particular attention to exploitation in existing
socialism.22 He claims that exploitation still exists in socialism, and that
socialist exploitation, based on the inequality in ownership of skills, is socially
necessary at a certain stage. The historical task of socialism is to eliminate
capitalist exploitation, rather than socialist exploitation. However, Roemer, as a
follower of Marx who devotes considerable efforts to explain Marx’s work, still
shows his ethical concern about socialist exploitation, by asking ‘if a form of
exploitation is socially necessary, what should one’s attitude toward it be?
Should its existence be endorsed?’ (p.240). This piece of work directs my
attention to concerns about exploitation in the Chinese internet industries: to
what extent do we consider inequalities in the Chinese internet industries as
exploitation? If exploitation is industrially and socially necessary, what should
our attitudes towards it be? To what extent should we criticise it? Or should we
dispute the notion of socially necessary exploitation? Could we argue that it is
possible for exploitation not to be socially necessary?
Roemer answers these questions with reference to the level of ‘social
consciousness – how the people involved think’ (p.248). He puts it thus: if the
exploited fight against injustice, even though the revolution or rebellion is
doomed to fail, the social necessity of the exploitation then should be
questioned. Because of this, it would be morally wrong to accept a form of
exploitation which seems to be socially necessary, without criticising it. I will
answer these questions with some empirical data in Chapter Seven, where I
will illuminate the internet workers’ agency as a response to the exploitation. It
might be argued that the exploitation of internet workers’ labour efforts and
skills are acceptable, because it is necessary for the rapid growth of the
21 See Roemer 1982, Chapter Seven
22 See Roemer 1982, Chapter Eight
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Chinese internet industries. This, to a certain extent, leads to the growth of the
Chinese economy. But as Roemer points out, if the exploited – internet
workers in this study – fight against such injustice, because the injustice
results in the difficult working conditions, it thus would be arguable to state the
notion of socially necessary exploitation. Put simply, the response from the
internet workers towards the injustice in their working-life experiences, which is
caused by exploitation, shows that the social necessity of the exploitation
needs to be questioned.
Cohen (1995) argues that Roemer correctly states that exploitation is not
based on natural injustice, but that he is incorrect to indicate that an unequal
product flow is unjust ‘only if it reflects an unjust initial asset distribution’
(p.204). The work of exploitation needs to focus on the unjust exploitative
allocation. This is because Roemer’s work directs our interests to unjust asset
distribution, which in Cohen’s understanding is caused by the unjust product
flow. As an alternative, Cohen states that it is necessary to focus on the
‘injustice of an exploitative allocation’ (p.207) rather than the ‘injustice of the
initial distribution’ (ibid.), as the former generates the primary injustice that
drives the latter to be unjust.
Wright (1985) criticises Roemer’s work on exploitation because of the
elimination of class relations in his analysis of injustice. For example, Wright
states that Roemer fails to point out that unjust inequalities are created by ‘real
transfers from one actor to another’ (p.74). According to Wright, Roemer fails
to introduce the notion of dominance in his game-theory approach to
exploitation. As an alternative, Wright defines exploitation as a process that
contains both ‘economic oppression’ (ibid.) and the ‘appropriation of the fruit of
the labour of one class by another’ (ibid.). As a criterion of exploitation, the
benefits of the exploiter must depend on the work of the exploited. As quoted
in the beginning of section 2.3, Wright restates the Marxian concept of
exploitation with three conditions, which indicates a relationship in which the
exploiting class depends upon the efforts of the exploited class for the
reproduction of values.
Roemer’s work represents a more sociological approach, and, by contrast,
Wright builds his work upon the sociological approach and ‘classical’ Marxian
approach, namely using a ‘neo-Marxist approach’. It is Wright who points out
the importance of discussing the problem of class in analysing exploitation and
understanding modern social modes of production. He distinguishes his work
from both the Weberian approach, which regards economic inequality as the
result of relations of exclusion, and traditional Marxist approach, which centres
on structural exploitation and domination. He emphasises the necessity of
using an integrated analytical approach, which consists the micro level model
of stratification approach and the macro level models of the Weberian
approach and the traditional Marxist approach (see section 2.1), to understand
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the class problem. This then leads his discussion to the exploitation problem in
different social modes of production.
2.4.1 Social modes of production
Wright (1976: 28-29) claims that exploitation needs to be discussed within
varied modes of production, as different forms of exploitation correspond to
different modes of production. For example, workers in industrial capitalism
are exploited in a way that is distinguished from workers in the earliest
capitalism: on the one hand, they cannot control the labour process as
producers in cottage industries did, because they are gathered in factories; on
the other hand, the labour force is deskilled and the production process is
fragmented, because of the introduction of new technologies in factories.
Meanwhile, capital is not a commodity in existing socialism as it is traded in
capitalism. Burawoy and Wright (2002: 478-480) distinguish existing socialism
from Marxist socialism by using the example of Soviet communism, which is
entitled ‘state socialism’. They claim that state socialism refers to a central
planned system: a class of ‘planners’ take charge of the ‘redistribution of
surplus’, which is extracted from a class of ‘direct producers’. This extraction is
legitimised in the name of ‘the superior knowledge of the planner about the
needs of the people’ (p.479).
Roemer (1982) divides modes of production into four categories, based
on the different forms of exploitation: feudal exploitation, which is based on
injustice generated by unequal distribution of labour power assets, in which
lords and serfs are the main classes; capitalist exploitation, which is based on
injustice generated by unequal distribution of alienable assets, in which
relations between bourgeoisie and proletariat are the main class relations;
status exploitation, which exists in the existing socialism, a historical stage
between capitalism and socialism; and socialist exploitation, which is based on
injustice generated by unequal distribution of inalienable assets, in which
experts and workers are the main classes. In status exploitation, exploiters
control labour power and property because of their high status in the social
structure. This is different from the injustice generated by either means of
production or skills, and this is the Weberain approach which Wright is against.
Wright (1985) agrees with Roemer that skill-based exploitation would exist
in a Marxist socialist society, and it could only be eliminated in Marxist
communism. But Wright indicates that Roemer’s concept of status exploitation
is problematic in two ways: first, it is not necessarily related to production at all;
and second, it is hard to distinguish it from feudal exploitation. As an
alternative, Wright (1985) points out a post-capitalist mode of production that
exists between the stages of capitalism and socialism, statism, which is based
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on organization asset. In this mode of production, bureaucrats and managers
occupy the class location of the exploiter.
This is agreed by Callinicos (1983), who interprets that existing socialism
is ‘bureaucratic state capitalism’ (p.183), as the working class is exploited by ‘a
state bureaucracy which competes with its Western counterparts’ (ibid.). In the
context of the Soviet Union, socialism, or ‘bureaucratic state capitalism’, did
not self-emancipate the working class, as it claimed. The followers of the
Soviet Union, such as China, reproduce this mode of bureaucratic state
capitalism in their societies. Callinicos (2004) further explains his arguments in
his later work. He states that the existing socialist societies are ‘state
bureaucratic socialist, combin[ing] the statist and socialist modes of production’
(p.223). This includes multiple occurrences of exploitation based on the
unequal ownership of varied resources: ‘skills, organisational assets, means of
production, labour-power’ (p.225).
This exploiter class, which allies bureaucrats and capitalists, has been
acknowledged by some theorists who work on modern Chinese society. I have
demonstrated such research in the last chapter, in order to build up the class
structure in contemporary Chinese society and clarify the social class of
internet workers. Here, I continue my argument from the last chapter, based on
Wright’s and Callinicos’ work, recognising the social mode of production in
modern China as bureaucratic state capitalism or bureaucratic state socialism.
The bureaucratic capitalist class, which I defined in section 1.2.1, where I
talked about the Chinese class structure, occupies the location of exploiter
class, with ownership of the means of production, organisational assets, and
political authority. This class accumulates huge wealth by controlling labour
power and the skills of the middle class and the working class. This activity of
appropriation then generates inequality and injustice between the bureaucratic
capitalist class, the middle class, and the working class. I will now explain this
special social mode of production and analyse how the exploiter class
appropriates the labour power and skills of the exploited classes, in order to
clarify how and why internet workers, as the lower middle class facing the
problem of proletarianisation, suffer from injustice and inequalities.
2.5 Exploitation in the Chinese context
I have outlined the class structure in section 2.2.2, where I recognise the
emergence of the bureaucratic capitalist class and the polarisation of the
middle class: the lower middle class (such as workers in private enterprises),
and the upper middle class (such as workers in SOEs and civil servants). In a
sense, the upper middle class in China dominate the lower middle class and
the working class, because of their family background. As Figure 2.3 indicates,
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good jobs in China not only depend on education levels and skills, but also on
people’s family backgrounds. Thus, family background excludes the lower
middle class from good jobs. As this research adopts a neo-Marxist approach,
which balances the Weberian approach and traditional Marxist approach, such
exclusion arising from the social status results in inequalities between classes.
However, as Wright (2009) stresses, not all domination involves exploitation.
In the context of contemporary China, it is hard to claim that the upper middle
class accumulates wealth by appropriating the labour efforts of the lower
middle class or the working class. Thus, I argue that the Chinese middle class
is polarising, as the upper middle class dominates the lower middle class,
which faces the problem of proletarianisation. Here, I will analyse the
relationship between these different classes, in order to explore the issue of
exploitation in the Chinese context.
Some researchers have analysed unjust relations between different social
classes in China. For example, Zhao (2003) discusses the inequality between
urban middle class and rural peasants. She says the following about their very
different access to the media: ‘While the rising business and urban middle
classes are increasingly using the media to articulate their interests and shape
state policies toward their preferred ends, the rally cries of tens of thousands of
Chinese workers and farmers in their struggles for economic and social justice,
for example, have simply fallen on deaf ears in the Chinese media system’
(p.63). Zhao states that the rising business and urban middle classes
increasingly enjoy better quality of life, such as gaining more prestige, better
education, better health care; but workers and farmers, by contrast, are still
struggling at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Moreover, Zhao (2007)
explains the uneven regional development by quoting Hu, Zhou and Li’s work
(2001), which depicts China as ‘one country, four worlds’ (p.102) because of
the fragmentation and polarization of ‘class, region, gender, ethnicity and other
cleavages’ (p.101). Here, Zhao highlights inequalities between classes due to
their different opportunities of accessing certain life chances.
Zhang (2008: 9-10) points out the inequality between the higher classes
and lower classes in post-reform China: the privatisation of SOEs enabled the
cadres and capitalists to become rich, whilst causing cuts in public social
welfare to balance the deficit resulting from fiscal decentralisation, and also
caused millions of ordinary workers to be laid off; the privatisation of village
enterprises enabled the expansion of the petty bourgeoisie, resulting in
millions of peasants losing their lands and having to move to big cities as
peasant workers. Zhang then states that the high cost of social development in
China fell on ordinary people.
Sun (2002) argues that contemporary Chinese society is polarised into the
privileged class, which powerfully imposes state policies in order to benefit
itself, and the vulnerable class, whose benefits are sacrificed to favour the
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privileged class. Zhang (2000: 35-38) points out that the social problems of
modern China are centred on the emergence of the new advantaged class (the
bureaucratic capitalist class in my definition) and the new disadvantaged class
(such as retired workers, laid-off workers and peasant workers), as well as the
large gap between these classes.
Andreas (2008) points out that China’s Gini coefficient – a system
measures that the inequality amongst values of a frequency distribution, such
as the international income inequality, and the range is from 0, which indicates
absolute equality, to 1, which indicates absolute inequality – was amongst the
lowest rates in the world in 1978 (the figure was 0.22), which indicated China
as an equal country. But this figure increased to 0.496 in 2006; higher than that
of the USA and nearly amongst the highest rates in the world. He blames this
high inequality on the unequal distribution of resources between regions and
between rural and urban areas.
Some social tensions are generated by such inequalities between
various social classes, such as the crisis of social trust depicted in Yan’s work
(2009: 286). He argues that these inequalities have led to a crisis of social trust
in contemporary Chinese society. This crisis involves several elements: people
do not trust the market because of unsafe goods and poor services; they do
not trust strangers; they do not trust friends and even relatives; they distrust
law enforcement officers, the law, and legal institutions. At the time of writing
this thesis, the recent Hong Kong milk powder restriction accurately reflected
the crisis of social trust in mainland China: in 2008, six babies died after
drinking milk laced with the industrial chemical melamine in mainland China.
Some big local milk brands were reported to have added the industrial
chemical melamine to their milk products, which caused a crisis of social trust
in Chinese society – people did not trust the law and the market. Since then,
large numbers of parents in mainland China chose to buy milk powder in Hong
Kong or from Western countries, which caused a shortage of milk powder in
the Hong Kong market. As a result, the Hong Kong government issued a new
restriction on milk powder on 1st March 2013, in order to limit unlicensed
exports of powdered infant formula. Even though the central government in
mainland China has assured people that most Chinese brands of milk powder
are now safe, large numbers of Chinese parents still distrust the local market
and rush to the Hong Kong market and other global milk powder markets.
Researchers generally relate the class inequality in China to the unequal
distribution of economic and social resources amongst classes. For example,
Bian (2002) claims that the state workers (workers in party-controlled
enterprises after the privatisation of SOEs) have a privileged position in society
because the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) controls the economic
resources, such as oil, banking and telecommunication. Sun (2002) blames
the inequality between the privileged class and the vulnerable class on the
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unequal distribution of state properties, economic resources, and skills during
the economic reform in the beginning of 1990s. Duckett (2001) points out that
state departments started to set up profit-seeking businesses by investing
state resources in the capitalist market in the 1990s. This investment
accumulated capital for the bureaucratic capitalist class, rather than benefiting
the entire society, such as people in the lower classes. This then generated the
inequality between the upper and lower classes.
Wright (2006) points out that socialism is an economic structure whereby
the entire society owns the means of production and social power allocates
resources. By contrast, statism, which he argues is contemporary ‘socialism’,
is an economic structure where the means of production are owned by the
state, and resources are allocated by the exercise of state power. The Chinese
economic structure, as I stated in the last section, is neither complete
socialism nor absolute statism. Instead, it is bureaucratic state capitalism
(similar to Dickson’s term ‘crony communism’ or ‘crony capitalism’, which I
stressed in Chapter One, because all concepts emphasise the close
relationships between govern officials and capitalists), where the means of
production are owned by the bureaucratic capitalist class, and resources are
allocated through the exercise of both state power and economic power. The
bureaucratic capitalist class is dominant, because it owns means of production
and it has the power (both the state power and economic power in Wright’s
terms) to allocate resources.
The discussion above guides the concept of exploitation in the Chinese
context to the question of ownership of varied resources, such as labour power,
skills, and means of production, and towards the question of political authority
in the allocation of these resources. The working class in contemporary
Chinese society sells labour power in order to survive, as their livelihoods are
not guaranteed by society. The bureaucratic capitalist class owns the means of
production, such as factories/firms, raw materials and telecommunication, and
has the political authority to allocate these means of production (see section
2.2.2 about the class structure in China). For example, executives in the
party-controlled enterprises (the SOEs in contemporary Chinese society) and
government departments own the main raw materials and economic resources,
such as oil and telecommunication. Officials in the bureaucratic capitalist class
with certain political power (similar to Wright’s state power) and capitalists with
certain economic power allocate these raw materials and economic resources.
But what does the middle class own, and what are the relationships between
the middle class and these other two classes?
According to a number of commentators, most people in the middle class
have high skill levels, such as the internet workers with professional skills and
technical skills, but, as I argued in section 2.2.2, these skills are only effective
when placed in the capitalist’s service. Some people in the middle class own
64
certain resources. For example, some internet workers own company stocks,
but this does not give them any managerial power; and the amount of the stock
is so small that it is hard to help workers to survive. Although some people in
the middle class own certain means of production, generally, most of them,
especially people in the lower middle class, lack the power to allocate these
resources, and they still need to sell their skills to survive.
As I have discussed in the last section, the Weberian approach of
exploitation understands the inequality between classes as the result of the
unequal distribution of resources. By contrast, the neo-Marxist approach
relates the inequality to the production process, where the exploiting class
appropriates the effort of the exploited class because of the ownership of the
means of production. Here, the bureaucratic capitalist class dominates the
working class and the middle class, because of the ownership of the means of
production, and the power to allocate these resources. It is the bureaucratic
capitalist class, where officials and capitalists gain benefits from corruption and
bribery, which appropriate the fruits of other classes. Due to this, the wealth of
the bureaucratic capitalist class is based on the labour efforts of the working
class, who contribute labour power, and the middle class, who contribute skills.
The picture then becomes clear: the bureaucratic capitalist class own the
means of production, and appropriate labour power of the working class and
skills of the middle class, by having both political power and economic power
to allocate the resources; the middle class owns skills, some of them own
certain means of production, but lack the power to allocate the resource;
instead, people in the location need to exchange their skills in the capitalist
market in order to survive; the working class owns labour power and sells it to
survive. The significant issue here is that the bureaucratic capitalist class
builds upon the appropriation of the efforts of the middle class and the working
class. This then becomes the special model of exploitation in a Chinese
context.
However, exploitation is a macro level concept that emphasises dynamics
between classes, rather than describing personal experiences. As Wright
points out, at the centre of exploitation is the causal relationship between the
welfare of one group of people and the material deprivations of another. It is
the dominating class, which controls relevant productive resources, that
appropriates the fruits of the dominated class. Due to this, it is difficult to use
the concept of exploitation to analyse the micro level experiences, such as
internet workers’ working experiences. In this research, exploitation is the
mechanism for understanding why the working conditions in the internet
industries are deteriorating and why the internet workers suffer. It is also the
concept to structurally understand ‘the problem of the middle class’,
proletarianisation. Therefore, ‘the Chinese model of exploitation’ as I have
described it here is useful for understanding the quality of working life in the
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internet industries. Based on such an understanding, in the following section, I
build a model that contains issues relevant to the working life in order to
evaluate the quality.
2.6 A model for evaluating working life beyond
exploitation
As I indicated above, the framework of exploitation is a mechanism to
evaluate workers’ experiences in the Chinese internet industries. As it is a
structural concept, which focuses on the structural activities between different
classes, it cannot be directly applied to subjective experiences. Therefore, in
this section, I develop a model with concepts that exemplify injustice
surrounding working life, in order to evaluate workers’ subjective experiences
in a theoretical way.
Some theorists emphasise the importance of evaluating workers’
self-understanding of their subjective experiences. Ezzy (1997) for example,
argues that workers’ self-understandings link ‘pre-existing cultural discourses,
the structuring effect of a person’s social location, and the individual’s creative
use of these resources’ (p.440). Workers’ self-understandings become an
important perspective to approach the quality of work. Banks and
Hesmondhalgh (2009) also explain the necessity of conceptualising creative
labourers’ subjective experiences to understand creative industries. They point
out that creative work is highly appreciated because it provides good rewards,
fame, autonomy, and chances for self-expression. As Hesmondhalgh and
Baker (2010) claim, self-expression, autonomy and individualization in creative
work mean that the ‘taste of freedom can be most deliciously savoured’ (p.417).
These experiences are mostly subjective, and can only be collected via
workers’ self-understanding. Thus, the vivid working-life experiences in this
study can also be analysed via addressing certain issues that relate to workers’
self-understanding of their subjective experiences. Therefore, it is important to
build up a model with issues relating to workers’ self-understanding of
subjective working-life experiences to assess the quality of working life in
Chinese internet industries.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) develop a model of good and bad work,
as illustrated in Figure 2.9, based on Blauner’s model of alienated and
unalienated work, to evaluate creative labourers’ subjective experiences. In
this model, they particularly focus on concepts of ‘autonomy, interest and
involvement, sociality, self-esteem, self-realisation, work-life balance and
security’ (p.36) to evaluate whether it is possible for creative work to be
considered ‘good work’. Moreover, they regard the ‘social and cultural value of
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products’ as another important dimension of good work. Green (2006) regards
‘skill, effort, autonomy, pay, and security’ (p.150) as the main ingredients of
work quality. Building on these discussions, which assert that subjective
experiences in creative work are important, I develop a theoretical model for
my research, which brings together the concepts of work effort, security, and
autonomy, to analyse internet workers’ subjective experiences.
Figure 2.9: Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s model of good and bad work
Source: summary by Hesmondhalgh and Baker of their model (2010)
Green (2006: 44-47) points out that little attention has been paid to the
impact of work effort on the quality of work life and there is only some
psychological research focusing on it (Warr 1987, Berg and Schalk 1997). He
argues that work effort needs to be understood as a key element for evaluating
the quality of work life. Green (2006) regards work hours as an important
component of work effort, which is equal to work intensity – the intensity of
labour effort at work. Work intensity is conflated with concepts of efficiency,
individual performance, and skills, whereas work effort could only be
measured by relative effort and effort changes. Individual performance refers
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to ‘the extent to which an individual performs contractual tasks’ (p.47), which
are equal to the productivity of an individual. An individual’s productivity could
be evaluated by relating to workers’ skills and efficiency. As Green (2006:
47-48) interprets, an individual’s performance is efficient if it can be improved
by ‘raising either skill or work intensity or both’ (p.47). Both relative effort and
effort changes are closely related to individuals’ self-report or their perception
of their own effort. Relative effort refers to some norm related to judgements of
work effort, which are set up by researchers and have ‘fixed effect’ – change
little over time. Effort change based on people’s self-report of their own
changes in terms of effort levels at different times. In the case of Chinese
internet workers, I argue that work effort could be partly measured by work
intensity and work hours. Work hours are measured to explore work overload
in the industries, and work intensity refers to how much labour effort workers
make during their time at work. Because of the characteristic of internet work, it
is possible that some workers do not work overtime, whilst making a large
labour effort during their working hours. This then demonstrates the high work
intensity in the internet industries. Put simply, work intensity in the daily work of
the internet industries needs to be examined as an important feature of work
effort in the industries.
Meanwhile, Green (2006: 63-64) discusses pay as another component of
work effort, because high pay usually is the reward for high work effort.
However, this might be wrong in the case of the Chinese internet industries:
workers with high work effort do not always receive reasonable rewards, which
I talk about with empirical data in Chapter Four. It is possible to have a job in
the Chinese internet industries, with unequal pay levels for hard work. Thus,
pay should be taken as a factor by which to evaluate work effort in the internet
industries.
2.6.1 Security in work
Green (2006) claims that workplace uncertainty is harmful to the quality of
working life, in which continuity and progress of employment is the centre. He
understands job insecurity as ‘the loss of welfare that comes from uncertainty
at work’ (p.130). Green points out that the loss of welfare to a certain extent
refers to workers’ income stream, which includes current income and uncertain
future wages for the work. Work is insecure when something causes a
decrease in current income, such as cutting wages, or makes future income
uncertain, such as losing an expected promotion or even a job. Therefore,
Green connects work security with workers’ income. Here, Green’s work is
useful to understand internet workers’ unequal pay and promotions. This
research then develops some questions to analyse the empirical data based
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on the discussion of uncertainty in Green’s work which I have outlined here:
how often do workers change their jobs? To what extent do they have the
chance to get promotion? How much opportunity do they have in terms of
wage increase?
Some research on freelance workers draws attention to the precarious
working conditions of freelancers by focusing on forces that lead to insecurity
(Fraser and Gold 2001, Ekinsmyth 2002). For example, Ekinsmyth (2002)
shows factors that generate insecure working conditions for freelancers:
‘uncertain work and pay, lack of employment benefits, difficulties of taking on
commitments, and the difficulties of working at home’ (p.178-179). Ross (2008)
relates these issues to the accumulation of capitalism: he blames
post-industrial capitalism accumulating capitals by generating benefits from
‘vulnerability, instability and desperation’ (p.44). He understands insecurity in
work as a precarious working condition in modern society. He argues that
research on the quality of working life needs to focus on precarious working
conditions. It is a problem that is shared by workers in both low-end services
and high-end knowledge industries. Precarious working conditions contain ‘the
temporary or intermittent nature of their [workers’] contracts, the uncertainty of
their future, and their isolation from any protective framework of social
insurance’ (p.41). Ross (2008) blames precarity and insecurity on
post-industrial capitalism, because such capitalism builds upon the former –
the precarious and insecure working conditions of workers. Unstable working
conditions then become a basis to generate benefits in contemporary
capitalism. Put simply, insecure working conditions indicate injustice
surrounding certain working conditions. Thus, security needs to be understood
as an important issue to evaluate the quality of working life.
Building upon these theorists’ work, some questions corresponding to
tensions between the state, businesses and workers are addressed to
examine the empirical experiences in the next few chapters: how stable is
work in the internet industries? Can a stable future, which is secured by social
insurance, be expected?
2.6.2 Autonomy as self-exploitation?
According to Kim (2009), Theodor Adorno is the pioneer of research in the
field of autonomy. He defines autonomy as the relationship of art to capitalist
production and accumulation. Adorno argues that this concept is not only
useful for describing the growing culture industry, but also important to be a
critical reflection of the society. Kim (2009) agrees with Adorno’s views about
the significance of valuing autonomous art, which is ‘a form of resistance to the
political and economic effects of capitalism on cultural production’ (p.136) on
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the one side; and helps critical theorists observe ‘the objective conditions that
led to the rise of non-autonomous forms of culture’ (ibid.) on the other.
According to Kim (2009), research on the definition and explanation of
autonomy has varied in different contexts: from ‘a synonym for independence
or self-determination (Koivisto & Valiverrone 1996), to the structural
relationship between ideology (and, by extension, culture) and the economy in
capitalist society (Johnson 2006, Sparks 1989), to the practice of journalism in
relationship to the state and/or corporate pressures (Craig 2004)’ (p.128) [and
probably much more]. This diverse discussion of autonomy highlights the
importance of ‘independence’ and ‘freedom’ in terms of both culture and
people’s practices. Thus, autonomy today is not only about art, as it was in
Adorno’s original research, but also relates to people’s independent
professional practices and their freedom in society and organisations.
Critical theorists in cultural production (Banks 2007, Hesmondhalgh 2006,
Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010) explore the question of cultural workers’
autonomy in their recent research. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) provide a
sophisticated framework for understanding creative workers’ autonomy in
cultural industries. This framework is borrowed here and applied in later
chapters to internet workers’ subjective experiences of autonomy.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 40) admit that it is impossible to have
total autonomy, to be entirely free from any constraint or determinant, in one’s
life. They explicitly state their fundamental claim about autonomy as follows:
‘we use it to refer to ‘self-determination’, but we recognise that autonomy
cannot simply be understood as freedom from others’ (p.40). Autonomy in their
research then is divided into two parts: workplace autonomy and creative
autonomy. By workplace autonomy, they refer to ‘the degree of
self-determination that individual workers or groups of workers have within a
certain work situation’ (ibid.). And creative autonomy in their definition refers to
‘the degree to which “art”, knowledge, symbol-making and so on can and/or
should operate independently of the influence of other determinants’ (ibid.).
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 39-41) state that only some work in
cultural industries provide high levels of autonomy, which is shown in Mike
Sosteric’s empirical research (1996) about workplace autonomy in a Canadian
nightclub. Sosteric finds out that employees in the nightclub enjoyed high level
of autonomy. They were, for example, allowed to develop their own
personalised service styles. This high level of autonomy resulted in low
turnover rate, job security and good relationships between customers and
employees, although this autonomy was later decreased by a new manager,
which resulted in employee resistance. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010:
40-41) point out a problem that relates to this workplace autonomy: ‘Is
workplace autonomy really better understood as a mechanism to distract
workers’ attention from the “real” exploitation and alienation lying beneath the
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surface of their working life?’ (p.43). This question corresponds to the recent
research on self-exploitation in cultural industries (du Gay 1998, McRobbie
2000, Ursell 2000).
Wright (1996: 697) points out that in the production process exploiters try
to moderate their domination in order to elicit consent from the exploited.
Some governmentality theorists tend to discuss this indirect way of
management with the concept of self-exploitation (McRobbie 2000, Ursell
2000). It is a concept that criticises the autonomy offered in cultural production
at the price of suffering experiences of overtime, low pay, and high risks and
uncertainty. For example, McRobbie (2000) believes that firms/managers
authorise some degree of creative freedom and space to cultural workers and
train workers in ‘self-exploitation’ or ‘self-management’ in order to control them.
In other words, she argues that state and firms manage cultural workers
through discourses of self-exploitation, instead of simple domination. Banks
and Hesmondhalgh (2009: 421) appreciate McRobbie’s work because it
usefully questions the quality of creative work by acknowledging the difficult
working conditions in cultural production, such as self-blaming. They also
quote other theorists’ work on self-exploitation in culture-related industries,
such as the IT industries (Ross 2005), in order to show a tendency that reflects
‘disappointment and disillusion’ (p.421) behind ‘aspirations to and expectations
of autonomy’ (ibid.).
Banks (2007) agrees that such creative management combined with the
authorising of certain autonomy to workers aims to ‘override any misgivings,
constraints or disadvantages that might emerge in the everyday reproduction
of this highly competitive and uncertain domain’ (p.55). But he also argues that
governmentalists’ work is problematic in terms of self-exploitation: by
understanding autonomy and creativity as a seduction from the state and firms,
it ignores the agency and subjectivity of cultural workers. Wright (1996)
explicitly states that the constraining force of exploitation also offers a certain
power to the exploited. The subjectivity and power of the exploited shown in
Banks’s and Wright’s work could be related to workers’ agency, which will be
introduced in the next section, although Banks does not define cultural work as
exploitation. Meanwhile, Hesmondhalgh (2010: 274) also claims that research
on exploitation in cultural industries needs more careful work, as the vital issue
in explaining exploitation is to distinguish whether the work is carried out under
the illegitimate form of compulsion or not.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 61-67) divide creative autonomy into
aesthetic autonomy and professional autonomy. The former defines works of
art that are produced without applying to human product or natural object.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker argue that it is necessary to aspire, which is linked
to the social value of culture and communication, to human freedom which is
included in aesthetic autonomy. But they also state that most work in cultural
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industries does not involve aesthetic autonomy, as most creative workers do
not conduct aesthetic or artistic production. For example, journalists are a
large group that is not involved in such aesthetic production, whilst their work is
still largely autonomous. Indeed, the autonomy sought by journalists is close to
that sought by professional groups. Therefore, Hesmondhalgh and Baker
argue that autonomy in creative work needs to be understood in two ways:
aesthetic autonomy and professional autonomy, the latter in which journalistic
autonomy belongs.
Some internet workers conduct work related to aesthetics or arts, such as
visual art designers who deal with works of aesthetics online. However, most
workers in the internet industries are not involved in such aesthetic work;
instead, they occupy jobs that centre on knowledge, information and
technologies. These workers search for autonomy that is closer to journalistic
autonomy, professional autonomy in Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s term, rather
than aesthetic autonomy. This professional autonomy involves workers’
self-determination in their work practices and creativity, under the pressures
that are exerted by the state and firms. Meanwhile, internet workers also
search for workplace autonomy in their daily work. As Hesmondhalgh and
Baker clarified in their framework, this is sought by people desiring freedom
from constraints or determinants in their work, which is different from personal
autonomy, which is the freedom sought by individuals in their lives. By
comparison, internet workers search for freedom in their daily work, such as
the balance between work and life. Internet work blurs the labourers’ work and
leisure time, as some work in modern societies does. This blurring sometimes
results in internet workers’ desire to seek free space in terms of working hours.
Thus, workplace autonomy constitutes the other account of the autonomy I
discuss in the empirical part.
Given these various forms of autonomy, it is likely that workers’
experiences of autonomy are subjective and ambivalent. This would seem to
suggest that in an analysis of workplace autonomy, it is crucial to include the
degree of autonomy workers experienced in their daily work, and ‘the
pressures that they feel are being exerted on their professional autonomy’
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010: 67). Moreover, it is also vital to explore
forces, such as political and economic issues, that shape workers’ experiences
of autonomy. These forces help to show workers’ subjective experiences of
autonomy, which would consequently contribute to an evaluation of the quality
of working life in the internet industries.
In this section, I have outlined a theoretical model that contains concepts
of work effort, security, and autonomy, in order to exemplify my framework for
assessing working life in the Chinese internet industries. I argue that work
effort needs to be examined with reference to issues of working hours, work
intensity, and pay. In terms of work security, I raise some questions that
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concern the need for stable conditions and knowledge regarding the future of
the work, in order to shape a framework that would be applied to an
examination of tensions between the state and internet workers. I then follow
Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s framework in relation to autonomy to clarify my
approach to internet workers’ autonomy. As I outline in detail later in the thesis,
I propose that it is imprecise to discuss workers’ experiences of autonomy
using the concept of self-exploitation. Instead, I argue that the internet workers’
experiences of autonomy are quite ambivalent. They need to be discussed via
two variants: workplace autonomy and professional autonomy. These
experiences could be examined via workers’ subjective understandings of the
degree of autonomy in their daily practices as well as the pressures upon their
autonomy. It is also necessary to discuss the political and economic forces that
shape these experiences of autonomy in workers’ practices.
2.7 Acts of agency
As discussed earlier, in section 2.5, Wright (1996: 697) points out that
exploiters moderate their domination by eliciting a certain degree of consent
from the exploited, in order to reduce costs. This moderation then authorises a
certain power to the exploited. Wright (2002: 850) explicitly claims that this
power authorised to the exploited enables them to resist appropriation. It is
essential to class relations, as the exploiter depends upon the exploited.
Because the exploiter needs the exploited classes, the latter’s resistance to
the exploitation is hard to counter. Burawoy and Wright (2002: 474-475) further
claim that inequalities, especially the unequal distribution of interests in
workers’ lives within social relations will lead to conflicts by those who are
exploited. These exploited classes ‘have inherent sources of power to resist
their exploitation’ (p.475). Here, the collective activities of conflict are
understood as a response from the exploited class to their exploitation.
But such conflicts are impossible to be realised in contemporary Chinese
society, where political power is still highly centralised in the hand of CCP (part
of the bureaucratic capitalist class). Large-scale social movements, a key
component of class struggle, are hard to find in a Chinese context. However,
this does not mean that the lower middle class and the working class are
exploited without any resistance. Small scales of resistance are initiated
against appropriation within the classes. But, again, class conflict is a macro
level concept for understanding the dynamics between classes, such as
resistance from the working class to the bureaucratic capitalist class, rather
than one that might be used to analyse individual acts of resistance. Like the
concept of exploitation, it provides a context to explain why internet workers
have certain experiences, practices and values. Moreover, it would not be a
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real choice, if all acts of agency or autonomy were understood as a product of
systemic exploitation. How can people resist if everyone is hopeless, trapped
and exploited? Thus, it generates the necessity to clarify what is meant by acts
of agency, especially worker agency.
Callinicos (2004) clarifies his understanding of the concept of human
agents by restating Elster’s work. According to Elster, human action is
distinguished from the rest of nature by intentional behaviour, which is an
action that relates to the future. It is ‘guided by a goal that is absent,
not-yet-realised, merely imagined or represented’ (p.5). Callinicos (2004)
quotes Perry Anderson’s work to divide this intentional behaviour into three
forms. The first is acts towards ‘the pursuit of ‘private’ goals’ (p.1), such as
choosing marriage and exercising skills; the second is behaviour that
‘operate(s) within the framework of existing social relations, pertaining to the
kind of ventures involving ‘public’ goals’ (p.2), such as political struggles and
commercial explorations; the third refers to acts involved in ‘the collective
pursuit of global social transformation’ (ibid.), such as the French Revolution.
Callinicos (2004) endorses Anderson’s analysis as it ‘overcome(s) the abstract
polarity between structure and agency represented by Althusser and
Thompson respectively’ (ibid.). For Althusser, history is a process, which
results in certain accumulation of structural contradictions and changes.
Human beings only participate in historical change. In other words, Althusser
focuses on structural change, with ignoring agency of human beings. In
comparison, Thompson highlights human beings’ struggles in the historical
process, which ultimately consciously control and change the world.
Anderson’s work is valuable to distinguish ‘public agency’ and ‘collective
agency’ from ‘personal agency’. But Callinicos also points out that Anderson
fails to consider the common ground between the different forms of agency.
Thus, Callinicos’s research sheds light upon empirical studies of worker
agency by offering a philosophical understanding of human agency.
In the field of sociology, theorists work on the question of subjectivity or
agency via various approaches. For example, O’Doherty and Willmott (2001)
introduce three tendencies of exploring agency in labour process theory: the
orthodox school, which, according to O’Doherty and Willmott, overemphasises
the economistic and structuralist issues of Marx’s labour process theory by
neglecting labour’s subjectivity; the anti-realist approach, which abandons
analysis of subjective/objective or structure/agency; and the post-structuralist
approach, which offers a critical way to understand the social formation of
subjectivity. Critically, this approach explores complex ‘political, economic,
psychological and existential processes that inter-articulate and combine in the
practices of the labour process’ (p.465), which, in O’Doherty and Willmott’s
discussion, focuses on both structure and agency. O’Doherty and Willmott
prefer the post-structuralist approach as it helps them to understand ‘how
subjectivity is co-implicated in the accomplishment and reproduction of
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capitalist employment relations’ (p.457). The post-structuralist approach is
valuable in terms of realising workers’ subjectivity and agency, but it
overemphasises individual subjectivity by neglecting structural production
relations, which, in my view, is an important contextual factor that helps us to
understand workers’ experiences. Moreover, it does not specifically focus on
agency in the workplace; thus, it could not be thoroughly applied in this
research to understand internet workers’ agency.
Instead, the definition of worker agency in Randy Hodson’s work (2001) is
more useful. He defines agency as ‘the active and creative performance of
assigned roles in ways that give meaning and content to those roles beyond
what is institutionally scripted’ (p.16). He further divides worker agency into
four categories of behaviour, ‘resistance, citizenship, the pursuit of meaning,
and social relations at work’ (p.17). Hodson’s definition and categorization of
worker agency are valuable in terms of relating workers’ subjectivity to social
relations at work. Hodson explains workplace resistance as the subtle and
subdued practices that are actively and passively enacted by workers against
unequal ‘abuse, overtime and exploitation’ (ibid.). It usually relies on
‘small-scale actions involving a subtle withdrawal of cooperation or a banking
of enthusiasm’ (ibid.). Here, it shows the interactive relations between the
issue of agency and class exploitation by understanding acts of resistance as
a reaction to exploitation. Hodson’s other three issues with reference to worker
agency are also important, such as citizenship, which explains workers’
purposive practices aiming to create productions above the organisations’
requirements. But, in this study, I am particularly interested in Hodson’s work
of resistance.
In the field of the cultural industries, Banks (2007) criticises two
approaches towards cultural production for neglecting worker agency: critical
theorists who recognise the erosion of labour’s creativity and autonomy in
cultural industries because of the pervasiveness of globalisation, whilst
neglecting the agency of labour; and governmentalists who use the concept of
self-exploitation to understand creative management in cultural production,
whilst understanding workers’ subjectivity in a negative way. As an alternative,
Banks acknowledges a certain degree of worker agency in the concept of
individualisation. To him, individualisation is double-edged: although it is the
means for state and firms to manage workers, it still runs the risk that one day
people will be genuinely independent ‘in ways unanticipated and unwelcomed
by government’ (p.100). Put simply, Banks indicates a sense of worker agency
in the cultural industries, and the importance of recognising acts of agency.
Building on this, I argue that acts of worker agency indeed need to be
understood as a part of working life: workers engage in acts of resistance and
negotiation in order to support their own existence – improving working
conditions, and contributing to moral practices – such as looking for certain
freedom for the lower classes (I will explain this issue in Chapter Seven). The
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responses from the internet workers then form part of the uniqueness of
working experiences in the Chinese internet industries.
Wittel (2004) argues that worker agency is commonly neglected in the
political economy of communication approach, which claims that agency only
matters in some studies of audiences’ consumption practices. This top-down
approach argues that agency only matters in the production process if we look
at ‘a very few powerful people in the media and communications industries,
such as Rupert Murdoch or Bill Gates’ (p.84). In other words, political economy
of communication, in Wittel’s argument, neglects ordinary workers’ agency.
Such neglecting of worker agency is criticised in some theorists’ work (such as
Callinicos), who regard work agency, especially worker resistance, as a
significant issue in various ways. Callinicos (1983) points out that workers’
resistance contributes to ‘the consciousness and organisation of the working
class’ (p.147).
Ross (2008) also highlights spaces of resistance in the cultural industries.
He points out that the concept of immaterial labour – labourers that produce
service, social relationships, affects, knowledge, and communication (Negri
1989, Hardt and Negri 2000, Dyer-Witheford 2005) – is helpful to generate a
political cross-class coalition of interests between low-end workers, such as
service workers, and high-end workers, such as the creative class in
knowledge industries, even though the concept is problematic in several ways.
Because all these workers share a similar experience of precarity in
contemporary capitalism, there is enough space to prompt an anti-precarity
movement, which might ‘forge a political coalition of interest against the class
polarization associated with economic liberalization’ (p.41). Put simply, Ross
indicates a possible resistance that unites different social classes against the
precarious conditions in their work experiences. This could be understood as
power originating from the bottom to the top in contemporary capitalism. For
example, Ross gives the case of the recent anti-precarity social movement in
France. In 2006, the French government planned to issue new labour policies
to make it easier to fire youth under 26. This generated massive resistance
amongst students, and later linked student movements to immigrant rights
struggle and service workers’ struggle. According to Ross, this large-scale
social movement was regarded as a ‘cross-class alliance’ ‘drawn from sectors
of the service class, the creative class and the knowledge class’ (p.41). It is
arguable that ‘immaterial labour’ unites people in such anti-precarity
movements; rather, I argue that the ‘precarious’ working and living conditions
organise people to initiate such anti-precarity movement.
Likewise, Qiu (2009) points out a similar tendency in the Chinese social
context: low-end workers and users, the ‘information have-less’, in Chinese
society generate a transformative power potential from the bottom to the top –
a possible transformation initiated by this low class to against the state, aiming
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to create a better China. This have-less class experiences difficult working and
living conditions, such as low pay with manual work, which results in their
difficult lives in cities, and discrimination against workers from rural areas,
which makes them unable to settle down in cities. As a result, this have-less
class tries to gain control over the power distribution in the information society,
by using their simple skills, physical labour force and social networks, to
express their discontents about the injustice and difficulties they experience
and to even improve their working and living conditions. These ordinary
Chinese people discuss their experiences of inequalities in contemporary
China and then take effective and significant actions in varied new media
events, which I will discuss in Chapter Eight. This have-less class then
becomes ‘an important harbinger of change’ (p.226) in contemporary Chinese
society. Qiu then argues that this have-less class shape and empower a new
working class in Chinese society and might take Chinese society into a new
era via large-scale social transformation. The agency of low-end workers and
users in Qiu’s research is regarded as a potential power from the bottom to the
top that would bring possible transformation in Chinese society.
Ross’s and Qiu’s work points to the possibility of cross-class coalitions
between low-end workers and high-end workers: is it possible that the working
class in Qiu’s research, ordinary Chinese new media producers and users, and
the lower middle class in my study, internet workers, shape a cross-class
coalition, because of their similar experiences and interests in contemporary
Chinese society? And, if they do, will this cross-class coalition embark on
collective resistance that would lead to a potential transformation in Chinese
society? I will address these questions in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight,
when I discuss internet workers’ agency.
In this section, I have argued that internet workers’ agency consists of
negotiation with and resistance to the state and firms. This agency, I argue, is
a part of working life in the internet industries; it represents workers’ response
to the difficult working conditions they face. These individual acts of negotiation
and resistance arise from macro level class conflicts, which are shaped by
macro level class exploitation, and a certain theory of personhood – to support
one’s own existence and contribute to moral practices. Moreover, based on
Ross’s and Qiu’s work, I further point out a possible cross-class coalition
between the lower middle class, internet workers in this research, and the
working class, the low-end workers and users in Qiu’s work. I argue that
through such cross-class coalition, it is possible to initiate a transformation in
the Chinese society that might lead to a better China.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I began with a discussion of social class and Marx’s
concept of exploitation, which fundamentally contributes to my understanding
of working life in the Chinese internet industries. Based on his
conceptualisation of exploitation and other theorists’ restatement and
modification of his work, I argued that exploitation is a structural context and
that this notion is an important conceptual tool with which analyse workers’
subjective experiences in the industries. Then, I built up a theoretical
framework based on this context, which contained concepts of work effort,
security, and autonomy. In subsequent chapters, I use this framework in order
to evaluate my empirical data relating to workers’ subjective experiences in the
next few chapters.
Moreover, I argued that the agency of internet workers and their acts of
negotiation and resistance also need to be understood as a part of their
working life. This agency is believed to initiate a possible social transformation
which might lead to better Chinese internet industries and a better Chinese
society in the future. It indicates that the power is not only in the hands of the
powerful, but also in the hands of the lower classes in contemporary Chinese
society.
In this chapter, I argued that both exploitation and agency are macro level
notions, which focus on structural relationships and dynamics between classes.
Exploitation refers to the dominating class, which owns the relevant productive
resources, appropriating the labour efforts of the dominated class. This
indicates the causal relationships between the classes’ activities. Agency
refers to the response, in forms of class conflict, of the dominated class to
exploitation from the dominating class. This emphasises dynamics between
the classes. Both notions provide a macro model of class analysis, which is
difficult to use to directly analyse individuals’ subjective experiences. Thus, I
argued that both notions need to be used as contexts for understanding
subjective experiences: the notion of exploitation explains why workers suffer
from bad working conditions; whilst the notion of agency explains how workers
strive to improve working conditions and why they still work in the industries,
despite the bad conditions.
As Wright (2009) argues, a fully elaborated class analysis needs to
combine both a macro model and micro model of class analysis. Here, I
combined the macro model of class analysis, notions of exploitation and
agency, and the micro model of class analysis, subjective experiences of
workers in the lower middle class, such as their work effort, autonomy and
security in work.
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Therefore, as I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, I intend to adopt
a neo-Marxist approach to class analysis as the fundamental mechanism for
understanding workers’ subjective experiences in the Chinese internet
industries. This fundamental mechanism will be applied to analysing my
empirical data, which was collected during my fieldwork, in the empirical
section (from Chapters Four to Seven) of this thesis. But before I move to the
empirical discussion, I will first explain my five months’ fieldwork and discuss
the methodology for this research in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
According to Llobera (1998), historical research, whereby researchers
investigate the past in order to understand the present, is the key method to
archive both large-scale social change and small-scale individual experiences.
In his view, the approach mainly depends on primary sources and secondary
sources. Primary sources include ‘interviewing people directly, observing them,
or analysing the documents they produce in going about their lives’ (p.74),
whilst secondary sources involve ‘reviewing and synthesising a range of
research reports each describing a single but different society, whose authors
had themselves built their descriptions on primary sources’ (ibid.). However,
such methods are not only valuable in historical research. These methods are
also valuable for conducting other qualitative research relating to humanity,
such as understanding individuals’ experiences of working life in contemporary
societies. This research then prioritises the primary sources of interviewing
workers directly and observing them to archive and assess the quality of their
working life experiences.
In this chapter I discuss why and how I collected the primary sources via
these qualitative research methods. In section 3.2, I introduce the two
companies in which I carried out fieldwork and clarify what kind of internet
workers I am talking about in this research. In section 3.3, I discuss the two
methods I used to conduct this research: in-depth interviews and participant
observation. I explain why I chose these methods and how I applied them to
collect data. I argue that it is necessary to conduct covert observation in the
Chinese internet industries, where much academic research of this nature is
viewed with suspicion. In section 3.4, I introduce how I analysed the data,
where I highlight the problem of translating the Chinese language data into
English. In section 3.5, I explain the ethical issues related to this research: the
problems I found difficult to solve and my reflections on these problems. In
section 3.6, I discuss my reflections during the fieldwork and in some
academic occasions after the fieldwork.
3.2 Research companies and workers
As I have already established in the preceding chapters, this research
project focuses on the quality of working life in the Chinese internet industries.
I am particularly interested in how workers themselves understand the quality
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of their working life. This includes how they evaluate their experiences and
practices, and how they understand their values towards products. Also, if the
workers evaluate the quality of their working lives to be low, then how (and
whether) they improve that quality. I do not intend to compare the quality of
Chinese internet workers’ working lives with the quality of internet workers’
working lives in other geographical and political contexts via a quantitative
study. Instead, I pay particular attention to how Chinese internet workers are
experiencing and practicing their work in contemporary Chinese society:
whether they enjoy a quality middle-class life as their social class indicates, or
whether they are exploited by certain upper classes? What results in this
quality of working life? And to what extent does their working life matter?
As I pointed out in Chapter One, little research has paid attention to the
quality of working life of internet workers, especially Chinese internet workers.
Due to this, I take a close look at internet workers’ practices and experiences
via participating in their work and life; I also talk about internet workers’ values
towards their products via directly discussing the issue with them. As I wanted
to find out how these workers work in the internet industries and live in
contemporary Chinese society, I spent three months (September – December
2011) participating in the work at one internet company (Grand) to observe
what kind of working life the workers experience and practice, and I conducted
in-depth interviews with workers in another internet company (Campus) to find
out what the workers think about their work.
3.2.1 Research questions
As noted in Chapter One, the main research question is: What is the quality
of working life in the Chinese internet industries? In order to explore this
question, some subsidiary questions to be considered are as follows:
(1) What are the main features of working life in Chinese internet industries?
(2) What is internet workers’ class location in Chinese society?
(3) Why do internet workers suffer injustice and inequality in their working
lives?
(4) How do the workers themselves understand these experiences?
(5) How do the state and companies seek to control workers?
(6) To what extent we can criticise the workers’ experiences as exploitation?
(7) What are the responses of workers to the state and companies’ control?
(8) Why do workers work in the industries, despite the difficult working
conditions?
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In order to answer these research questions, a qualitative methodology is
needed to gain a deep understanding of the quality of working life. Before I
introduce the qualitative methods I adopted to collect empirical data, I first turn
to introduce the two companies in which I chose to conduct my fieldwork.
3.2.2 Research companies
There are thousands of internet companies in China, some of which
produce significant economic, cultural and political benefits. For example,
microblogs play an important role in the construction of online spaces, which
are perceived by many to be mechanisms for free speech. Because of
microblogs, it is claimed that ordinary Chinese people have the chance to
discuss public issues and push the state to improve public services, such as in
the case of the 7/23 Wenzhou train crash, discussed in the introduction, where
criticism in microblogging platforms led to a change in government strategy. As
a response to the government’s restriction on media coverage of this accident,
internet users successfully forced some officials in the Ministry of Railways to
resign, via their strong online criticism and other online activities of resistance.
At the same time, local governments have been pushed to be transparent
about certain issues, with over 10,000 local government departments setting
up microblog accounts to make their services transparent.23
However, when this research was initiated, microblogging was not as
popular as it is now, so it was not my first choice as a site through which to
conduct this research. As an alternative, I chose the company where I had
conducted interviews for my MA fieldwork as one of my fieldwork sites. My MA
project considered some internet workers in Campus as a part of immaterial
labour – labourers that produce services, social relationships, affects,
knowledge, and communication – via discussing the blurring of their work and
life. There were three reasons for choosing Campus as one of my fieldwork
sites. First, the access problem would be easily solved, as I had already built
up my social networks in that company; second, it would benefit this research
to revisit some participants in my MA project to discuss certain sensitive issues,
such as practices against the state; third, it was easy to build up a rapport with
the participants, because of our prior contact, which facilitated my aim of
discussing issues in great depth.
At the beginning of this research, I planned to choose the top online
commerce company to conduct another part of this ethnographic study –
Taobao, the major player in Chinese online commerce market, launched by
Alibaba Group in 2003. It has had deep cooperation with Sina microblog since
23 China National Information Infrastructure, 11th January 2011
82
April 2013, when Alibaba invested Sina microblog. For example, users with
Sina microblog accounts were able to log in to Taobao directly. However, this
plan failed because the company rejected my request to carry out participant
observation when it recognised me as an academic researcher, who might
publish information that it did not want in the public domain. This highlights the
access problem when conducting ethnographic research in China: most
companies reject academic research that does not bring economic benefits
(unless researchers have guanxi with government officials or company
leaders). Moreover, some companies worry that such academic research will
expose certain issues that harm them, such as bad working conditions in the
companies. Therefore, I decided to conduct covert observation in another
company, which a friend introduced me to. I will discuss this covert observation
in section 3.3.2, and talk about the related ethical concerns in section 3.5.
As a result, I chose two companies from amongst the top 20 Chinese
internet companies to carry out my fieldwork. I anonymise the two companies
in this research, in order to protect all participants. The first I call Grand here.
This company focuses on online entertainment, such as online games and
online novels. It was listed on the US-based NASDAQ stock exchange in 2005,
and has dominated the online games market since then. The second company
I call Campus. This provides social networking services, like Facebook. It
dominates the Chinese online social networking market and was listed on the
US-based NASDAQ stock exchange in 2011. I carried out covert observation
for three months (September – December 2011) in Grand. Whilst in Campus, I
conducted fourteen interviews (five people – William, Lara, Galeno, Carl, and
Louis – were interviewed twice, and four people – Wynn, Davis, Lee, and
Walter – were interviewed once). I also invited one of the interviewees from
Campus, named Galeno here, to keep his working journal for me as a form of
self-observation. Meanwhile, I chose some interview contents of my MA
project as a part of the data (such as interviews conducted with Alex and
George). All of this important interviewee information is shown in section 3.3.1,
whereby I explain how I conducted these interviews. There are also some key
participants in my observation I introduce in section 3.3.2, where I explain the
process of covert observation.
It has been difficult to decide to what extent I should introduce these
companies in this section. Some parts of this research deal with sensitive
issues in the Chinese context, such as how workers improve their working
conditions via practices against the companies and the state. Thus, it would be
risky to give too much information about the companies, as it would probably
identify the participants. On the one hand, certain information about the
companies is necessary to explain why they were chosen for this research,
and on the other hand, anonymising all participants’ information, such as their
names and positions in the company, will reduce the risk of them being
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identified. I will discuss these concerns in section 3.5. First I clarify who these
workers are below.
3.2.3 Who are these workers?
Some research in the ‘turn to labour’, has a tendency to centre on notions
of creative labour and knowledge labour (Florida 2002, McKercher and Mosco
2008). For example, Florida (2002) argues that a new creative class, which
includes core creative workers and creative professionals, is forming in the
creative economy. The term core creative workers refers to workers ‘creating
new ideas, new technology and/or new creative content’ (p.8), and creative
professionals are workers ‘engaging in complex problem solving that involves
a great deal of independent judgment and requires high levels of education or
human capital’ (ibid).
But McKercher and Mosco (2008) make the criticism that the notion of the
creative class is too narrow, as it only focuses on highly educated people
‘whose major value lies in their ability to translate human capital into creative
work’ (p.24). As an alternative, they argue that the notion of the creative class
should be broadened to the concept of knowledge labour, and should focus on
the subjective experiences of workers, such as the ways they choose to
organise their unions, rather than on external criteria. In other words,
McKercher and Mosco (2008) suggest a broader concept than creative class –
knowledge labour – to include most forms of mental labour.
However, both concepts (creative class and knowledge labour) are
criticised in Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s research (2010: 56-60), because of
their neglect of the specificity of cultural labour. Hesmondhalgh and Baker
(2010: 5-6) argue that McKercher and Mosco’s definition of knowledge labour
is too broad to acknowledge ‘the specific importance of culture, of mediated
communication, and of the content of communication products’ (p.59).
As an alternative, Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) distinguish the term
creative labour from terms for other mental workers, because it highlights the
importance of the ‘tensions and contradictions between economics and culture,
creativity and commerce’ (p.9). Creative labour focuses on the activities of
symbol-making, by primarily being involved in the ‘creation and dissemination
of very particular kinds of products, ones that are mainly symbolic, aesthetic,
expressive and/or informational’ (p.60). Consequently, Hesmondhalgh and
Baker clarify their definition of creative workers as ‘primary creative personnel
such as writers, actors, directors, musicians; craft and technical workers such
as camera operators, film editors and sound engineers; creative managers
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such as television producers, magazine editors and A&R personnel;
administrators; executives; and unskilled labour’ (p.9).
According to this definition, it is possible to argue internet workers are a
part of these creative workers, as most of them belong to primary creative
personnel, such as visual art designers and product designers; craft and
technical workers, such as web designers and engineers; administrators and
executives, such HR (Human Resources). But due to the framework of
assessing working life adopted in this research – working hours and pay,
autonomy, security, and worker agency, it is important to categorise these
creative workers based on their work status, such as work patterns, rather than
their work contents. There are some differences between these creative
workers’ working-life experiences, because of their different work patterns. For
example, those who work as part-time (interns), have different working hours
and pay compared with workers who work full-time. Thus, it is necessary to
borrow another framework based on work patterns to categorise creative
workers in the Chinese internet industries.
Noon and Blyton (2002: 5) point out several criteria by which to classify
people’s work, such as the way jobs are undertaken, the main purpose of the
work, job status, temporal pattern, and work location. In this research, I classify
the workers by the criterion of temporal pattern, such as full time/part time, and
permanent/temporary. According to this criterion, these workers are full-time
workers, interns and agency labour.
‘Full-time workers’ refers to workers who are paid and hold formal
occupations in internet companies. These workers are the main contributors to
the creation of cultural products. Some of these workers possess high skills,
whilst some have low skills, though none of them only sell manual labour as
manual workers did during industrialist capitalism. Thus, some full-time
workers here are understood as technical workers, conducting
technical-related work, such as programming, web design and APP
(Application Software) developing, etc. Other full-time workers are
non-technical workers, who are mainly involved in administrative and routine
work, such as HR (Human Resources) recruiting and training employees;
marketing workers doing promotional work; and PR (Public Relations)
personnel maintaining relationships with government officials, etc.
Interns have more flexible contracts than full-time workers, and have
different working-life experiences compared with full-time workers. This is
discussed in the empirical part of this thesis, in Chapters Four to Six. The
internship seems to have become a popular temporary work status for
university students in a variety of geographical and political contexts. For
example, Perlin (2011) conducted a survey on internships, which implied that
they are increasingly becoming an important part of university students’ lives in
the USA and beyond. It is the same situation in China, where most university
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BBSs (Bulletin Board Systems) provide information about internship vacancies
in various companies for university students. Figure 3.1 is part of the
internships information from the BBS in Zhejiang University – the 3rd most
successful university in China.
Figure 3.1: Internship information on Zhejiang University’s BBS
Source: Flicker account of a graduate from Zhejiang University
(http://www.flickr.com/photos/delai/4453587152/), translated by the writer
In figure 3.1, eleven out of twenty-one intern opportunities are in
internet-related companies, such as Intel, IBM, and Taobao (the main online
commerce company in China). In other words, the internet industries favour
recruiting interns from universities. University students hope to have gained
fruitful intern experiences before accessing job markets. For example, Janet,
an intern in Grand, whom I spent the most time with during my observation,
started her internships at the beginning of her university life. Lily, another
intern in Grand, had interned in more than ten companies before joining Grand.
This number might be higher than most other new full-time workers. According
to both of them, it is common to find university students keen to acquire as
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many intern experiences as possible before graduation, as they aim to have a
good start for a successful career.
As well as full-time workers and interns, there are large numbers of
agency workers in the Chinese internet industries. There are two forms of
agency labour here: self-employed workers and ‘code farmers’. The former is a
team of high-skilled workers, who work on certain projects outsourced by big
internet companies, without having temporary or long-term positions there.
The latter are workers who are sent to the internet companies by outsourcing
companies to conduct outsourced work, both technical and non-technical.
They do not sign long-term contracts with the internet companies, nor do they
hold any formal position in the companies. Rather, they tend to sign contracts
with the outsourcing companies. This form of employment relationship is called
labour outsourcing services. The internet companies send projects to the
outsourcing companies, which then assign workers to carry out work in the
internet companies. These code farmers do not have regular employment
relations with the commissioning companies – the internet companies in this
example. In both Grand and Campus, I found large numbers of agency
workers in various departments. For example, most workers in the culture
department in Grand – the department responsible for building up and
maintaining the company’s culture (such as the ‘geek culture’) via editing
internal magazine and reports relating to working life – were agency workers,
as the internal magazine the department was working on, was completely
outsourced to an advertising company. Therefore, most of the agency workers
here, were dispatched from the advertising company.
Full-time workers, interns and agency workers have experiences in
common, such as their unequal pay compared to SOE workers and executives.
These common issues imply their difficulties and struggles in contemporary
society, which suggests the low quality of their working life. It is important to
distinguish between full-time workers, interns, and agency labour here,
because their different working-life experiences address significant issues. For
example, full-time workers’ ambivalent experiences of autonomy, addresses
the tensions between companies, the state and internet workers. The
experiences of injustice by interns’, addresses the problematic Chinese
education system, which highlights social problems in contemporary Chinese
society. The precarious working conditions of agency workers, highlights that
individual workers in contemporary Chinese society are forced to have
responsibilities, which formerly belonged to the state, on their shoulders. Put
simply, both the common and different working-life experiences between these
workers, implies that internet workers, the lower middle class in contemporary
Chinese society, struggle with the inequalities and injustices partly caused by
structural exploitation – the bureaucratic capitalist and higher middle class
appropriate the labour efforts of the lower middle class – and unequal power
distributions between different classes. I explain these common and different
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working-life experiences and how they relate to internet workers’ class status
in the following chapters.
Among these full-time workers, interns and agency workers, I chose nine
full-time workers in Campus to interview (five full-time workers were
interviewed in August and December 2011, four full-time workers were
interviewed in August 2011, and one full-time worker was invited to partake in
self-observation). There were more than twenty full-time workers and interns I
contacted via chatting, having dinner and lunch, hanging out, and having
coffee in Grand, among which, I chose six full-time workers and five interns’
experiences to present in this research. I did not directly contact agency
workers via interviews, but had observed two code farmers in the HR
Department of Grand. I introduce these participants’ information in detail
below.
3.3 Data collection
3.3.1 In-depth interviews
Seale (1998) claims that interview methods in qualitative research help us
to investigate the things that cannot be seen or heard, such as ‘the
interviewee’s inner state – the reasoning behind their actions, and their
feelings’ (p.202). Fielding (1993) divides the interview into three categories:
standardised or structured interviews, semi-standardised interviews, and
non-standardised interviews. For standardised interviews, interviewers always
ask the same questions to all the interviewees. In comparison,
semi-standardised interviews are more flexible; the interviewers ask certain,
similar questions to interviewees, but are free to alter some sequencing
questions depending on different situations. The most popular interview form
in qualitative research is the non-standardised interview, which is also called
‘an unstructured or focused interview’ (p.136). Interviewers in
non-standardised interviews normally have a list of topics that relate to their
research, but they are free to phrase the questions during the course of the
interview, and even join the conversation by discussing the questions with their
interviewees. This list of topics is called an interview guide.
In this research, because the working life experience is individualised and
fragmented, it is more reasonable and valuable to adopt the non-standardised
interview rather than other interview forms. As I noted in the last section, this
research builds upon my MA project from 2010, where I had conducted seven
interviews on Campus to discuss the blurring of these internet workers’ work
and life with the concept of immaterial labour. One of the seven interviewees I
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originally interviewed for my MA, was interviewed again for this PhD research;
some information from the original seven interviews is also used here in this
thesis. Ideally, I would have liked to confirm with the seven interviewees about
the use of their interview content in this thesis. But, all of them had left Campus
when I revisited there in 2011, and it was only possible to contact one of them.
Therefore, I received agreement to use the data collected in 2010 from only
one person. I hope that if my participants read this thesis and recognise
themselves in it, they understand my motivations for using content from their
interviews in this research.
In addition to the seven interviews conducted for my MA project, I
conducted fourteen interviews in 2011. During this period (August and
December 2011), the interviews were divided into two parts: nine interviews
were carried out in August, the time before I conducted participant observation
in Grand, in order to have a general understanding of the working life
experiences. The other five interviews were carried out in December, when I
revisited some of the original nine interviewees in order to discuss some
issues I identified in the observation. I give details of these interviews in Table
3.1.
All interviewees were chosen according to the following criteria:
1. In order to avoid the problem of bias, both female and male workers
were chosen, although there were fewer female workers than male
workers, due to gender discrimination in the industries. Thus, seven
male workers and two female workers were chosen for this research.
2. All workers were interested in the research and eager to talk about their
own experiences.
3. In order to explore the different experiences of the workers,
interviewees were chosen from different departments.
4. In order to explore the sensitive issue of control by the state and the
company, I chose some interviewees who planned to leave Campus, or
who had already resigned from the company. They would be more likely
to discuss issues frankly.
5. In order to explore the issue of workers’ responses, some interviewees
were the most active workers, who were familiar with most colleagues
and participated in most activities in the company.
Details of the interviewees are as follows (names of interviewees are
anonymised):
Name Interview
time
Ag
e
Gend
er
Working background
William 26th
August
24 Male Joined Campus in 2010. He worked in the
3G department to enable social
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2011; 19th
December
2011
networking services on mobile platforms.
Lara 26th
August
2011; 19th
December
2011
26 Fema
le
Joined Campus in April 2011. She worked
as an intern at Campus since 2009. After
receiving a Master degree, she worked in
the Advertisement department to attract
advertisers to buy advertising spaces on
Campus’ social networking services.
Galeno 24th
August
2011; 20th
December
2011
23 Male Joined Campus in 2010. He worked in the
Product Administration Department, taking
charge of designing online products.
Carl 27th
August
2011; 20th
December
2011
24 Male Joined Campus in 2009. He worked in the
Open Platform department to enable
online products produced by individuals or
other internet companies to work on the
website of Campus.
Louis 28th
August
2011; 18th
December
2011
25 Male Joined Campus in 2010. He started his
work in the Open Platform department to
develop online products in 2010, when I
first interviewed him for my MA project. He
had already left Campus when I visited
him in August 2011.
Wynn 24th
August
2011
24 Fema
le
Joined Campus in 2010. She worked in
the Open Platform Department to enable
online products to work on the website of
Campus.
Davis 25th
August
2011
24 Male Joined Campus in 2010. He worked in the
Advertisement Department dealing with
technical work.
Lee 27th
August
2011
25 Male Joined Campus in 2011. He worked in the
Product Administration Department
designing new online products.
Walter 25th
August
2011
27 Male Joined Campus in 2011. He worked in the
Advertisement Department at Campus,
conducting mainly technical work.
Table 3.1: Information of interviewees
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Additionally, as I stated earlier, I adopted some data from my MA project,
among which, Alex, Leo and George were three important interviewees. Alex
joined Campus at the same time as Louis in 2010. He worked in the Open
Platform Department to promote new online products to internet users. At the
time I interviewed him, he planned to leave Campus to start his own business.
Five months later (August 2010), when I contacted him again, he had left
Campus and joined his friend’s company, which created APPs. He had
provided me with a lot of information about how workers in Campus negotiate
with and resist the state and companies, and introduced me to some technical
workers in Campus (including Louis), which ultimately helped me successfully
conduct the interviews for my PhD research.
Leo graduated from one of the most successful university in mainland
China. He worked in the Open Platform Department at Campus at the time I
interviewed him. But, he later changed his job to another internet-related
company. He provided me with some information about how the state
intervened in internet workers’ creativity and daily practices, which helped me
recognise the complicated relationships between the state, internet companies
and workers.
George was a unique case in Campus. He was one of the few ‘top
workers’, who graduated from a branded university and had experience of
studying abroad. He gave me some valuable information about how to balance
restrictions from the state and workers’ own expectation of creating free online
space. This helped me to identify internet workers’ struggle and negotiation
towards control from the state, which became an important part of this
research.
The topics addressed in non-standardised interviews generally ranged
from workers’ innovatory practices, responses to mechanisms of control, the
construction of social networks in the company, and the organisational
contexts under which the interviewees worked. In particular, I asked
interviewees about their motivations behind these practices, such as
responses to mechanisms of control, and their own understanding and
evaluation of such experiences. Details of the interview guide are shown in
Appendix A.
On average, the fourteen interviews lasted two hours. In terms of the
language of communication, all interviews were conducted in Chinese. I will
turn to a discussion of the problem of translation and transcription in section
3.4.
Overall, in-depth interviews were a useful tool in terms of understanding
participants’ values towards production, motivations towards innovation, and
their beliefs behind the practices which they used to respond to the state and
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companies’ control. But, according to Fielding (1993), it is possible that
interviewees sometimes ‘lie or elaborate on the true situation to enhance their
esteem, cover up discreditable actions or for any of a whole gamut of motives’
(p.148). During the interviews, I noted that some participants avoided certain
issues, due to a range of concerns. For example, some interviewees refused
to talk about their salaries, as the company forbade them to talk about this
issue. Some interviewees avoided issues relating to social networks, because
they did not want to expose their bad relationships with colleagues.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) also recognise this problem in their empirical
research by claiming that interview methods have some well-known potential
limitations, for example, interviewees will be influenced by the interviewers’
leading questions, interviewees’ attitudes will change over time, etc. Hence, it
was necessary to adopt another important qualitative research method,
participant observation, to help supplement the data gathered from interviews.
While interviews were able to obtain what interviewees were thinking, with
participant observation it was easier to investigate what was happening. I now
turn to discuss this method in more detail.
3.3.2 Participant observation
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) define ethnography as a method that
‘involves the ethnographer participating overtly or covertly in people’s daily
lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what
is said, asking questions – in fact, collecting whatever data are available to
throw light on the issues that are the focus of research’ (p.1). By some
definitions, participant observation is regarded as a part of ethnography, and
this is adopted in my research, though arguably not for an extended period of
time. Brannan and Oultram (2012: 310) claim that participant observation
enables the exploration of certain human experiences, such as cultural and
emotional life experiences, which cannot be explored via other research
methods.
According to Walsh (1998), ethnography is classified into four categories,
depending on the potential observer roles: complete participant, complete
observer, participant as observer, and observer as participant. Complete
participant is also sometimes known as ‘covert participant observation’
(Brannan and Oultram 2012: 297). This form of participant observation does
not inform participants about the research. Thus, this role involves a certain
degree of duplicity, which can result in some ethical problems. It also has the
risk of ‘going native, where the observer abandons the position of analyst for
identification with the people under study’ (Walsh 1998: 222). These issues will
be discussed in section 3.5, as they represent some of the ethical issues I
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encountered during this research. In the complete observer role, the
researcher observes people from an alien framework, avoiding any social
interaction with them. This method may prevent the observer from getting at
people’s meanings and understanding the situation well. Both participant as
observer and observer as participant refer to overt ethnography. The former
emphasises ‘participation and social interaction over observing in order to
produce a relationship of rapport and trust’ (ibid.), whereas the latter prioritises
observation over participation to prevent the researcher from ‘going native’.
As I noted in section 3.2.2, most Chinese internet companies reject
academic research that does not result in significant economic benefits. As a
result, I was rejected by the online commerce company where I planned to
observe internet workers’ practices and experiences. Therefore, I changed my
plan and decided to carry out covert participant observation in Grand, where a
friend had secured me an internship for three months. Moreover, another
reason I chose covert research was to witness more ‘genuine’ acts of worker
agency.
There are many debates regarding the advantages and disadvantages of
covert participant observation. Fielding (1993) claims that covert research is
helpful for some research where access would otherwise be impossible, which
matches my research – the company refused academic access for research
purposes. Jorgensen (1989: 49) also argues that covert approach enables
researchers to access certain ‘closed’ field sites and ensures ‘genuine’ results.
Calvey (2000) highlights the necessity of conducting covert research in his
covert observation research about door supervisors in Manchester pubs,
where he regards covert research as a useful method to solve access
problems and protect researchers in dangerous fieldwork, such as work
relating to criminals. He also stresses that ‘covert participant observation was
the richest way to engage with the participants in any meaningful sense’
(p.47).
But Walsh (1998) argues that covert research produces ‘major problems
of an ethical and practical kind and a massive problem if the cover is blown’
(p.222) after accessing the research field. Brannan and Oultram (2002) point
out that covert participant observation has been criticised because of ‘being
unethical, dishonest, failing to respect human rights and potentially putting the
participants’ interests at risk’ (p.299). Berg (2009) points out the risk of
harming research pariticipants when conducting covert research. It is possible
that covert research may damage research reputation because of deceptive
activities, which will close off further avenues for research. Spicker (2011:
119-120) also points out that covert research is always questioned because of
deception involved in the process. But he also claims that most deceptive
research is not covert. He argues that many objections to covert research are
objections to deception rather than covert activity.
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Calvey (2000) admits that covert participant observation is done whilst
being indifferent to ‘all corrective moral judgements of the adequacy, value or
success in the way participants perform their work’ (p.47). However, he argues
that the covert role only matters seriously if one ‘holds on to a traditional
concept of the objectivity of the fieldworker’ (p.55). Instead, he argues that
ethics needs to be applied more broadly as ‘situational and case contingent’ –
to put ethics as ‘part of the ethnographic setting rather than extracted from it
and given honorific status (ibid.). He questions the issue of informed consent,
which was suggested by researchers who regard covert research as a
problematic method, by highlighting the practical concerns of ‘understand[ing]
the setting without disturbing it’ (p.47). Rather, he encourages more
investigative social research to be done on controversial areas with covert
methods.
Meanwhile, the criticism of the covert role does not mean overt participant
observation can solve all problems caused by covert research. Brannan and
Oultram (2002: 300) mention that some researchers argue that the benefits of
covert approaches can outweigh the risks. For example, Lauder (2003) argues
that covert research can be justified when the benefits outweigh the potential
risks. Fielding (1993) admits that overt and covert approaches indeed ‘shade
into each other’ (p.160): not all overt research informs its participants, and
some covert research does inform its participants with informed consent.
Brannan and Oultram (2002: 300) argue that it is impossible for a participant
observation researcher to be an ethical researcher, because the overt
approach also contains certain covert issues, such as duplicity due to the
necessity of collecting certain sensitive information.
Admittedly, the covert approach I adopted in my research resulted in
some ethical problems. For example, I felt that I was deceiving ‘participants’ as
I simultaneously built personal friendships and gathered their stories.
Participants told me their personal stories because they saw me as a friend;
friendship therefore helped me to gather data. This then presents me with a
dilemma regarding sharing the stories that participants confided in me.
But as Calvey argues, such ethical concerns need to be put as ‘a part of
the ethnographic setting’ rather than extracted them from the ethnographic
setting and gave them honorific status. Spicker (2011) also argues that covert
approach is necessary in some research, which has to ‘minimize the effort of
the process of observation on the way that people behave’ (p.120). In this
research, workers’ acts of agency, such as resisting to the state and
negotiating with the company, are the field that I want to minimise the impact of
my observation on the way that these workers behave. By using a covert
method, I felt that I would be able to witness more ‘genuine’ acts of worker
agency.
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Meanwhile, as I argued earlier, the access problem is the other reason
that I insist on using this covert method: because Chinese companies tend to
reject requests for access to do academic research, unless the research could
bring them commercial benefits. Such rejection would certainly have been the
case for my research into workers’ practices. Therefore, although I realised
certain ethical concerns in the process of using this covert approach, I still
decided to use this method due to its necessity for this research.
Moreover, Spicker (2011) points out that there are two rights in relation to
research subjects need to be considered when using the covert research:
particular rights and general rights. The former refers to the relationships
between the researchers and the participants – that is researchers’ actions
should be consistent with the principles they affirm. The general rights include
rights of citizenship, ‘general legal rights, and human rights, including rights to
privacy where appropriate, and the right not to be exploited’ (Spicker 2011:
122). The researchers are responsible for avoiding harm, promoting welfare,
and respecting persons. These duties apply not only to research participants,
but also to ‘third parties and potentially to wider social groups’ (ibid.).
The way I used covert approach in this research addressing the deception
issue may harm the participants, if the particular rights of participants were
taken priority over other general rights. But, the ‘genuine’ research results,
based on this covert approach, will benefit ‘wider social groups’ – I feel that the
research results contribute to understanding Chinese society and the role
played by internet workers. In other words, the covert research ensures the
general rights of wider social groups by contributing to common good – helping
us understand how internet workers contribute to the growth of Chinese
internet industries and the development of Chinese society. Therefore, I chose
covert observation as an important method to explore the working life. I will
discuss this issue in more detail in section 3.5.
Walsh (1998) suggests that the typical means of recording the data of
observation is making field notes, which is ‘concrete descriptions of social
processes and their contexts and which set out to capture their various
properties and features’ (p.228). Brannan and Oultram (2002) also highlight
the importance of making field notes during participant observation. In my
research, as I adopted the covert approach, it was difficult for me to keep notes
when I was working as an intern. Therefore, I wrote-up issues with key words
on my notebook during working hours, and developed them into diaries after
work as field notes. These field notes not only kept what I saw and thought
during work, but also my reflections during the fieldwork. I discussed some
parts of these notes with my supervisors via email during my three months’
observation. From our discussions, I reflected on certain issues and changed
some of my data-collection strategies.
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As an intern, I was placed in the HR department and dealt with work
relating to translation (from Chinese to English, and from English to Chinese).
In this work, I read large amounts of documents relating to working life, such
as recruiting, training, and rewarding. These documents were only circulated
inside the company, so my covert approach facilitated my access to this
information. My internship also enabled me to share experiences with other
interns. These experiences gave me a deep understanding of interns’ working
conditions in this internet company and also facilitated my awareness of some
of the general problems in contemporary Chinese university education, as all
interns were university students.
As my internship was in the training team in the HR department, which
took charge of workers’ training programmes, I was able to talk to workers in
different departments, including some technical departments. These workers
included both new workers and experienced ones; thus, conversations with
them showed me both the expectations from new workers and the subjective
experiences of experienced ones. Sometimes, I found that workers who had
work experience in other internet companies gave more detailed and
comparative information about working life in the internet industries. This
certainly helped me towards obtaining a general idea of working life in the
Chinese internet industries.
On a number of occasions, I showed my interest in working in the internet
industries, and was able to discuss certain topics relating to my research with
full-time workers or interns. In these cases, I collected data from ‘personal
narratives’ (Madison 2012: 28) – not only personal perspectives on certain
events, but also personal experiences and lives – and ‘topical interviews’ (ibid.)
– individual points of view towards particular topics. This kind of data,
especially the personal narrative, gave me detailed and illuminating
information about working life. For example, an intern in the HR department,
Janet, told me of her difficulties and struggles in finding a job and settling down
in Shanghai. Her experiences showed me a new world, with young people
struggling for jobs and living in cities. Such stories have been in the media
recently, but did not have the same impact as when I heard them directly from
a university student my own age.
I was also asked to take part in some internal events at the company.
These experiences helped me to understand how ordinary workers built up
social networks in the company. In some events, I took pictures as part of my
data for this research, and this visual data helped to show working life
first-hand. I also took pictures for some issues relating to my research by my
mobile phone. This became an important part of my first-hand information in
the field.
As previously discussed, there were six full-time workers and five interns I
spent the most time with during the three months, though I talked with more
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than twenty workers in terms of their feelings and thoughts about their working
life. I now introduce the information of these eleven participants below.
Name Gender Position in the
company
Working background
Sam Male Full-time worker;
Senior manager
in HR
department
He was a middle-aged man, who had
worked at several companies in HR. He
worked in Shanghai, away from his
family, who were based in Nanjing,
another city two hours away from
Shanghai by train.
Peter Male Full-time worker;
Senior manager
in HR
department
He was a similar age to Sam, and had
also worked at several companies in
HR. He also worked in Shanghai alone,
while his family resided in Shenzhen,
another big city two and a half hours
away from Shanghai by air.
Tim Male Full-time worker;
Technical
worker in
Innovation
Department
He was the same age as me, and joined
Grand at the same time as me. He had
worked at another internet company for
two years before he joined Grand.
Sarah Female Full-time worker;
The manager of
Online Novel
Department
She was a middle-age woman, who had
several years’ experience in HR and PR
at different companies.
Monica Female Full-time worker;
An experienced
HR
She was the friend who introduced me
to Grand. She was in her thirties. She
had a Master degree in HR, and had
worked at another internet company in
HR before joining Grand. Her husband
worked in another internet company as
the team leader of a technical
department.
Katy Female Full-time worker;
HR
She was in her thirties, and worked in
the HR department at a state owned
telecommunications company, before
joining Grand. She shared many
experiences working over-time with me,
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and gave me information about working
life in SOEs, which enabled me to
evaluate the quality of working life in
internet companies.
Janet Female Intern;
HR Department
She was a postgraduate at a famous
university in Shanghai when she did the
internship. She joined Grand in 2010
after having had internships in several
other companies. She shared a lot of
her and her classmates’ working and
living experiences in Shanghai with me,
which helped me create a picture of
university students’ situations in
mainland China.
Salina Female Intern;
HR Department
in Online Game
Department
She was a postgraduate at a university
in Shanghai. She joined Grand at the
same time as Janet. She had also
worked in several companies as an
intern. She provided me lots of
information about technical workers in
the game department, which enabled
me to explore how these workers
practice in the company.
Cathy Female Intern;
Customer
Service
Department
She was a postgraduate from a
university in Shanghai. She joined
Grand in the beginning of 2011. She
had worked in two companies as an
intern before joining Grand.
Lily Female Intern;
HR Department
She was a postgraduate. She had
worked in more than ten companies as
an intern before joining Grand. She told
me lots of stories about relationships
between supervisors and students,
which helped me explore how
supervisors ‘use’ postgraduates for
profits.
Shelly Female Intern;
HR Department
She was a postgraduate in a university
in Shanghai. She had worked in three
companies as an intern before joining
Grand.
Table 3.2: Information of participants in Grand
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As stated earlier, I did not have direct interviews with any agency workers,
but heard lots of stories about self-employed workers and code farmers from
interviewees in Campus. I also heard about their situation via talking with
Salina, the HR intern in The Game Department. In the department where I
worked as an intern, I observed two code farmers while they worked, and
watched them communicate with other colleagues in the department. Ideally, I
would have collected more information about these two code farmers, but due
to their limited networking with colleagues, I had few chances to talk with them,
and hear their thoughts on working life.
In addition to in-depth interviews in Campus and covert observation in
Grand, I invited one worker at Campus, Galeno, who participated in my
interviews twice in 2011, to conduct self-observation. Bauchard (1976) defines
self-observation as the ‘self-reports of activities (of participants) in the form of
diaries, check lists, etc.’ (p.398). According to my instruction, Galeno kept a
journal of his working life from 31st August 2011 to 20th December 2011. He
also gave me the working journal he kept from September 2009 to July 2011.
Therefore, I received his journal of working life during the period of September
2009 – December 2011. I had hoped that more workers would agree to
engage with this process but they did not.
Bauchard (1976) points out that the validity of self-observation is low
because of ‘the unpredictable manner in which human perception and memory
select and distort information’ (p.398). He suggests systematic sampling
techniques as a way to solve these problems. Admittedly, the validity of
Galeno’s self-observation might have been questionable but, as I conducted
in-depth interviews after collecting the data, such risk was reduced. Galeno’s
journal contained his thoughts and reflections during the production process;
how he judged control from the company and the state; and how he evaluated
their practices in the production process.
3.4 Data analysis
Madison (2012) claims that ‘coding and logging data is the process of
grouping together themes and categories that you have accumulated in the
field’ (p.43). I started the process of data analysis by transcribing the fourteen
interviews. This took some time, as they were each two-hours long. But the
most difficult thing for me was to translate the Chinese language interviews
and field notes into English: some Chinese terms with special cultural
connotations were difficult to translate, and it would have been a tough and
painful job to completely translate all interviews and field notes, which came to
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over 40,000 words. Therefore, I chose to categorise the Chinese interview
content and field notes first, and then translate the necessary content
according to different themes.
Madison (2012) notes that grouping themes creates points of views. At
this stage, I read through the interview materials and field notes in order to
familiarise myself with the data. Then, I created certain themes according to
both my literature review and findings. Themes drawn from the literature
review included: pay, work hours, autonomy, staff turnover, pressure, security,
control from the company and the state, and acts of resistance and negotiation.
Some of the themes that emerged in the interviews and observation included:
relationships between full-time workers and interns, contribution of agency
labour, monopolisation, and workers’ ambition to set up individual businesses.
Then, I translated most Chinese materials under these themes into
English. At this stage, I discussed most of the translated materials with my
supervisors. From these discussions, I was able to filter and reorganise the
data. Coding and translating the raw findings not only helped me identify and
manage the data, but also helped me formulate my arguments. It is with this
understanding that I approached the write-up of this thesis.
3.5 Ethical issues
Madison (2012) claims that ethics is part of being human, as it includes
the ‘beliefs and principles upon which we judge human action’ (p.96). Critical
ethnographers have a responsibility to act morally, in order to ‘contribute to the
quality of life and to the enlivening possibilities of those we study’ (p.97-98). My
covert approach has raised the necessity to discuss ethical issues. As a
researcher concerned with people’s well-being, I felt responsible to protect my
participants and minimise the harm that might be brought to them as a result of
this research. Calvey (2000) claims that one of the ethical struggles in his
covert research centred on ‘the threat to my sense of self in the research
process and the ongoing management of personal relationships, loyalties,
obligations and confidences that developed’ (p.54). This shows the difficulty of
managing personal relationships and avoiding the problem of ‘going native’
during covert research.
Likewise, as noted in section 3.3.2 – my discussion of how I carried out
covert observation in Grand, the first ethical issue is deception, which has
been debated for a long period in relation to covert research. Although some
researchers (Douglas 1976, Ferdinand et al. 2007) argue that the benefits of
covert research can outweigh the risks, I still emotionally felt I was deceiving
the participants. All participants in my research told me about their personal
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narratives and activities because they regarded me as their personal friend,
and believed that I would not reveal their experiences. The way I collected
material via building up personal friendships with the participants helped me
quite a lot in terms of accumulating research data, whilst it also presented me
with a dilemma regarding using the information.
Before I wrote up this thesis, I presented this concern at various academic
events in order to find help. For example, I presented this concern during the
ECREA (European Communication Research and Education Association)
summer school in August 2012 (it focused on the topic ‘Media in/and society –
present trends and developments’, through a variety of working forms, such as
feedback seminars, workshops, and lectures), where one response was that it
originated from my problem of ‘going native’, and it was suggested that I ignore
this issue. It is possible that my feeling of deception was partly because of my
‘going native’. But, I would argue that I definitely have the responsibility to act
morally and reflect on this feeling of deception as a researcher, when
concerned with the quality of working life and well-being. I also discussed this
issue with other researchers in a roundtable, named ‘other ethics’ (it focused
on internet research ethics beyond some key concerns that have already been
addressed. It discussed how the umbrella of ethics can be broadened in
internet research), at the 13th AoIR (Association of Internet Research)
conference, where it was suggested that I emphasise my identity as a
researcher when using the information, instead of deceiving the participants by
identifying myself as a friend of them.
This feeling of deception remains, yet I choose to write about the research
in the public domain (the publicity of this PhD thesis is somewhat limited, but
some journal articles and probably a book, which would be produced based on
the data after this thesis, would be more public), because I feel that it
contributes to understanding Chinese society and the role played by internet
workers. Indeed, this is why I chose to pursue the research through what might
be seen as an ethically problematic means. I hope that if my participants read
this thesis and recognise themselves in it, they understand my motivations for
carrying out covert research and the benefits it may bring, and that they do not
feel deceived by me.
The second issue in terms of ethical concerns is how to protect the
participants. Madison (2012) notes that researchers must make efforts to
ensure that ‘their work does not harm the safety, dignity, or privacy of those
with whom they work’ (p.129). And she regards anonymity as an important
tactic. Thus, I anonymised both the companies and participants. I blurred most
information about the companies, aiming to make them unidentifiable. It is
arguable whether anonymity can completely protect the participants, because
their colleagues and leaders might figure out their identity, as I describe their
acts in detail. For example, when I describe that some interns in Grand help
each other clock on and off, this might get them in trouble as their leaders
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might recognise them if they read this thesis. But I believe it would not be a big
problem, due to the high turnover rate in the internet industries. Indeed, most
interns and full-time workers mentioned in my research had left Grand by the
time of my writing. It then becomes safe for them to appear in this thesis with
their acts of resistance.
The third issue is the safety of the researcher. As I was reminded during
the 13th AoIR conference, certain parts of my research may harm me, as a
Chinese student in the UK who might return to China to work after graduation.
Admittedly, some parts of this research, such as my focus on workplace
agency, might not be welcomed in China, which might have a negative impact
upon my academic career. However, the main focus of this research is on
quality of working life and I do not believe this subject would have a serious
affect upon my future career in China.
I was reminded about my own safety in China after publishing some parts
of this research, when I attended the ECREA summer school. China might
be well known as an authoritarian state, but it is not a totalitarian state that
seriously inhibits all academics speaking out within their publications. This is a
piece of research concerning people’s well-being, rather than dealing with
some more dangerous issues, such as Calvey (2000) did in his door
supervisors’ research that might hurt him, due to the drug and gang issues that
appeared in the fieldwork process. In other words, I believe that my future
career in China might be slightly negatively influenced by the publication of
some parts of this research, but I do not think that I would be put in jail when I
return to China because of this research.
The last issue is the storage of data. I stored all the data, especially my
field notes, on my own laptop when I conducted fieldwork, in order to make
sure that the data was only used for this research. I plan to delete all the data
ten years after I finish this research, in order to ensure the security of the data.
3.6 Reflection
Haynes (2012) defines reflexivity as ‘an awareness of the researcher’s
role in the practice of research and the way this is influenced by the object of
the research, enabling the researcher to acknowledge the way in which he or
she affects both the research processes and outcomes’ (p.72). Reflexivity
helps researchers to identify problems relating to social, ethical and political
issues emerging in the research process, which includes ‘defining research,
data gathering, analysis and interpretation’ (p.86) and ‘writing up and
publication’ (ibid.).
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Following Haynes (2012) suggestion, I kept reflection notes during my
fieldwork, especially during my three months’ observation. I usually went back
to read my previous month’s diaries, in order to find out some significant issues.
I sometimes went back to the discussions between my supervisors and I,
which focused on my findings in the two companies. This reminded me what I
needed to discover. Also, I continued reading other researchers’ work during
my observation, to remind myself of my identity as a researcher.
Looking back, I would say that conducting the fieldwork was both
challenging and rewarding. Some of the challenges were emotional, as I noted
in section 3.5 (ethical issues): sometimes I felt that I was deceiving my
participants. Some challenges emerged when I was preparing for the
participant observation, especially when the online commerce company
rejected my request for observation. Undoubtedly, carrying out interviews and
observation was also challenging, due to certain difficulties I faced. Some
participants for example, refused to talk about how they resisted the company
to improve certain working conditions. But it was also rewarding; when I
conducted the five non-standardised interviews after my observation, I felt
confident to construct the non-standardised interviews, as I had learnt a lot
from the nine interviews I carried out before the observation. I also felt a
responsibility after engaging in the internet industries, as I was impressed by
how the workers were working, living, and struggling. I had a much deeper
understanding about the aim of my project, which mattered because it related
to people’s well-being. Moreover, it was the fieldwork that linked theories and
practices, and gave me an insight into the Chinese internet industries.
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Chapter Four: Excessive working hours and little pay
4.1 Structure of this chapter
I have stated the issues relating to internet workers by addressing the
class problem in Chapter Two, and also developed a theoretical and
conceptual framework in the chapter. In this chapter, I start to examine the
empirical data using the theoretical background I provided in Chapter Two. In
section 4.2, I introduce the high work intensity of these workers, and discuss
their working hours. I not only illustrate these workers’ excessive working
hours, but also explain why these workers need to work excessive hours, and
what problems are caused by this. I demonstrate variation within internet
workers: different internet workers suffer different experiences in terms of
working hours. I also explore dynamics of disunity within these workers. I
argue that there are tensions within the lower middle class, due to these
workers’ different life chances. In section 4.3, I explore the issue of pay. I
argue that different castes of workers experience different levels of inequality
and injustice in terms of pay. The high work intensity and unreasonable pay
clearly indicate a necessity to explore how the lower middle class – the social
class of internet workers – is exploited (though there is variation across the
class in the degree of exploitation they experience), and suffers inequality in
terms of working hours and rewards, notwithstanding tensions within this class.
In section 4.4, I argue that the Chinese internet industries constitute a new
form of sweatshop in the digital era, where internet workers struggle with
different experiences of inequality and injustice, which indicates the different
levels of proletarianisation of this lower middle class. The status struggles
between the three types of worker indicate tensions and disunity within this
class of workers.
4.2 Work intensity
As I mentioned in section 2.6, work intensity refers to working hours and
how much labour effort workers expend during their time at work.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) regard working hours as an important issue
when assessing working conditions in cultural industries. There are three key
points they remind us to pay particular attention to when looking at cultural
workers’ working time: ‘Workers needing to be flexible with their time; workers
not getting paid commensurate to the hours actually worked; and workers
having to take on second jobs to make ends meet’ (p.116).
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Here, I am particularly interested in the extent to which these internet
workers are working excessive hours, and why these workers need to work
excessive hours.
Most of my interviewees, technical workers, stated that excessive working
hours is a common phenomenon in the internet industries. For example, Tim, a
new technical worker who joined Grand at the same time as me, stated that he
had worked overnight for several days since he joined the department half a
month ago. The following are some quotations from other workers who also
experienced this issue.
I always work until 10pm, which is nearly twice the standard working
time… (Davis, technical worker in the Advertisement Department at Campus,
25th August 2011, interview)
There is no end to overtime… Look at the record of my clocking on and off:
one day I worked 16 hours without any break… (William, technical worker in
the 3G Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
We [the four team members] worked overnight for a whole week in last
month… Normally, we work for nine hours per day, does it mean overtime? If it
does, to be honest, we do overtime every day… (Walter, technical worker in
the Advertisement Department at Campus, 25th August 2011, interview)
In Campus, the standard working time is 10am-9pm… This [long working
hours] is quite common in the industries nowadays, where 10 hours are the
average working hours… I have a friend working in another internet company,
where he usually finishes his work at 11pm or 12am. We have the same
experience during peak time, which refers to every two months in a season,
when some departments even need to work during weekends. As far as I know,
workers in the 3G department now are still staying in a hotel to work day and
night for a new program… (Louis, former technical worker in the Open
Platform Department at Campus, 28th August 2011, interview)
This overtime experience is also shared by non-technical workers in both
companies. For example, Cathy, a new employee in the customer service
department in Grand, said that she needed to work from 9am to 9pm with only
a half-hour lunch time. Katy, a new HR worker, who joined Grand at the same
time as me, worked overtime for nine days, which usually meant she finished
work at 11pm or midnight, during the first ten days she joined the company.
She said that sometimes she even considered sleeping over in the office,
because her home was far away from the company. If she was ‘lucky’ enough
to finish work 11:30pm, she could claim reimbursement for the taxi fee and
would arrive home after midnight, and go to sleep by 1am. But she would need
to get up at 5am, as she needed to change three times on the underground to
arrive at the office. Thus, the overtime seriously reduced her sleeping time and
made her very tired.
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Another story was collected from two experienced HR workers in Grand.
They stated that, in 1998, when the company was experiencing rapid growth,
they were required to work overtime until 2am and return to work at 9am.
Figure 4.1 is a picture I took in the beginning of my fieldwork in Grand. It
encourages all full-time workers to write good comments for the company’s
new product on the Apple App Store and the Android Store in order to promote
the product. Here, workers are encouraged to do extra work - writing
comments as ordinary users - with reward of EXP, a system that links to
workers’ promotion and pay. It might not be as heavy work as full-time workers
usually do in the excessive working hours, but it still shows a creative way, via
which the company encourages workers to work excessive hours without
realising the fact.
Figure 4.1: Advertising for new product within Grand
Source: Observation journal 9th October 2011
All these stories show the serious excessive working hours worked by
full-time internet workers. And the most significant issue here is whether the
excessive working hours is reasonably rewarded. This will be the first question
answered in section 4.3. The key point of the issue in this section is to answer
why these workers need to work excessive hours.
The easiest way to earn
EXP!!!
Go to APP Store or Android Store to write
good comments for our new product,
Microphone (anonymity). Every comment,
approved by the company, can earn 10 EXP
for you!
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4.2.1 Why do full-time workers work excessive hours?
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) and some governmentality theorists (for
example, McRobbie 2000, Nixon and Crewe 2004) point out that ‘pleasure in
creative work’, helps to explain the degree to which workers in the cultural
industries push themselves hard in the form of long hours. Some
governmentality theorists relate such pleasure to the concept of
self-exploitation: the concept highlights that autonomy often results in
experiences of excessive working hours, low pay, and high risks. I addressed
this issue in section 2.6.2 (a theoretical discussion of autonomy). According to
my participants’ experiences, there are certain rewards, such as pleasure,
which encourage them work excessive hours. For example, some technical
workers indicate their preference for working during weekends or after working
hours, because the company provides good working conditions.
Internet speed in the company is faster than my home, and all my working
documents are in the office, so I prefer to work at weekends when I can spend
half of time playing and half time on writing some reports and preparing for my
next week’s work… I don’t think it is overtime work, instead, I think it’s my own
choice to spend time in the office… It’s not uncommon among my
colleagues… (Wynn, technical worker in the Open Platform Department at
Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
This quote shows the rewards some workers in Campus gain from
working during weekends. As Wynn highlighted, the fast internet speed and
the relaxing environment in the office encouraged her to work excessive hours.
These may not be pleasure in work as commonly discussed, in terms of the
mental pleasure workers receive from their work. But these good conditions
give some workers in Campus feelings of enjoyment and relaxation while
working during the weekend, and need to be considered as one kind of
pleasure given by internet work.
Internet industries are creative industries, which are productive because
of our creative ideas. Sometimes, the creative ideas could only come out after
you’ve been thinking for ten hours, then, working overtime is quite usual… In
my case, I usually work until 10pm, as I need time to rethink some of my
ideas… Some of my colleagues mention that they could only [do] programming
after working hours, as it’s the only quiet time when they can concentrate on
the creative stuff… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration
Department at Campus, 20th December 2011, interview)
Therefore, these rewards, fast internet speed, flexibility of workload, and
space for self-reflection, encourage workers to spend extra time on their work,
and they enjoy the blurring of this work and leisure time.
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Ross (2005, 2007) specifies that work in the high-tech industries has
some characteristics in common with knowledge work. He claims that the
endless and never-solved problems in all knowledge work keeps workers
going on after their working hours. In the internet industries, it is necessary to
keep up to date with new information and technology, even after working
hours.
Even after I go back home, I am still doing the same things as I did in the
office: reading, using the internet, designing, and programming… (Galeno,
technical worker in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th
December 2011, interview)
Galeno’s statement shows that internet work, similar to other knowledge
work, requires workers to update their skills and knowledge via reading,
designing and programming after work. It also leaves ‘endless and
never-solved problems’ to workers, which sort of forces them to carry on the
same work they did in their companies when at home.
Moreover, internet work has other extraordinary characteristics that drive
workers to sacrifice their leisure time.
[Overtime] sometimes is because of the industries themselves. I mean
you can only leave after your programs are updated and [you] have made sure
there is no problem. So, it requires you to stay longer than the office hours…
(Lara, non-technical worker in the Advertisement Department at Campus, 26th
August 2011, interview)
Some technical workers need to get up at midnight if there are emergency
cases, such as some emergency problems relating to users’ online activities…
(Lara, non-technical worker in the Advertisement Department at Campus, 19th
December 2011, interview)
Here is the difference that distinguishes internet work from other
knowledge work: technical workers need to update and secure the running of
programs, which forces them to spend extra time on their work. It is not my
intention to relate such characteristics of internet work to self-exploitation,
which has already been widely done. Instead, I intend to relate overtime to
certain aspects of Chinese culture and to questions of exploitation.
Ross (2005, 2007) points out that workers in the Chinese outsourcing
high-tech industries work overtime because of high competition in the
industries: they need to work harder to help avoid the risk of other workers
taking their places. Some of my participants show the anxiety caused by high
levels of competition.
Of course, there are some workers working overtime because of the high
pressure from their work: they need to work more after the office hours, in
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order to meet a lot of deadlines... (Louis, former technical worker in the Open
Platform Department at Campus, 18th December 2011, interview)
I work overtime because I always have very tight deadlines [so] I need to
work harder to meet them… (Lara, non-technical worker in the Advertisement
Department at Campus, 26th August 2011, interview)
Every month we have KPIs [Key Performance Indicators] to push us to
work overtime… (Walter, technical worker in the Advertisement Department at
Campus, 25th August 2011, interview)
Both deadlines and KPIs are set by managers to push workers to compete
with each other. For example, workers who cannot keep deadlines will be
marked low in KPIs, and workers with high KPIs have higher bonuses and a
greater chance of promotion than workers with low KPIs. Such competition
forces workers to be anxious about their career in relation to promotional and
economic benefits, and to work overtime, in order to secure these benefits.
My leader always reminds me to keep myself in a high competitive status.
For example, to think about who will be fired if the company needs to lay off
staff and if I might be the person laid off: all this means I need to work harder.
(Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration Department at
Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
Managers and companies play a key role in pushing these workers to
work overtime, because they seek high profits with low labour costs. For
example, Galeno shows how his manager keeps him in a sense of crisis: he
may be laid off if he does not work hard. Louis, Lara and Walter all indicate that
companies push them to work overtime by endless deadlines and KPIs, which
are directly related to their bonus and pay.
According to my participants, it is common to promote ‘geek culture’ in all
internet companies, which encourages workers, especially technical workers,
to show their love of the internet work via working day and night.
I hate geek culture in the company. It just encourages these nerds [she
points to her technical colleagues] to work day and night without any pay! The
company promotes this culture in every event, such as training and gathering,
so I always try to avoid these events… This [geek culture] is exploitation...
(Lara, non-technical worker in the Advertisement Department at Campus, 26th
August 2011, interview)
This reference to ‘geek culture’ suggests the need to discuss Chinese
culture in relation to work. Qiu (2009) points out the importance of considering
the one-child policy in terms of assessing work in contemporary Chinese
society. He claims that young workers nowadays work hard and are keen to
succeed in a short space of time, because they are the only child in the family,
and everyone has high expectations of them. Ross (2005) claims that the
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one-child policy drives every family to have high expectations of showing-off
the attainments of the only child. This forces young workers to frequently job
hop, in order to succeed quickly. Here, most of my participants, who are the
only child in their families, indicate their parents’ high expectations. Moreover,
some of them are from developing areas, where they are the only university
student in their villages. In this case, not only their parents, but also the whole
village has high expectations of them obtaining a highly respected job with
good pay in one of the big cities. This expectation certainly gives some
workers a sense of competition – they need to compete with their classmates
to get a good job, and compete with their colleagues via hard work to keep this
job.
The one-child policy also impacts overtime in another way: non-local
workers are more likely to spend extra time in the office, because they do not
need to have dinner with their parents, whereas local workers, who are the
only child in the family, do. Therefore, both internet companies in my study
prefer to recruit non-local workers, who are more likely to devote themselves to
working overtime.
I am alone here [in Beijing] without my parents, so I don’t need to enjoy
dinnertime with them. And it makes me able to work in the company until
midnight… Basically, parents prefer children to come back from work around
7pm-8pm, in order to have dinner together… There are fewer local employees
in my company, because it is impossible for local Beijingers to work overtime
like us [non-locals]… (Wynn, technical workers in the Open Platform
Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
Here, Wynn points out an important part of Chinese culture: spending time
with one’s parents. It is an important part of Chinese people’s lives, which may
be because of the one-child policy. Qiu (2009) states that the one-child policy
helps to tighten the relationship between parents and the only child in the
family. Parents focus on their only child with unprecedented protection and
control, for example, they often require the child to come back from work
before dinnertime, even very regularly after getting married. Therefore,
non-local workers in big cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, where these
internet companies are based, are more able to frequently work overtime than
local workers. It is the same situation in Grand: most non-local workers tend to
spend more extra time in the office than local workers. These non-local
workers work late and hard because they are far away from their family and
friends.
The last reason that internet workers over-work is related to the Chinese
work ethic. Max Weber (2002) regards the Protestant work ethic as an
important force behind Protestantism’s involvement in the development of
capitalism. He believes that the Protestant work ethic drives Protestants to
work hard and engage in commercial investment to accumulate wealth, which
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ultimately contributes to the development of capitalism. His later work on the
impacts of the Chinese religions of Confucianism and Taoism towards Chinese
social development, such as answering why capitalism did not develop in
China, is not helpful to this research. However, his Protestant ethic thesis
helps relate Chinese internet workers’ hard work to a certain Chinese work
ethic: Chinese people believe that working harder makes their lives, especially
their family well-being, better. Lim and Lay (2003: 321) highlight Confucianism
as an important factor relating to Chinese work ethic. They claim that
Confucian values, which still play a vital role in contemporary Chinese society,
encourage individuals to contribute back to family and society via hard work,
because of the close relationships between them.
Harrell (1985) discusses the Chinese work ethic in a sophisticated way.
He points out that Western scholars, from Arthur Smith’s observation of
diligent Chinese people in 1894 to Chester Holcombe’s observation of Chinese
poor, to whom ‘life is a never-ending struggle against starvation’ (p.205), in the
nineteenth century, have stereotyped the Chinese as tireless workers for
centuries. Chinese people are characterised as ‘industrious and diligent’ (ibid.)
workers. However, Harrell also points out that there are certain circumstances,
especially after the economic reform in 1978, in which some Chinese people
choose to not work hard. Thus, this enlightens him to consider Chinese work
ethic in a historical and cultural perspective.
On the basis of his observations in a village in Taiwan, he sums up the
values that motivate Chinese people to work hard as ‘the ethic of
entrepreneurship’: ‘the investment of one’s resources (land, labour, and/or
capital) in a long-term quest to improve the material well-being and security of
some group to which one belongs and with which one identifies’ (p.216). Here,
he particularly highlights three elements in these values: a long-term quest, the
idea of security – not only maximising economic benefits, but also establishing
‘hedges and defenses against loss’ (ibid.), and the group – the family or ‘the
collectivity of one’s jia (family) mates and all their potential descendants’
(p.217). With such elements, he claims that Chinese people will work hard
when ‘they see possible long-term benefits, in terms of improved material
conditions and/or security, for a group with which they identify’ (ibid.).
This could be related to certain social values promoted by CCP in recent
years: the Chinese Dream – a slogan promoted by the new Chinese leader, Xi
Jinping, that refers to building a moderately prosperous society and realise
national rejuvenation via hard work. He encourages the youth to ‘dare to
dream, work assiduously to fulfill the dreams and contribute to the revitalisation
of the nation’.24 This is what Harrell sums up as a political context of Chinese
ethic: Chinese leaders tend to direct Chinese traditional values of hard work to
24 Xinhua News 2013
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‘a different set of goals and into service of the interests of different kinds of
groups’ (p.212). Here, the new Chinese leader tends to direct Chinese
people’s traditional work ethic – improving the material well-being and security
of their families via hard work – into service of the interests of the bureaucratic
capitalist group, which are to build a moderately prosperous society.
These young people, who ‘dare[s] to dream, work[s] assiduously to fulfill
the dreams’, certainly includes most young Chinese internet workers, who
value hard work over enjoyment. They are expected to devote themselves to
hard work, as it shows their morality. Some of my participants mentioned that
they spend extra time on work because they are single.
… [Working extensive hours] is because most of us are single, and the
condition in [the] office is better than in our accommodation…We don’t have
any friend to spend time with when we just come here, so work becomes the
best choice for us… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration
Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
There are several reasons for us to work overtime… Some of us stay in
the office until late night just because the condition in [the] office is better than
in our rented houses, and we don’t have extra money to spend on leisure. For
example, social life in Beijing is quite expensive compared to our low salary, so
some of us cannot afford to go outside with friends. Using [the] internet in [the]
office becomes the best way to have a social life for these people. (Louis,
former technical worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 18th
December 2011, interview)
These single workers are usually non-locals, which results in their limited
social networks. It might be hard for Western scholars to understand the logic
here: even though these workers are far away from their families and friends,
they could still have other choices rather than spending time on work after
normal working hours. This again relates to the Chinese work ethic, as
discussed above: Chinese people work hard when ‘they see possible
long-term benefits, in terms of improved material conditions and/or security, for
a group with which they identify’ (p.217). Young people in modern China keep
to this ‘religion’ in their working habits, which now echoes Xi’s slogan of the
Chinese Dream: work hard to improve material conditions of their families and
build a prosperous society.
This work ethic sometimes even influences experienced workers who
have families. Some of my interviewees said that some executives in Campus
chose to play online games with them after office hours in order to build up
close relationships with them. Such social networking helps executives
manage their workers, which is an important part of their work. Again, these
executives devoting themselves to their work, by giving up spending time with
their families, shows the important role the Chinese work ethic plays in the
overtime work in Chinese internet industries.
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Therefore, full-time workers’ excessive working hours depend on four
issues: the rewards of internet work; characteristics of knowledge work; high
competition in the industries; and the Chinese work ethic. The high competition
is driven by the managers (of companies), who seek high profits via workers’
overtime, and the parents, who expect their child to succeed in a short space
of time.
Interns also work overtime in the internet industries, as they do in other
Chinese industries. But their overtime in the internet industries brings about
some significant issues. One is their complicated relationship with full-time
workers, which indicates status struggles within the class, and another is their
reasons for working overtime, which indicates some problems in the
contemporary Chinese education system. Below, I talk about interns’ inferior
positions in the two companies, compared to their overtime work – interns are
treated as an inferior group in companies, although they do overtime work as
full-time workers.
4.2.2 Interns’ inferior positions
Interns in the internet industries are mostly treated as full-time workers in
terms of their working hours. In Grand, interns are required to clock on and off
as full-time workers do, and spend the same time on work as full-time workers
do. Janet told me that her team needed to recruit some Spanish and Arabic
translators for the technical departments. But, after negotiating with some
interviewees, the head decided to recruit interns who majored in Spanish and
Arabic to carry out the work, because the salaries of full-time translators were
out of their budget. Interns in this case, were regarded as an alternative to
full-time workers, because they could do the same work.
Lily, an intern in the HR department, said the company continuously
recruited interns to fill full-time vacancies, because interns were cheaper and
easier to manage. For example, Janet was struggling to write up her MA
dissertation, find a formal job and conduct her intern work near the end of her
internship in Grand; therefore, she decided to quit the internship. But this was
rejected, as her work could not be suspended because of her departure. It was
suggested that she find a new intern to take over her work, if she really wanted
to leave. Here, the pressing issue is that interns are forced to take over the
company’s responsibility of finding new interns to fill vacancies. This then
becomes a way for the company to control the interns.
We [full-time workers] think they [interns] are the same as us, in terms of
working time and the tasks being arranged… (Wynn, technical worker in the
Open Platform Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
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… I did more work when I was an intern than now. During my internship,
we three interns were required to carry out seven full-time workers’ work…
(William, technical worker in the 3G Department at Campus, 26th August 2011,
interview)
But such overtime does not guarantee interns the same position in
companies as full-time workers. Instead, interns are regarded as an inferior
group in companies:
Most interns are following our [full-time workers’] steps. They are doing
the jobs we assigned to them… They are a separated group from us… They
are still students rather than professionals… They are the second-class
workers… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration Department
at Campus, 20th December 2011, interview)
According to these full-time workers, they are the people who control the
production process, whereas interns are in an inferior position regarding work.
This indicates the tension between these two groups. Some cases below show
the struggles of interns because of their perceived inferior positions.
At the time that I did my internship in Grand, there was a story about the
tension between full-time workers and interns, which was widely being
circulated amongst interns. An intern who had worked in Grand for more than
three months was guaranteed a position after her graduation. But this did not
materialise, because her team leader disliked her. She received this news at a
time when Campus recruitment was nearly over, which meant she was unable
to find a good job during that year, and needed to wait for one more year. In
this case, one full-time worker had a large influence on one interns’ future
career.
Sometimes, interns are required to take over the responsibilities of
full-time workers, both because of and despite their inferior positions. For
example, Janet was blamed by her team leader because a new employee
could not find anyone in her team to begin his commencement procedures
when she was on leave. Janet argued with her leader that it was her holiday
and that she was not supposed to be responsible for the work. But she was still
blamed because she was the only intern involved in the work. As Janet said,
every time there was a mistake, it was the interns’ fault.
This story may seem to suggest a problem with my argument concerning
the class schema in Chapter Two: interns struggle in the relationships with
full-time workers, rather than suffer similarly bad working conditions. This may
seem to suggest that they occupy different class locations, However, as Wright
(2009) emphasises, a fully elaborated class analysis needs to combine the
‘macro-model of conflict and transformation with the macro-micro, multi-level
model of class processes and individual lives’ (p.111). The class structure of
his model includes not only the mechanisms of exploitation and domination
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associated with the traditional Marxist approach, but also analysis of
mechanisms that sustain the privileges of advantaged classes by status,
associated with Weberian approaches to inequality.
Breen (2002) has discussed Weberian understandings of the mechanisms
sustaining the privileges of advantaged classes in terms of the concept of ‘life
chances’. Life chances are chances that ‘individuals have of gaining access to
scarce and valued outcomes’ (p.43). He then claims three aspects of the
distribution of power in society, which is widely adopted by Weberian approach,
as factors that influence the distribution of life chances: classes, status groups,
and parties. All these dimensions overlap, whilst none of them can be reduced
to others. The status groups imply ‘some level of identity in the sense of some
recognised “positive or negative social estimation of honour” (Weber
[1922]1978: 932)’ (Wright 2002: 834). In other words, members of a status
group are conscious of being members of the group.
Wright (2002) points out that Weber distinguishes status from class by
highlighting the different mechanisms through which they shape inequalities of
the material conditions of people’s lives: status affects people’s well-being with
‘the monopolisation of ideal and material goods or opportunities’ (p.835); by
contrast, class influences people’s well-being via economic assets that people
bring to market exchanges. Weber distinguishes status groups from classes by
highlighting members’ consciousness, and regards classes as objective
places.
Here, as some of my interviewees state, both full-time workers and interns
are conscious of being members of certain status groups in society. For
example, Galeno points out that interns are still understood as ‘students’, a
group considered inferior to professionals. Nevertheless, some of them do
the same work as professionals. Some of my observations in Grand also
suggest that there are various status groups within the lower middle class. For
example, interns, ordinary full-time workers and team leaders all have their
own dining areas. Team leaders usually drive together to good restaurants in
the downtown area of Shanghai, full-time workers usually go to the canteen in
the centre of the Software Park, and interns usually go to cheaper snack bars
near underground stations. Most members are conscious of belonging to these
different groups – it is rare to find ordinary full-time workers go with team
leaders for lunch, for example. This shows disunity within the lower middle
class: different forms of workers have their own ‘principles of their consumption
of goods as represented by special styles of life’ (Cox 1950: 226) – the way
‘status groups’ distinguishes from ‘classes’.
These different kinds of workers have different life chances, and this
results in status struggles, such as the bullying of interns by some full-time
workers. Such tensions raise a question: why do large numbers of university
students still pour into the intern market, when they have inferior positions, and
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have to work as hard as full-time workers? This might relate to the pay they
receive for their hard work, which I will discuss in section 4.3. However, the
more significant issue here is the high competition amongst fresh graduates.
Below, I introduce the issues that cause this high competition amongst fresh
graduates, which ultimately pushes them towards the intern market.
4.2.3 The large number of interns and the problematic
education system
As I mentioned earlier, all interns I met during my fieldwork had fruitful
intern experiences. The intern market has grown rapidly in recent years and
one of the forces behind this rapid growth has been high competition in the job
market. The large number of low-quality university graduates, caused by the
problematic education system, has resulted in difficult employment conditions:
the job market cannot afford the large numbers of fresh graduates, and a large
number of vacancies require graduates with higher education quality than they
have now. Thus, this results in large numbers of graduates cannot find jobs,
whilst large numbers of vacancies are waiting for candidates with high
education quality.
Qiu (2009) paints a historical picture of the Chinese education system
since the Han dynasty, the time when Confucian learning was broadened to
include members of the lower class. He focuses on the recent reform of the
education system in the 1980s, when the CCP further extended national
compulsory education to ‘peasants and the proletariat working class’ (p.135).
In particular, in 1999, the CCP issued two policies ‘The Action Plan for
Education Development in the Forthcoming New Century’ (Mianxiang 21st shiji
jiaoyu zhenxing jihua) and the ‘Decision of Deepening Educational Reform and
Promoting Quality-oriented Education’ (Guanyu shenhua jiaoyu gaige
quanmian tuijin suzhi jiaoyu de jueding), 25 aimed at expanding college
education. This education reform caused some problems: university degrees
were denigrated because of the large number of students graduating;
employment difficulties followed on from the large number of graduates and
denigration of university degrees; free interns were pervasive because of the
high competition in the job market; and rural students struggled because of the
increasing tuition fees.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show increases in the higher education population
increased from 1999 to 2010. For example, the proportion of acceptances rose
25 Higher Education Research Institute, 31st August 2009
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from 55.6% in 1999 to 69.4% in 2010 (see Figure 4.2), meaning that nearly 70%
of students who took the college entrance exam were guaranteed to be
educated in colleges in 2010. Furthermore, the proportion of students going
into higher education had risen from 12.5% in 2000 to 26.5% in 2010. This
meant the number of students accessing higher education in 2010 was double
that of 2000. This would not be problematic if quality remained high. But the
problem here is that the high quantity of university students has not
guaranteed a higher quality of the higher education. In fact, in contemporary
Chinese society, higher education is largely derogated, because of its low
quality.
Figure 4.2: Numbers of colleague students’ population from 1990 to 2010
Source: China Education Online, 25th January 2010
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Figure 4.3: 2000-2010 proportion of Chinese people going into higher education
Source: Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, 21st March
2012
At the time of writing, there is a widely popularised understanding of
higher education in Chinese society: if education is a train to working life, then
there is standing room for junior college graduates, seats for undergraduates,
hard berths for masters, and soft berths for PhD students. However, when the
train arrives at the labour market, all students are cheap labour. According to
this understanding, there is no difference between various education degrees,
because all graduates only qualify as cheap labour in companies.
In particular, the postgraduate programme is a good case by which to
understand the denigration of higher education degrees. In 2004, the top three
universities in China, Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Zhejiang
University, claimed that the number of postgraduates (including masters and
PhD students) was larger than the number of undergraduates. 26 The
expansion of postgraduate programmes, then, required more supervisors to be
recruited, because of the one-to-one teaching model. But few supervisors
26 Education in China, 11th January 2012
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were newly recruited to these three universities to reflect their largely
increased postgraduate numbers. Instead, supervisors were encouraged to
supervise more postgraduates than they were able to.27 The result of the
education reform is that students have had more chances to access higher
education, but the most important part of the education, the quality, has been
reduced.
For example, from what I heard amongst all interns, nowadays,
postgraduates (students with master degrees) in China can pay publishers to
publish their research. According to Lily and Cathy, the two interns in Grand I
mentioned earlier, the price of publishing a paper varies from £80 to £200,
depending on the level of the journal. CSSCI (Chinese Social Science Citation
Index) journals charge more than other lower-level journals. It is not most
students’ personal choice to pay for publication; rather, they are forced to pay
this money by universities, because publication has become the criterion for
judging postgraduates’ degrees in almost all universities. Thus, postgraduates
are forced to spend money on these non-qualified publications. It is depressing
to come across these cases, but it does highlight the serious problem: the
denigration of higher education degrees caused by the education reform.
As I mentioned earlier in this section, the large number of graduates and
the denigration of university degrees has resulted in employment difficulties.
For example, Janet told me that many graduates cannot find a job. In one of
her hundreds of job interviews, seven out of nine interviewees had master
degrees. Janet’s university has been highly regarded by many employers in
Shanghai over the few past years, however it became quite hard for graduates
to find jobs in 2011, because the university expanded its undergraduate
program and postgraduate program in 2008 and 2009, which created large
numbers of graduates in 2011. According to her friend who majored in German,
only one student out of all the graduates in the class, received an offer from
Amway – a company selling health and beauty products – as a salesperson.
Such difficulties in employment were also shared by graduates of other majors.
According to a member of staff in the Employment Guiding Centre in Janet’s
university, who had a close relationship with Janet, few students in the
university were able to find jobs in 2011, and the average monthly salary had
been reduced to £300 after taxes; even lower than a migrant peasant’s salary.
The employment difficulty then makes finding jobs quite competitive:
graduates are not only required to have good academic records, but also need
to have accumulated many working experiences before graduation, such as
intern experiences. Therefore, more and more students pour into the intern
market, as I mentioned earlier in this section.
27 Ibid.
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There are still some significant issues I want to address in terms of interns’
experiences, related to their pay. Thus, I will return to these interns’
experiences later, in section 4.3. Now I turn to assess agency labour’s work
intensity.
4.2.4 Code farmers’ inferior positions and
self-employed workers’ high work intensity
Similar to interns, code farmers are regarded by full-time workers as an
inferior group in companies, though they suffer from working excessive hours
like full-time workers. They are completely differentiated from full-time workers
via their online user names, ID cards and daily lives in the companies. For
example, in Grand’s internal online instant message system, OC (Office
Communication), these code farmers have a special signal ‘v.’ on their online
user names, which easily distinguishes them from full-time workers and interns.
Meanwhile, these code farmers wear special work ID cards displaying a white
line, which also differentiates them from full-time workers and interns.
Code farmers are the inferior citizens of the company, with lower skills,
lower pay, and no social benefits. So they definitely would group [into] their
own social networks, which obviously are far away from ours [full-time
workers’]… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration
Department at Campus, 20th December 2011, interview)
Personally, I rarely talk to them [code farmers]… They are another group
that is far away from us… (Louis, former technical worker in the Open Platform
Department at Campus, 18th December 2011, interview)
All these material goods enable code farmers to be conscious of their
identities: a group of people, whose pay and education levels are lower than
others, without the guaranteed social benefits available to other kinds of
workers. This again highlights the Weberian concept of status groups: though
internet workers are generally in the lower middle-class class position, several
status groups interact with each other within this class. These tensions and
dynamics thus influence certain groups of people’s well-being, along with the
special class location of these workers.
For example, in Grand, the two code farmers in my group rarely talked to
others in the department, and never spent lunchtime with us. Salina, a HR in
the game department in Grand, said that code farmers in the game department
never joined full-time workers for lunch, as the latter usually excluded the
former from their social networks. Monica, my friend working in Grand, told me
that in her previous internet company, most code farmers felt inferior and
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never tried to talk to full-time workers, because their low wages and uncertain
working conditions obviously excluded them from full-time workers’ social
networks.
The inferior positions of code farmers, result in excessive working hours in
certain ways. Salina gave me an example: a code farmer in the game
department was required by a full-time worker to work overnight in order to
finish a project, which was taken charge of by the full-time worker. In other
words, the code farmer was required to take over the full-time worker’s work
without any pay or even appreciation. Salina said it was common to find code
farmers in the department being bullied by full-time workers in this way,
because full-time workers believed that some low-skilled work needed to be
carried out by the inferior groups, such as code farmers.
They [code farmers] usually carry out the hardest work. We rarely have
the chance to talk to them… (Lara, non-technical worker in the Advertisement
Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
There is a big board with the word ‘outsourcing’ outside the software park,
which clearly reminds us that the city has been occupied by outsourcing
services. To IT workers, such as me, outsourcing means thousands of typists
who do low-skilled jobs as cheap labourers… The only advantage of these
agency labourers is that they do not pollute the environment… (Galeno,
technical worker in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 12th
October 2009, Self-observation journal)
In his working journal, Galeno indicated his contempt for code farmers,
referring to them as ‘typists who do low-skilled jobs’. In his mind, the only
advantage of recruiting code farmers in internet companies is that they ‘do not
pollute the environment’. This part of the journal shows how full-time workers
undervalue code farmers and are highly aware of the different status groups to
which full-time workers and code farmers belong. I show tensions between
different status groups within the lower middle class and status struggles
experienced by code farmers, which influences the quality of their working
lives in the industries.
Self-employed workers, the other form of agency labour I discuss in this
research, have the highest work intensity amongst all workers, because their
pay directly relates to how many projects they finish in a certain time.
… Their working time is insanely long: usually from 8am to 2am the next
day. Do you think you could work over 14 hours per day? Even though their
wage is high, no one could do the work for years… (William, technical worker
in the 3G Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
It is easy to understand self-employed workers’ long working hours,
because their wages are based on the number of projects they finish in a
month. As my interviewee, William, a technical worker in the 3G department
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said, these workers need to work day and night to meet every deadline, in
order to conduct as many projects as possible.
This point needs to be related to the New Labour Law (xin laodongfa),
which seems to benefit agency labour, but indeed makes self-employed
workers’ working conditions worse. Before 2008, there was a form of
outsourcing services, known in the industries by a Chinese phrase I am
translating as ‘labour dispatch service’ (laowu paiqian). Internet companies
paid outsourcing companies according to the number of workers dispatched to
carry out the project, as opposed to the now dominant form of outsourcing
whereby internet companies pay outsourcing companies by project rather than
by worker. Payment by worker was more popular than payment by project, as
the price for the former was cheaper for internet companies.
However, the situation changed in 2008, when China’s new labour law
took effect: the new labour law has restricted the use of the labour dispatch
service. For example, it requires that ‘dispatched workers shall enjoy the right
to obtain the same pay as that received by workers of the commissioning entity
for the same work’.28 This raised labour costs for internet companies. The new
labour law also requires that ‘the dispatched workers shall assume the
temporary, assistant or substitute positions generally’, 29 which limits the
positions that dispatched workers can take in the industries. Consequently, the
law has decreased the use of labour dispatch services, although it was
criticised as the term ‘equal pay for equal work’ was not clearly defined. It was
not clear whether equal pay included equal social benefits and bonuses from
the commissioning companies. In other words, according to the new labour law,
commissioning companies need to pay more for and have fewer chances to
use the labour dispatch service, because the law standardised the way of
using the service. Since then, the labour dispatch service has been replaced
by a labour outsourcing service (laowu waibao), a form that allows
commissioning companies to outsource projects to individuals or small teams,
and requires commissioning companies to pay outsourcing companies by
project rather than by worker.
The new labour law seems to standardise the outsourcing market, and
guarantee good working conditions for agency labour. However, from what I
observed and from my interviews, it is obvious that self-employed workers are
pushed very hard and suffer from high work intensity – finishing as many
projects as possible, because their wage is based on project completion.
These poor working conditions are similar to the situation in the ‘pre-industrial
family-based household economy’ (Prak 2000: 150), when workers were
forced to be responsible for the production process and benefits of products.
28 Article 63, in Labour contract law of the People’s Republic of China
29 Ibid.
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One of the differences here is that the self-employed workers do not have
kinships as workers in the family workshops did. And the other difference is
that workers here are pushed to have high work intensity, which is where the
new labour law plays an important role. I further discuss these self-employed
workers’ difficult working conditions in Chapter Six, where I highlight the high
risks involved in such outsourcing work.
With recognising that most internet workers I observed and interviewed
had experiences of excessive working hours or high work intensity, it is
important to discuss how much they were paid for their work, and whether the
pay really reflected their work efforts. Therefore, in the next section, I discuss
the inequalities and injustices surrounding the issue of workers’ pay.
4.3 Pay
As I pointed out in section 2.6, Green (2002) regards pay as an important
component of work effort. How much are internet workers paid for their high
work intensity? Workers’ pay here includes two parts: salary and pay for
excessive working hours, as discussed below.
4.3.1 Unequal salaries
According to a report from International Labour Organisation, which
investigates per capita monthly income in 72 countries, Chinese workers’
average income is £399 ($656).30 Although there is no official figure of
Chinese internet workers’ average income, a relevant figure given by Sina
Economy indicates that internet workers’ monthly salary is above the per
capita monthly income. The average annual salary of fresh graduates in the
top 5 internet companies is between £10,000 and £15,000 (the average
monthly income is between £833 and £1,250). 31
Figure 4.4 shows how new employees in Grand gain promotion and pay
rises: the employee can rise one professional level (S level, which I will explain
in Chapter Five) and 250 RMB (£25) pay rise after earning 1013 EXP, which
can be earned via daily work, projects, and extra tasks (such as writing good
comments for the company’s new product). This game style management, a
style of creative management created by Grand, may not directly show how
much different levels of workers earn, but at least, we can get a sense about
30 Ifeng news 2012
31 Sina Economy 2013
123
the average salary of most workers there: as figure 4.4 shows, the starting
monthly salary is 5,000RMB (£500). This is still above the average monthly
salary of Chinese workers (£399).
Growing Map of Employees in Game Style Management
System
S level S30
Salary 5,000 RMB
EXP 20,000
New
employee
S30
5,000 RMB
20,298
--
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
S30
5,000 RMB
20,770
--
S31
5,250 RMB
21,013
S31
5,250 RMB
21,282
--
Figure 4.4: Game style management system
Source: An internal-circulated document from Grand
However, this does not indicate that internet workers enjoy a high-level
salary among all Chinese workers. Instead, their annual income is still lower
than SOE workers and civil servants. According to the State Statistics Bureau
Population Division, the average annual income of workers in Chinese private
enterprises in 2012 was £2,875; in contrast, the average annual income of
SOE workers was £4,677.32 This indicates a large gap between private
enterprise workers’ and SOE workers’ income. In particular, another report
from the Website for Agriculture, Rural areas and Farmers states that even in
the same industry, the average annual income of SOE workers is much higher
than private enterprise workers’. For example in the telecommunication
industry, SOE workers earn on average 1.8 times more than private enterprise
32 Netease Economy 2013
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workers’.33 In 2013, Netease Economy, one of the most popular portals in
China, conducted a survey about SOE workers’ income in 287 SOEs, which
stated that the average annual income of these SOE workers in 2012 was
£11,136, which was 3.8 times higher than private enterprise workers’. The
highest average income in one SOE was even over £42,000.34 All these
figures indicate that internet workers, representative of private enterprise
workers, earn a lower income than most SOE workers. This addresses a
necessity to compare internet workers’ income with SOE workers’ income, and
further discuss this gap.
Based on the unofficial figures about internet workers’ income, which were
provided earlier, and some figures from my participants, technical workers
seem to be paid about £13,000 per year, and non-technical workers receive
£4,500 per year, compared to SOE workers’ annual salary of over £10,000.
… The Monthly salary for new employees in the products department is
£450. My beginning salary was £600 per month, which was the same as new
employees with postgraduate degrees. The average beginning salary is
£500-£550 per month… Now my monthly salary is £900 after increasing twice.
But actually, I only get £700 per month after tax… (Galeno, technical worker in
the Product Administration Department at Campus, 24th August 2011,
interview)
After two years, my monthly salary is now £850 before tax, which is low in
the industries… (Carl, technical worker in the Open Platform Department at
Campus, 27th August 2011, interview)
Besides the basic salary, SOE workers also receive various bonuses from
the state and some of their living costs are covered by the state. At the
moment, there is no official report about details of SOE workers’ bonus and
benefits. But in recent years, some media reports have focused on the good
benefits and high bonus SOE workers receive from the state, which are usually
much higher than their salaries. For example, Sina Economy points out that
SOE workers receive higher pension and housing fund than other workers:
according to the state, workers’ pension funding and housing fund, which are
partly paid by the company, cannot be over 12% of their last year’s salary;
whilst such fund of SOE workers, which are fully paid by their work units, is
over 20% in most SOEs (this means SOE workers pay zero to the funding, but
receive higher pay after retirement than other workers).35 In 2013, another
news report from Netease News points out that the monthly travel allowance
for workers in a SOE in Shanxi, a northwest province in China, was £530,
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Guangzhou Daily 2013
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which was 5 times higher than the minimum wage in the province.36 During my
fieldwork, I was told by my friend, who works in a SOE in Shanghai, that every
employee there only needs to pay £0.10 per day for their meals, and they are
good quality (most food is organic, which I discuss later). In comparison, some
internet workers, as workers in private enterprises, live only with this fixed
salary, without extra bonuses and cheap meals.
Some internet companies advertise that they also provide bonuses to their
employees in order to recruit high-skilled workers. For example, both Grand
and Campus state this in their handbooks for new employees (see Figure 4.5
and Figure 4.6). Figures 4.5-4.6 were collected from the handbook for new
employees in Grand which I collected after being recruited as a new intern in
the company. These figures show that workers enjoy large amounts of
bonuses and benefits, which include insurance required by the state and other
extra bonuses provided by the company. However, the company never
provides details of these bonuses and benefits, such as how much allowance
they pay to employees. According to my own experiences and on the basis of
talking with some full-time workers in the company, few of these bonuses are
paid in cash; instead, the company gives cheap gifts or gift cards as bonuses.
For example, the bonus for the national holiday in 2011 in Grand was a £5 gift
card. My interviewees in Campus also told me that most of the ‘extra bonuses’
advertised by the company usually were gifts or gift cards provided by the
company’s customers or cooperative partners. In Grand, one of the
well-known benefits in summer – free and unlimited ice cream – indeed was
provided by its customers, ice cream companies which pay their advertisement
fees with ice cream.
36 Netease News 2013
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Figure 4.5: Bonuses and benefits in Grand
Source: Translated from an internal-circulated document in Grand
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Figure 4.6: Benefits in Grand
Source: Translated from an internal-circulated document in Grand
Obviously, such ‘extra bonuses and benefits’ for internet workers cannot
be equal to SOE workers, who may be provided over £500 cash for monthly
travel allowance and high housing fund. The difference might be assumed to
relate to their different work intensity, but the reality is that internet workers are
paid less, and have a much higher work intensity. In contrast, SOE workers
receive higher pay without working any overtime; neither do they have to
devote themselves to their work during working hours, as internet workers do.
In other words, internet workers are paid unequally, compared to SOE
workers.
My salary is £13,000 per year before tax [£1,000 per month * 13 months]
with the endless overtime, whilst my friend who works in a SOE, earns around
£20,000 per year after tax [£800 per month * 16 months, and bonus £200 per
quarter * 4 quarters] without any overtime. (William, technical worker in the 3G
Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
This is what Wright (2010) points out in his research in Chinese society:
SOE workers receive benefits from the party-state that ‘have been unavailable
to other poor individuals’ (p.3). Such inequality between SOE workers and
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internet workers can also be found in their different benefits: SOE workers and
executives in internet companies enjoy specially delivered organic food as a
benefit, whereas most internet workers do not. This will be discussed later.
There is another part of the internet workers’ wages that distinguishes
them from workers in other industries: sharing companies’ stocks. Internet
work has been fetishized in recent years because workers are likely to receive
companies’ stocks as their bonus, which I pointed out at the beginning of this
thesis. It sounds as if every internet worker can become a millionaire once
he/she receives stocks. However, large numbers of internet workers are
struggling in difficult working conditions with the dream of being the next hero,
but, only a small number of individuals achieve the dream (I discuss this issue
in Chapter Six). Likewise, large numbers of ordinary internet workers are still
struggling in the area of low-rewarded overtime; nevertheless, some of them
receive certain stocks from the companies.
I had some stocks before I left [Campus]. It was just 3,000 shares. It was
£0.40 per share when I received them, which was evaluated as £1 per share
when I left [Campus]. It seemed that I could receive £3,000 when I left. But, in
fact, the company had a rule which meant we could only sell ¼ of our shares
every year. So this year I can only sell ¼ of my shares, which is £750. But
because income from stock sharing is ‘windfall’ in the income tax law, I need to
pay 47% of this amount of money as tax, which means I only receive £397.50
after tax. This is even less than my monthly salary… (Louis, former technical
worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 28th August 2011,
interview)
According to Louis, a former technical worker at Campus who had
recently started his own business, only some experienced workers who had
joined Campus when it was founded could receive certain stocks. These
stocks are not worth as much as workers in other industries imagine them to
be. And few of the more recently employed workers can receive stocks.
Most of us were so disappointed when the company went public. All the
managers celebrated it, but it’s none of our business. We do not get any
benefit from it… Even for the workers who received stocks, such sharing does
not guarantee them anything. It only becomes a way for the company to stop
[workers] job-hopping: once you want to leave the company, HR would
suggest you stay for one more year, in order to sell another ¼ of your shares.
This does not only happen in our company, but also happens in other internet
companies. It [stock sharing] becomes a way for companies to bargain with us
[workers]… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration
Department at Campus, 20th December 2011, interview)
In Chapter Two, I discussed such stock sharing when considering the
issue of ownership of resources. It is clear that stock sharing does not
authorise these workers any managerial power; instead, it becomes a way for
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the company to control workers. This again goes back to the question: what
does the lower middle class own? And does the bureaucratic capitalist class
exploit this class? As I argued in Chapter Two, it seems that internet workers,
people in the lower middle class, only own skills which are effective when
placed in the capitalist’s service. Some of them own certain resources, such as
stocks here, but lack the power to manage such resources. Therefore, these
workers still need to sell their skills in the capitalist market to survive.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 114-116) highlight the issue of unequal
pay between executives, such as CEOs, and junior workers, who form the
majority in the cultural industries. It is understandable that executives receive
more pay than ordinary workers in the internet industries. However, in China,
where ‘the wealthiest 20 percent of Chinese citizens earned more than 58
percent of China’s income, while the poorest 20 percent took in only 3 percent’
(Wright 2010: 6), the inequality between executives and workers is more
significant in terms of their benefits, with organic food being one example. Both
executives in internet companies and SOE workers, the higher middle class,
enjoy organic food as part of their benefits, which is unavailable to ordinary
internet workers, the lower middle class in contemporary Chinese society. I
argue that such unequal benefits between the higher and lower classes, need
to be considered as a part of the inequalities surrounding internet workers’
pay.
Ross (2005) observes differences between executives and workers in the
Chinese high-tech industries in terms of their catering conditions, such as the
quality of food and eating areas, which I also discussed earlier. Indeed, the
inequalities become more obvious in current Chinese society because of the
food safety problem.
At the time of writing, more than 40 kinds of food in mainland China have
been exposed as poisonous, contaminated by toxic chemicals. Scandals
regarding food poisoning seem to be exposed every second week. For
example, in 2008, some newspapers reported a widespread contamination of
milk products with melamine, an industrial chemical used to make concrete,
fertiliser and plastic. But this news was suppressed by the Chinese
government, who were making efforts to create an image of a safe and
hygienic China, in the run up to the Olympic Games in Beijing in August, 2008.
By the time the central government admitted the problem in September that
year, tens of thousands of babies had been affected and several had died from
kidney stones.37 In 2010, thousands of restaurants in some big cities, such as
Shanghai, were reported to have used gutter oil (digouyou), recycled cooking
oil often retrieved from drains where it had been dumped by restaurants after
use. Such oil can contain carcinogens and toxic mould. Chinese Xinhua News
37 The Economist, 29th October 2011
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Agency, the government’s news agency, called gutter oil ‘the most nerve-jittery
problem of late’ concerning food safety, and the one that showed the ‘really
nasty reality of Chinese food today’.38 In April 2012, CCTV reported that
manufacturers in East China’s Zhejiang Province and North China’s Hebei
Province had used dirty scrap leather to make industrial gelatine, which
eventually ended up as medical capsules. At the time of writing, 33 capsule
medicine products, 23 out of the 42 samples tested, were found to have
contained excessive chromium, a toxic heavy metal. 39 According to the
reports of contaminated food from the mass media, individual examples of
almost all the food in China – from vegetables to rice, snacks to ingredients of
main meals, infants’ formula to daily family food – is unsafe. The following
figure is a map showing the food poisoning situation in China at the moment
(based on statistics collected from news reports and internet users’ comments,
the blue part means food in these provinces is generally fine, by contrast, the
red part means the food problem in these provinces is extremely serious). It is
easy to find that the problem is quite serious in some areas coloured red, such
as Sichuan, Guangzhou, Zhejiang and Shanghai.
38 Ibid.
39 Xinhua Net, 23rd April 2012
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Figure 4.7: Map of Chinese food poisoning situation
Source: Zhi chu chuang wai, 17th June 2011
Causes of the urgent food problem are varied. According to Qiu (2009),
one cause is ‘the pollution created by industrialisation and urbanisation’
(p.141). Here, I would also suggest the problematic developing model of the
Chinese market, which is economically oriented and centred, and the complex
relationships between local governments and local entrepreneurs, as another
important reason. On the one hand, some manufactures are pursuing the
largest benefits by reducing original costs, which can even be based on using
illegal toxic chemicals. On the other hand, in certain areas, the local
governments economically depend on these companies producing the
contaminated food. For example, in the case of poisonous milk, because of the
close relationships between the local government and the big brand milk
companies, the scandal was only exposed when the central government
intervened.
Because of the urgent food safety problem, Chinese people nowadays
favour and desire organic food. However, it is hard for ordinary Chinese people
to consume organic food, because of expensive prices and the limited number
of organic food shops. Then, only certain privileged classes – the higher
middle class and the bureaucratic capitalist class such as government officials,
SOE workers and executives in private entrepreneurs – have channels to
consume organic food. For example, it was reported that almost all
government departments in China had special organic food suppliers for their
canteens. Therefore, directly delivered organic food becomes an attractive
benefit for executives in the internet industries.
As I have argued, inequality concerning organic food becomes one part of
the inequalities in relation to internet workers’ pay. The difficulty of housing in
cities where these workers work, becomes another inequality in relation to pay.
For example, most internet workers are struggling to buy a house in the big
cities with their low salary.
I never think about settling down here, in Beijing, because it’s too
expensive to be here, especially buying a house… Now I rent a house with my
colleague, each of us pays £200 per month for a small and old room. It is still
not cheap for us… (Wynn, technical worker in the Open Platform Department
at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
A house in Beijing is f***ing expensive. I can’t even dream of buying a
house, as I even can’t afford to rent a good house here… It’s too hard to find a
room with a monthly fee of £150, even a low quality one… (Galeno, technical
worker in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 2nd May 2010,
Self-observation journal)
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In these big cities, it seems that only SOE workers, civil servants,
government officials and the rich can afford to buy a house. As Shelly, an
intern in Grand, told me, civil servants in Shanghai are usually offered
discounted houses by their work units (danwei), for which they only need to
pay less than half of the market price, because these houses are built by their
work units with free land provided by the local government. Here, the work unit
again plays an important role in workers’ benefits, as it did in Mao’s era. But
the difference is that the work unit in contemporary Chinese society only
protects and guarantees certain classes’ benefits, such as the higher middle
class – civil servants and SOE workers.
The Weberian approach usually relates such inequalities to different life
chances: workers are given different chances to access to scarce and valued
outcomes, such as organic food here. Both Weberian and Marxist approaches
agree that occupants of different classes enjoy different life chances, though
they provide different schemata for understanding class. The Weberian
approach might understand these inequalities and injustices in terms of salary
and benefits, as a form of exploitation, because they show inequalities in
people’s daily experiences. But the Marxist approach, especially the
neo-Marxist approach adopted by this research, understands exploitation and
domination as the mechanism linking different class locations to variations in
life chances. In other words, the neo-Marxist approach tends to relate these
inequalities in terms of salary and benefits to the production process: to
identify how the bureaucratic capitalist class (government officials in this part
of the study, and the higher middle class) – some SOE workers, civil servants
and executives in private enterprises, appropriate the effort of the lower middle
class – the internet workers, because of their ownership of means of
production, and their power to allocate these resources.
In terms of the different fixed salaries, it is hard to argue that internet
workers face unequal salaries, because their labour efforts are appropriated by
people in higher classes. It is also arguable whether these workers experience
inequality in terms of organic food, because people in higher classes exploit
their efforts. Rather, I argue that such injustice surrounding internet workers’
benefits and salaries are caused by a sort of domination between classes: the
bureaucratic capitalist class and the higher middle class dominates the lower
middle class, because they control members of such lower classes via
employment relationship, such as work contracts, via owning means of
production. This results in an injustice in relation to internet workers’ pay:
internet workers are not rewarded equally to their high work intensity, and in
contrast, SOE workers and civil servants are well rewarded for their low work
intensity. Put simply, some experiences in terms of internet workers’ unequal
pay, need to be understood as a result of domination between classes, rather
than exploitation.
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But this does not indicate that the lower middle class, the majority of
internet workers here, are not exploited in the industries. Instead, I argue that
all of these workers – full-time workers, interns, and agency labour, suffer
certain difficult working conditions, such as unrewarded or low-rewarded
excessive working hours, because of exploitation from higher classes, though
in various levels.
4.3.2 Unpaid overtime
As I stated earlier in section 4.2, most internet workers carry out a great
deal of overtime. But little of this overtime is paid. In Campus and Grand,
full-time workers’ weekday overtime is unpaid. Instead, workers working late
during weekdays can benefit from a free dinner or the money to buy a dinner,
which is usually offered with certain restrictions. For example, in Campus,
workers can only benefit from a free dinner after working for 12 hours, which
means the four hours’ gap is not rewarded. In Grand, workers only receive
£1.80 for a dinner when they work after 8:30pm, and can be reimbursed for
taxi fees only after 11:30pm, which indicates the two hours’ gap (the official
time for finishing work is 6:30pm) is not rewarded. Working during weekends is
paid at double time, but in both companies, weekend overtime work needs to
be approved by department leaders, who usually encourage workers to finish
their work during weekdays. In other words, full-time workers are forced to
work overtime without reasonable rewards.
Here, full-time workers’ labour efforts and skills are appropriated by
internet companies because of their low-rewarded overtime work. Admittedly,
some workers work overtime because of certain ‘immaterial rewards’, such as
pleasure in work, as I stated earlier, in section 4.2; some workers overtime
because of the characteristics of internet work. However, some full-time
workers devote themselves to the work because of the high competition in the
industries, which is partly caused by companies, managers and the state. With
such overtime work, these workers spend lots of extra time at work, and little of
this time is reasonably rewarded. Most of the benefits produced in this extra
time are appropriated by the internet companies.
In the Chinese context, such labour efforts and skills involved in overtime
work are appropriated not only in the capitalist production process – the way
internet companies accumulate economic capital, but also in the way the
bureaucratic capitalist class accumulate capital – the state closely involved in
the management and production process of internet companies (I discuss this
process in detail in the next chapter). Some internet workers cannot avoid
such appropriation, because they are forced to contribute extra time to their
work, given the high competition caused by companies and managers, as well
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as the Chinese work ethic. And such low-rewarded overtime work is prevalent
in the industries, in which individual workers cannot escape. In other words,
the bureaucratic capitalist class appropriates efforts of the lower middle class,
because the former owns the means of production and have political power to
allocate resources. This appropriation results in certain unequal experiences of
working life – low-rewarded overtime work.
Like full-time workers’ poorly-rewarded overtime, neither interns’ nor
agency labour’s overtime is rewarded. Interns in both Grand and Campus are
required to work as full-time workers, whilst their pay is quite low compared to
the latter. In Grand, interns are paid £12 per day, no matter how many
additional hours they work overtime.
Most interns [in Campus], who are confirmed to be full-time workers after
graduation, are paid £200 per month… (Carl, technical workers in the Open
Platform Department at Campus, 27th August 2011, interview)
Salaries for both interns and agency workers are lower than half that of
full-time workers’, although interns mainly do the same work as full-time
workers. As I highlighted in section 4.2.2, both companies recruited interns as
a cheap and easily manageable alternative to full-time workers. For example,
when I contacted my friend in Grand one month after I had left, she told me
that thirty out of the forty full-time workers in the HR department had been laid
off, including her. In contrast, all the interns were kept on, replacing these
full-time workers. In other words, the company used these cheap interns as
replacements for the full-time workers, in order to save on labour costs. As
Perlin points out, interns are a dream solution for employers to ‘test drive
young workers for little or no cost’ (2011: 29).
Like full-time workers, it is evident that interns’ labour efforts are
appropriated by internet companies, because of their unpaid overtime. In
section 4.2.2, I explained why students still chose internships, even though
they understood it as a form of exploitation. There is another important issue in
these interns’ experiences, relating to exploitation: postgraduate supervisors,
who become a link to ‘for-profit enterprises’ (Qiu 2009: 138).
Normally, every supervisor has certain vacancies for ‘special
postgraduates’, who are good at socialising rather than academic work. These
sociable students are necessary for supervisors to negotiate projects with
companies or the state. For example, my friend, who is doing an MA at
Zhejiang University, told me that one of his classmates was from an unknown
university, and had poor academic ability. He was the special student the
supervisor chose, because of his ability to socialise. Every time the supervisor
needed to negotiate business with companies, he would be the person to help
with the socialising. (William, technical worker in the 3G Department at
Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
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In this case, this student was chosen and used to help the supervisor’s
business with companies – supervisors earn lots of money from such
cooperated projects with companies. In addition, some students majoring in
humanities and social sciences are required by their supervisors to write up
books for free. For example, Lily, the intern in Grand I mentioned earlier, who
was majoring in communications studies, had been required to write up two
books for her supervisor to publish (the low quality does not matter in this case,
because these books were marked as compulsory reading for her supervisor’s
modules, and would be purchased by students who chose these modules). As
is common amongst postgraduates, she could neither receive any pay nor get
her name on the publication. Before that, she was also required to write up a
movie script for her supervisor, which was sold to a film company for £2,000,
whilst she was paid zero.
Janet, the intern in Grand, worked on a design project with her supervisor,
which was evaluated at around £500 by a company, whilst her work was
evaluated as a new dress, which was just £80, by her supervisor. Cathy, the
intern in Grand, who majored in communications studies, was asked by her
supervisor to produce some commercial videos for a cooperative company,
without any pay. In these cases, neither student was keen to contribute her
creativity and labour for free. Instead, they were forced to carry out the work,
because their supervisors could decide whether they would successfully obtain
their degree.
Such situations need to be understood as a result of exploitation: the
labour efforts and skills of lower classes are appropriated by the higher classes
by coercion. For example, interns are forced by supervisors, who decide
whether these students can graduate, to be the free/cheap labour. As a result,
members of the lower classes, such as university students here, contribute
poorly-rewarded or unrewarded labour efforts to capitalist production; by
contrast, members of the higher classes, such as the supervisors in this
instance, benefit from capitalist production via such appropriation. Here, it
needs to be acknowledged that these cases are not specific to the internet
industries. Indeed, these are general phenomena happening in all Chinese
universities, and again, draw attention to the problematic Chinese education
system.
Some cases from my data show the close cooperation between
supervisors and internet companies, which shows a for-profit enterprise, in
which postgraduates’ (interns’) labour efforts are appropriated.
I was recruited by an online game lab which was a joint venture
between my university and a Korean online game company. I was not paid
as usual… (William, technical worker in the 3G Department at Campus, 26th
August 2011, interview)
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… I was also forced to conduct projects for my supervisor in my three
years’ postgraduate study. To be honest, my supervisor is nicer than others,
because sometimes he bought dinner for us as pay for our work. Although
we all know that out work helps him earn a lot of money, we have no chance
to negotiate with him… I know some PhD students are forced to extend their
courses, because their supervisors need them to conduct projects for free…
(Lara, non-technical worker in the Advertisement Department at Campus,
19th December 2011, interview)
Some months ago, we [Campus] cooperated with the Chinese Academy
of Sciences on a search engine project. Some students from the university
were sent to the company as interns. But we didn’t pay for them, since their
supervisors took charge of it, [though we know supervisors do not pay their
students]. Personally, I guess, as a common understanding in Chinese
universities, these interns are never paid by their supervisors… (Louis, former
technical worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 18th December
2011, interview)
In these cases, supervisors and companies cooperated to set up business
relationships to make profits. Both supervisors and companies earn money
from this ‘for-profit relationship’: supervisors receive pay from companies, and
also publish papers with data from these projects; and companies obtain
economic benefits by profiting from the products of these co-operative projects.
Only postgraduates, who work day and night as interns in the cooperating
companies, are not fairly rewarded. This shows that interns’ labour efforts and
skills are exploited by the ‘for-profit enterprises’, which are built by supervisors
and internet companies.
Interns’ unpaid work in both internet companies and universities show a
different extent or model of exploitation than full-time workers’. Interns’
experience seems to indicate that their efforts are appropriated more seriously
than full-time workers, because of their lower pay and the ‘for-profit
relationship’ between internet companies and supervisors. This again shows
the great variety in internet workers: interns experience a different working life
than full-time workers, due to different extents of exploitation behind their
experiences.
It is widely known in the internet industries that code farmers are poorly
paid, some are paid even worse than interns. William told me that the pay of
code farmers was quite low (usually no more than £400 per month), which
sometimes was even less than interns. He gave me an example of a code
farmer, who had high skills but was rejected by the Campus HR department as
a full-time worker, because of his junior college education (da zhuan)
background. In fact, he had several years’ work experiences, but only earned
£700 per month in the outsourcing company. This amount of money may seem
similar to a full-time worker’s pay, but an experienced technical worker like the
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code farmer is usually paid double in internet companies. Lara explains why
code farmers are paid low below:
… Most code farmers’ pay is taken by the outsourcing companies, which
causes their low pay… (Lara, non-technical worker in the Advertisement
Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
As I stated in section 4.2.4, code farmers sometimes take over full-time
workers’ work, and often take charge of the hardest work in the companies,
due to tensions between different status groups. But all such work is not
rewarded fairly: they are not paid for overtime, because the internet companies
pay the outsourcing companies by project rather than by worker, which means
they are not responsible for paying for the code farmers’ work. Meanwhile,
outsourcing companies are well known for exploiting code farmers, meaning
that code farmers can rarely claim any pay for their overtime.
This issue again relates to the new labour law, which I explained in section
4.2.4. The new labour law makes the labour outsourcing service (laowu
waibao) take place of the labour dispatch service (laowu paiqian), which
intends to standardise the outsourcing market. But, indeed, as I argued in
section 4.2.4, it only makes agency workers’ working conditions worse: it
enables the commissioning companies (internet companies in this research),
to ignore code farmers’ overtime pay. In other words, code farmers experience
unrewarded overtime work, not only because the high class members, internet
companies and the outsourcing companies, appropriate their labour efforts;
but also because they do not have the right law and union to guarantee their
rewards. I will further explain the union issue in Chapter Six, where I state risks
relating to code farmers’ experiences.
Compared to code farmers, the self-employed workers are better paid:
they even earn more than full-time workers.
In a middle-sized team, a self-employed worker usually earns £50,000 to
£60,000 per year. For example, our company outsources a project to a team
with the price of £6,000 per person. Although the team leader would take some
of the pay, every member in the team could still receive more than £3,000 per
project [which usually takes a month]. Compared to us [full-time technical
workers, who earn £13,000 per year], their wages are quite high… Like
Macroserf [a famous independent outsourcing group in China, which is
anonymised in this research], which I mentioned earlier, there are just 20
members and they only take projects over £30,000, so you can imagine how
much every self-employed worker there earns… (William, technical worker in
the 3G Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
Walter, a technical worker at Campus, whom I interviewed in my first set
of interviews in August 2011, moved to his friend’s independent outsourcing
group. There were several reasons for him to choose to be self-employed,
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such as autonomy and freedom, which I discuss in the next chapter, but a
good salary was also a force behind his job-hopping.
However, such high wages do not necessarily indicate that self-employed
workers experience good working conditions. As stated in section 4.2.4, such
good pay is based on high work intensity. In other words, self-employed
workers’ high pay may imply that they are not exploited as badly as code
farmers and interns, but the high work intensity still shows they suffer from
poor working conditions.
High levels of risk, which I discuss in Chapter Six, and high work intensity,
discussed here, clearly show self-employed workers’ poor working conditions.
Some of these problems have become worse because of the new labour law.
As I argued in section 4.2.4, self-employed workers are pushed towards high
work intensity – finishing many projects in a short time, in order to ensure a
high working wage. This is caused by a sort of exploitation I criticise in this
research: the bureaucratic capitalist class – the state which issued the new
labour law, and owners of internet companies which profit from the work of
self-employed workers – appropriate the labour efforts and skills of lower
classes – self-employed workers, because the former owns the power to
control and allocate production resources. This consequently leads to a
situation in which self-employed workers’ labour efforts and skills are
appropriated in the high work intensity, nevertheless, such experience is in a
different level than full-time workers’, interns’ and code farmers’.
4.4 Conclusion: Status struggles and variety in
exploitation
In this chapter, I have argued that many experiences in internet workers’
working lives need to be understood as a result of exploitation. For example,
full-time workers’ overtime is poorly rewarded or unrewarded. These workers
work overtime for different reasons, such as rewards, characteristics of
knowledge work and the Chinese work ethic. But many of them are pushed to
work overtime by high competition in the industries. Such high competition
comes from parents’ expectations, and is pushed by managers and companies.
In particular, internet companies promote the geek culture in order to
encourage workers to devote themselves to their work without considering
rewards. Moreover, this endless overtime work in the industries is generally
unrewarded. This shows that internet companies seek to maximise profits via
reducing labour costs. Internet workers’ labour efforts and skills are
appropriated in this capitalist production process via overtime work without
equal rewards.
139
Admittedly, some full-time workers receive stocks as part of their bonus,
but such stock sharing does not guarantee the workers good pay, nor does it
give the workers any managerial power. In other words, with such limited
benefits, internet workers still need to sell their skills to survive. These workers
have no other choice, and must accept unequal conditions, because they are
controlled by companies via work contracts (internet workers cannot escape
these experiences of unrewarded overtime work, because it is so common in
the internet industries). In other words, internet workers are forced to
experience injustice in their working life. I argue that this is a result of
exploitation: exploitation is the economic force behind internet workers’
unequal working-life experiences, even though other non-economic factors
also help shape such unequal experiences.
Interns also undertake unrewarded overtime work. They do the same
work as full-time workers, whilst receiving less than half of their pay. But still
more and more students pour into the intern market, because of problems
caused by educational reforms. The modern education reform has resulted in
four problems: low quality higher education, a large number of graduates,
difficulties in employment (caused by the large number of low quality higher
education courses) and large numbers of interns, along with the difficulties in
employment [looks like 5 problems to me]. All of these problems have caused
lots of university students to pour into the intern market to become cheap
labour in the internet industries.
Moreover, interns’ labour efforts are appropriated in the ‘for-profit
enterprises’, built up between university supervisors and internet companies.
In these enterprises, interns are used as cheap labour to work for projects run
by supervisors and internet companies, who receive both economic benefits
and immaterial rewards, such as publication. But interns are usually unpaid for
their hard work. Therefore, I argue that interns’ experiences of unrewarded
overtime in internet companies and unpaid hard work, are as a result of
exploitation. As part of the highly educated lower middle class, interns’ labour
efforts and skills are appropriated by the bureaucratic capitalist class, which
accumulates capital by coercion .
Another point here is the different levels of exploitation experienced by
interns’ and full-time workers. Interns experience a higher level of inequality in
the working life than full-time workers, not only because of their much lower
salary with the same workload, but also because their labour efforts are
appropriated by both universities and internet companies – the ‘for-profit
enterprises’ created by the bureaucratic capitalist class.
Both code farmers’ and self-employed workers’ working conditions have
been worsened by the new labour law, which enables internet companies to
not take care of agency labourers. Code farmers sometimes need to take over
full-time workers’ work, but this hard work is not rewarded. Self-employed
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workers receive the highest pay amongst all internet workers, but it is based on
their work intensity being the highest. Both forms of agency workers sell their
skills by offering unlimited working time, in order to survive in a society where
the minority bureaucratic capitalist class owns the majority of resources, and
the majority lower middle class and the working class need to sell skills and
labour efforts to survive. I argue that these experiences of agency workers –
unpaid overtime and high work intensity – are a result of exploitation. The
higher classes accumulate capitals based on appropriating the labour efforts
and skills of lower classes, because the former owns the means of production
and have the political and economic power to allocate these resources,
manifested in their ability to alter labour laws further in the direction of
exploitation. This results in the lower classes needing to sell their skills and
labour efforts in order to survive, and accept unequal ‘prices’ for such efforts.
The differing working conditions of code farmers’ and self-employed
workers’ indicate the variety in experiences brought about by exploitation:
self-employed workers may experience a lower level of inequality than code
farmers, due to their higher pay, though this comes with a high work intensity.
The different working conditions experienced by different kinds of internet
workers show the variety of social relations brought about by exploitation.– for
example, full-time workers suffer poorly-rewarded overtime, which is caused
by the appropriation of the lower middle class’s labour efforts and skills by the
bureaucratic capitalist class, whilst they still have a better working life than
interns, who experience bad conditions both in companies and universities.
Admittedly, there are some jobs that pay more than others, which cannot
be viewed as a result of exploitation. But, in this study, internet workers in the
lower middle class receive low pay, which is unequal to their overtime work
and high work intensity, because they are controlled by the higher classes.
Thus, it is necessary to criticise some experiences as a result of exploitation.
But, another significant issue here is to recognise the variety in exploitation:
some workers enjoy a better working life because of lower levels of
exploitation.
All the experiences shown above are discussed in relation to exploitation,
which is based on dynamics between classes. Both a Weberian approach and
a Marxist approach regard class as an important concept. For example, the
Weberian approach recognises the significance of class, because it ‘links
individuals’ positions in capitalist markets to inequality in the distribution of life
chances’ (Breen 2002: 47). As the organic food example in this research
shows, executives and government officials, members of the bureaucratic
capitalist class, gain access to scarce resources in society, such as organic
food in this case, partly due to their privileged positions in the capitalist market.
Here, inequality of the distribution of life chances is determined by individuals’
class locations.
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But this does not indicate that individuals in the same class position
always enjoy the same life chances. As Breen (2002: 56) shows, different life
chances amongst members in the same class location are related to other
factors. So we need also the concept of status groups to theorise some
internet workers’ experiences. As I argued earlier, full-time workers, interns,
code farmers and self-employed workers are conscious of being members of
certain status groups. For example, code farmers are conscious of their
identity as the ‘second-class workers’ in both industries and society, due to
their lower education level and lower salary. Interns are also conscious of
being members of a low status group in society, due to denigration of their
university degrees as well as their low skills.
Membership of such status groups influences individuals’ working-life
experiences. Different kinds of internet workers experience different levels of
overtime work and unequal pay; certain members of status groups experience
status struggles. For example, some interns and code farmers are forced to
take charge of the work for full-time workers, due to their inferior positions in
companies and the society, which ultimately increase their workload without
extra pay. This shows status struggles experienced by interns and code
farmers. Such tensions and dynamics within the lower middle class address
the great variety and disunity within the class.
Different working-life experiences and tensions within classes indicate
different members of the lower middle class are proletarianised to different
levels.. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the other side of the problem of
proletarianisation is the close relationships between the lower middle class
and the working class, which I describe as forms of agency and discuss in
detail in Chapter Seven. So, whilst it is true that internet workers are exploited,
as I have highlighted in this chapter, this represents only part of the picture.
But before discussing agency (or the other side of the proletarianisation
problem) in detail, I highlight other more negative aspects of internet workers’
experiences in the next two chapter. In the chapter that follows, I move on to
evaluate another issue in internet workers’ experiences: autonomy.
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Chapter Five: Autonomy
5.1 Structure of this chapter
I discussed internet workers’ working hours and pay in the last chapter,
and argued that exploitation one mechanism shaping their experiences. In
addition, tensions and disunity within the class also influence the quality of
working life in these industries. In this chapter, I discuss workers’ ambivalent
experiences of autonomy. I argue that some workers experience limited or low
autonomy in their work, despite the internet industries being fetishized as
workplaces providing high autonomy. I begin by specifying the context for
discussing autonomy in section 5.2, where I explain the complicated
relationships between the state and internet companies. In section 5.3, I
address workers’ subjective experiences of workplace autonomy. I suggest
that some internet workers experience a high level of workplace autonomy,
partly because of the way that guanxi operates in the company. Other workers
experience a high level of autonomy based on their high work intensity. Their
high levels of workplace autonomy need to be understood critically, in the
context of this high work intensity. In section 5.4, I discuss how the state
intervenes in workers’ daily practices and creativity, and how workers
themselves understand and evaluate these experiences. I recognise a
degraded form of agency, which may lead to negative results. In section 5.5, I
conclude that Chinese internet workers’ subjective experiences of autonomy
are distinct from autonomy as experienced in many Western contexts in that
their professional autonomy is not only limited by internet companies, as
experienced by internet workers in other geographical and political contexts,
but it is also limited by the state. In this section, I also recognise that workers’
autonomy could be understood as a kind of agency, which shows that people
have some capacity to influence their working lives. But I show how this
autonomy is sometimes used negatively, as when workers ‘choose’ to work
themselves extremely hard. This provides a link to the more detailed
discussion of worker agency, which I address in Chapter Seven.
5.2 The Chinese context for autonomy at work
As I clarified in Chapter Two, China has a unique class structure, where
cadres – some of whom benefited from the privatisation of SOEs to become
the rich in the 1990s – and capitalists cooperate as the bureaucratic capitalist
class. This bureaucratic capitalist class has a more privileged class location
than the other classes, because of its ownership of economic resources and its
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exercise of political authority. Therefore, it is worth discussing the complicated
relationships between cadres (including government officials), who represent
the state in this research, and capitalists, referring to the internet companies
here, as a context for evaluating the workers’ experiences of autonomy.
Ross (2005) recognises that Chinese government officials still play a
strong role in the Chinese economy, even though the central government has
not been planning the economy in detail since the 1980s. There are several
ways both the central government and local governments intervene in the
internet industries. First, central government intervenes through various
policies and regulations; second, state actors exchange both private and
public benefits with internet companies; and third, central government directly
intervenes in the practices of internet companies.
Some cases show that the central government controls the industries from
a macro perspective via its cultural and economic policies. In the Executive
Meeting of the State Council in 2011, Premier Wen Jiabao drew up a blueprint
for the internet industries. This was the first time that the internet industries
were a focus at state level. 40 On 4th May 2011, the National Internet
Information Office was set up by the state to manage the industries.41
O’Conner and Gu (2012: 4) claim that Chinese cultural policies, frames
and directs the market via targeting big companies rather than small and
medium enterprises. It is similar in the internet industries. For example, at the
end of 2011, the Beijing government issued a policy entitled ‘Several
Provisions of the Beijing Municipality on the Administration and Development
of Microblogs in Beijing’ (Beijingshi weiboke fazhan guanli ruogan guiding),42
aimed at controlling internet users’ online activities by forcing them to register
on microblog platforms using their real names and national identity numbers.
This policy focused on several of the largest internet companies that provided
microblogging services, such as Sina and Tencent. As O’Conner and Gu state,
this is the Chinese state’s slogan in terms of managing the cultural industries:
‘control the big, let go the small’ (p.4).
Of course all governments intervene in cultural industries via policy. For
example, in the UK, Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) claim that the forces
structuring cultural workers’ ambivalent experiences include ‘the general push
on the part of businesses and their allies in government towards neo-liberalism
and marketisation (the process whereby market exchange comes to permeate
societies)’ (p.85). However, a key difference between China and other
countries is the extent of state intervention in the industries.
40 China National Information Infrastructure, 13th January 2012
41 Ibid.
42 Beijing Municipality, 16th December 2011
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A second characteristic of the state’s intervention in the internet industries
is the exchange of benefits between officials and internet companies. As
O’Conner and Gu claim, the Chinese context is special because ‘the
management and ownership of these large entities included party and state
actors whose personal and professional interests were thus tied up with them,
blurring lines between public and private activities’ (2012: 4). Put simply, the
dynamics of the bureaucratic capitalist class contribute to the construction of a
very specific context for evaluating workers’ subjective experiences. In the
internet industries, it is not the party and state actors who own and manage the
large entities; rather, it is the internet leaders, who are subsumed into the
bureaucratic capitalist class after their companies dominate the industries.
Figure 5.1 shows the national conference: ‘Constructing Healthy Network
Cultures’ (gongjian gongxiang wangluo wenhua) organised by the party, which
all CEOs of the dominant internet companies were required to attend. At this
conference, the state intended to ask these internet leaders to follow its plan
for constructing the internet industries. For example, as the first picture in
Figure 5.1 points out, the state required internet companies to work in
conjunction with it to build a ‘healthy internet space’, where information
security, such as the filtering of all information against the state, would be
guaranteed. In this case, the internet leaders were ‘re-educated’ about the
state’s plan for constructing online freedom. They were subsumed into the
state’s plan regarding such construction.
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Figure 5.1: A conference in relation to internet industries organised by CCP
Source: From an interviewee’s personal website on Campus
The internet industries are different to the other industries in China,
because not all leaders of internet companies are cadres who set up their own
businesses by usurping resources from SOEs where they had executive
positions, as is universally the case among other industries. Instead, most
Chinese internet companies are privately owned by individuals who have
succeeded through years of effort. These leaders were mostly not part of the
bureaucratic capitalist class before their companies became large entities in
the industries. The state quickly made attempts to subsume leaders of the
large entities by organising ‘educational conferences’, in which leaders were
required to follow the state’s rules and plans concerning the internet industries,
in order to realise its slogan ‘control the big, let go the small’.
It would seem that the internet leaders are not keen to study the state’s
plan and rules about the internet industries, as the last picture in Figure 5.1
indicates – some internet leaders, such as the leader of Alibaba, the largest
online commerce company that has Taobao as its constituent company, and
the leader of Netease, one of the largest portals, fell asleep in the conference.
But this does not mean that they reject being subsumed into the bureaucratic
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capitalist class. Instead, most of the time, these leaders choose to stand with
the state, because their projected benefits are the same – both seek to
maximise their economic benefits from the internet industries. These benefits
are mostly based on the exploitation of the labour efforts of ordinary internet
workers, which I discuss in the next two sections.
Another example of such cooperation happened when I was in Grand. An
Election Meeting of Candidates of the National People’s Congress, an
important part of the Party system, was held in Shanghai. All CEOs of the
dominant internet companies, including the CEO of Grand, were chosen as
candidates by the Shanghai government. This was an attempt by the local
Shanghai government to subsume these internet leaders into its Party system
via such political activities. For internet leaders, similar to the previous
example, they might have been tired of attending these political activities, but
they did not reject being part of the bureaucratic capitalist class, which was
capable of bringing them economic benefits and higher social status. As a
return for such subsumption or cooperation with the state, the state authorises
certain benefits to these internet companies via its policies, such as low taxes
and cheap land rental, both of which are used to build up internet companies.
In a ‘crony communist’ country, where the state has great power to allocate
resources, such benefits (low taxes and cheap land rental) make it worthwhile
for internet leaders to accept being subsumed into the Party system.
In these two cases, internet leaders are closely tied to the state’s plans for
constructing the internet industries. The capitalists’ benefits are subsumed into
the Party’s construction plan. It is the manner in which capitalists and the
political power are entangled in order to maximise their common benefits in the
internet industries, that enables the bureaucratic capitalist class to emerge in
these industries.
Sometimes, the two groups in the bureaucratic capitalist class, the
internet companies and the state, exchange benefits, in order to guarantee
and maximise their economic benefits. This exchange blurs the ‘lines between
public and private activities’, to use O’Conner and Gu’s term (2012: 4). For
example, the household registration in Shanghai (shanghai hukou) is an
attractive benefit for all workers in Shanghai, because it opens up access to
housing, children’s education, and work pensions in Shanghai, amongst other
things. But the application criteria are high, and quotas are limited and so a lot
of workers struggle to obtain it. In contrast, the Shanghai local government
authorises Grand some extra registration quotas. This helps Grand to attract
high-skilled workers. For instance, Salina, the new HR worker in Grand’s game
department, told me that she joined Grand because it promised to help her
obtain the household registration in Shanghai.
In return, internet companies have certain benefits they exchange with
local governments, such as paying high taxes and helping to develop the
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outskirts of cities. In 2008, when the state faced the employment difficulty, as
mentioned in the previous chapter, Grand helped the local government by
recruiting an extra 1,000 university graduates. It seems that the 1,000
graduates also benefited from such benefit exchange, because they were
given jobs. However, according to my participants, these employees were the
victims in this situation. They were recruited to work in call centres, where lots
of vacancies existed. Many of these employees were qualified for better jobs
with higher salaries and better working conditions, but they were employed by
Grand as call centre workers with low pay and overtime. In other words, Grand
gained the benefit of recruiting highly qualified workers (with a good education
and high skills) at a lower price than usual; and the state gained the benefit of
solving the employment difficulty. But again, university graduates, some of
whom were interns in internet companies, became victims in such benefit
exchange, because they were evaluated as being of low quality, and had to
suffer bad working conditions, such as long working hours and low pay.
Some of these workers were later put in Grand’s talent pool, because they
had high skills, which were needed by other departments. Compared to
recruiting new employees with the same high skills, using these workers in the
talent pool was easier and cheaper for Grand: workers in Grand only get a pay
rise when they gain promotion (Figure 5.2 shows the structure of pay rises in
Grand): promotions are based on increases in EXP, usually depending on how
many projects they have conducted. Technical workers can choose to focus on
the work relating to technology, without having to do extra work in relation to
administration or management, by receiving a pay rise according to an
increase in their professional position. For example, a new technical worker
can receive a pay rise after conducting a number of technology-related
projects, according to the upgrade of his professional positions. But the highest
pay he can achieve is as chief expert, which is equal to the pay for senior vice
president. In other words, if technical workers seek a fast promotion with high
pay, such as the position of president, they are required to carry out extra
projects relating to administration or management, which mostly depends on
how many skilled projects they have conducted, whilst the salary of employees
recruited after 2008 increases year by year. In other words, even though these
workers joined Grand in 2008, earlier than the new employees, and they
moved to another department later, this still did not guarantee that they would
receive higher pay than the newly recruited employees. In this sense, Grand
saved on labour costs by taking advantage of these workers, via its
cooperation with the local government in 2008. This case shows how the
bureaucratic capitalist class dominates and exploits the labour efforts and
skills of the lower middle class, such as interns in this case.
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5.2: Pay rise model in Grand
Source: an internally circulated document in Grand, translated by the author
Internet companies also benefit local governments by arranging jobs for
government officials’ relatives. For example, Janet, the intern in Grand,
showed me an email from her manager, which asked her to recruit some
relatives of Shanghai government officials. These people did not reach
Grand’s standards, but they were still guaranteed positions in the company
because of their strong family background – having family members as
government officials – as I pointed out in Chapter Two. Internet companies
have become an alternative place to SOEs, for government officials to arrange
jobs for their family members. Here, the personal interests of government
officials – ‘Party and state actors’ in O’Conner and Gu’s terms – were tied up
with the companies. This blurs lines between private matters and public
activities.
Meanwhile, this example also shows how family background shapes
different life chances, which influence people’s well-being: family members of
government officials gain more chances of accessing jobs than members of
lower classes. This again shows the importance of considering some
non-economic factors, such as guanxi (personalised networks), embedded
social ties, and forms of social relations, as the mechanism to shape the
quality of working life.
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Moreover, O’Conner and Gu (2012: 4) point out that close relationships
with the government have become a valuable way for companies to enter the
Chinese market. In every internet company, there is a special ‘Government
Relationships Department’, which is responsible for building and keeping up
good relationships with official departments such as the Ministry of Culture and
The State Administration of Radio, Film and Television. Workers in these
departments are responsible for socialising with government officials, by
drinking and eating with them, and sometimes even by bribery, in order to gain
political connections. As one of my interviewees said:
It is in China, where most business needs to keep good relationships with
the government… (Carl, technical worker in the Open Platform Department at
Campus, 27th August 2011, interview)
In these socialising activities, government officials offer benefits to the
companies through their privileged political power, which allows them to
control varied resources relating to the market. In return, they receive money
and other individual benefits provided by the companies. Such Party and state
actors then blur the lines between private benefits and public activities. This
becomes a form of corruption, whereby the bureaucratic capitalist class
accumulates capital by appropriating labour efforts of the lower classes.
As indicated earlier, the third way that the state intervenes in the internet
industries is that it directly manages and standardises the practices and
products of internet companies. The main contradiction between internet
companies and the state concerns users’ online freedom and the extent to
which online users should be allowed the freedom to speak out. On the one
hand, internet companies want to attract internet users by providing them with
a free space to speak out; but on the other hand, the companies must follow
the state’s rules and limit this freedom, in order to avoid internet users
engaging in any discussion against the state. Internet companies struggle to
find this balance between encouraging internet users, who would bring
commercial benefits, and obeying rules from the state, which could easily stop
their business. For example, Sarah, the manager of the online novel
department in Grand, told me that workers in her department were worried
about the widely circulating news stories about teenagers’ addiction to network
cultures. If the news attracted the attention of relevant government
departments, such as the Ministry of Culture, then some of their novels would
be deleted and some of their related services would be adapted, or even
withdrawn.
In 2008, our whole product department was stopped for a period by the
government because we opened a new forum at that time, in which large
amounts of users gathered to talk about sensitive issues. Then, we were
required to stop the forum and rearrange our services… (Galeno, technical
150
worker in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December
2011, interview)
In these cases, the state shows its powerful nature, and could easily
influence or even stop internet companies’ services. It highlights the strong
political interventions in the Chinese internet industries, which distinguishes
the industries from those of other countries. The difficulty of finding a balance
between the state and internet users then influences the workers’ practices
and creativity, which I discuss in section 5.4.
All the three methods of central government and local governments’
intervention in the internet industries show how the bureaucratic capitalist
class emerges and operates in the Chinese context, especially in the internet
industries. Dynamics between the two actors in this class – the state and
internet companies – show the complex context in which internet workers have
ambivalent experiences of autonomy. Now I turn to evaluate these
experiences within this specific context.
5.3 Workplace autonomy
I introduced my framework for discussing workers’ experiences of
autonomy, which is mainly based on Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s model of
good and bad work, in section 2.6. Autonomy here is made up of two
components: workplace autonomy and professional autonomy. As I defined in
the theoretical model of evaluating workers’ experiences of autonomy in
section 2.6, workplace autonomy refers to the degree of workers’
determination within certain work situations, such as how they balance work
and life in their daily practices. I explain professional autonomy as workers’
determination in their work practices and creativity, under the pressures that
are exerted by the state and firms. Below, I discuss the first element of
workplace autonomy: to what extent workers determine their own work
intensity.
As I showed at beginning of this thesis some media reports, suggest that
internet work provides flexible working hours and large spaces for innovation.
Here, I discuss to what extent this is true.
In Grand, workers in the innovation department and game department
have one hour’s flexible working hours; workers in these departments can be
late for work by one hour, but they still need to give back the time, by working
late for an extra hour at the end of that day. Most of the other workers are
required to work between 9am to 6pm, which is usually extended because of
overtime. All workers are allowed to be late by half an hour three times in one
month; every time on top of this, they are deducted two hours’ salary if they are
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late by up to half an hour, and deducted half a day’s salary if they are late by
up to two hours. Put simply, most full-time workers in Grand do not benefit
from flexible working hours. Similar to workers in other Chinese industries,
internet workers are also required to have fixed working hours, and even more
work hours than other workers.
In Campus, there was flexible working hours for technical workers in 2010,
which required workers to work for 9 hours per day without fixed timetables.
But this was changed to a fixed working hours in 2011, similar to the working
hours in Grand.
Therefore, most workers in both companies see their autonomy limited in
terms of working hours.
I hate [to] clock on and off. There’s no freedom in terms of our working
time… It’s real freedom only when I can control my body, by which I mean I
can decide when I come to work… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product
Administration Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
Such low level of autonomy in terms of working hours then takes the
‘shine’ off internet work: in the Chinese context at least, internet work does not
provide flexible working hours as it is said to, and workers need to work
overtime frequently without reasonable rewards, as I argued in the last
chapter.
But, there are some exceptions: some internet workers have high level of
freedom in terms of working hours, because of their strong guanxi with
executives. For example, Lily, the intern in Grand, told me that her team leader,
Christina, had used a visit to the dentist as an excuse for absence for several
times within one week. This was possible because of her good relationship
with executives. Sunny is another worker in the HR department who usually
only works for half day. Indeed, both Christina and Sunny were ‘VIP workers’ in
Grand, who were not required to clock on and off as other workers do, and
could decide their own working hours. This was not because of these workers’
‘extremely high skills’, but because of their strong guanxi with executives or
even the boss in the company.
This again distinguishes Chinese internet industries from other cultural
industries: as I pointed out in Chapter Two, most Chinese internet companies
are private enterprises, which means the individual owners can make most
decisions. This allows considerable scope for guanxi to operate in the
companies, with effects on working life. Christina, the VIP worker mentioned
above, was known to have very strong guanxi with executives, via practices to
create trust in the relationship. For example, she organised groups of workers
in the department to look for an executive’s lost watch during working hours, in
order to please the executive. Another time, she sent her work, which in fact
had been completed that morning, to the executive in charge of the project, at
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midnight, because she knew the executive like people to work late to show
their diligence. All these practices enabled Christina to have strong guanxi with
executives, which ultimately give her great chances, such as promotion and
enjoying certain benefits that are only available to executives.
Here we see a non-economic factor, guanxi, as well as the economic
factor, class, influencing internet workers’ experiences in terms of working
hours: internet workers’ low class location determines that their working hours
are controlled by the bureaucratic capitalist class, the internet company in this
case, which is not as flexible as is often claimed; whilst within the class,
different levels of guanxi enable some workers to have a higher level of
freedom to decide their working hours than others.
The above account helps to provide some answers to questions relating to
guanxi that I asked in Chapter One: are internet industries outside of the
influence of guanxi? Can internet workers with weak guanxi receive the same
chances as those with strong guanxi? It seems the answer is no at the moment:
workers with strong guanxi with executives seem to have better chances than
others, and the internet industries provide scope for guanxi to influence
working lives. I will further discuss this issue in the next section. Interns in
both companies investigated in this research rarely have the opportunity to
decide their working hours. Most interns follow the working pattern of full-time
workers, and some need to work overtime, again, like the full-time workers.
I had interned here [in Campus] for five months before I was formally
employed. All new employees, who are recruited before graduation, are
required to do internships, before they formally join the company … My team
leader wanted me to do more work, so he asked me to do [an] internship
earlier than [the] others… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product
Administration Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
Sometimes, interns seem to be able to have more flexible working hours
than full-time workers, because they need time to focus on their studies as well
as working. But these holidays need to be approved by their team leaders, who
usually encourage interns to focus on their work. As shown in section 4.2.2,
Janet’s experience of failing to quit her internship indicates that interns do not
have ‘flexible working hours’: interns do not even have the right to quit their
internships, as the company decides this. Thus, similar to some full-time
workers, interns in the internet industries experience a low level of autonomy in
terms of working hours.
According to the new labour law, which encourages internet companies to
pay outsourcing companies by project rather than by worker, the working
hours of code farmers is controlled by the outsourcing companies. For
example, the two code farmers in my group in Grand, followed the working
hours of the outsourcing company, which was from 8am to 5pm. Colleagues in
Grand told me that these two code farmers were rather fortunate as their
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outsourcing company set up regular working hours for them. Some code
farmers in the game department did not have regular working hours, as they
were required to finish projects before the deadlines, so they usually needed to
work over 10 hours per day, sometimes even longer than the full-time workers
there. This indicates that code farmers do not have any chance to determine
their working hours; rather, their working hours is extremely controlled by the
outsourcing company, which pushes them to work as much time as possible.
In contrast, self-employed workers seem to have the highest level of
autonomy in terms of determining working hours, because these workers
self-group to conduct projects, which does not require them to clock on and off
as other internet workers do. But, as I pointed out in section 4.2.4, these
workers have a high work intensity, because their work is evaluated by the
number of projects completed; thus, they still need to work overtime. In other
words, self-employed workers are able to determine their working hours, but
they are pushed to work overtime because of economic pressures. Flexible
working hours do not guarantee them an easy working life; rather, they suffer
from high work intensity in order to survive. I will revisit this point in the next
chapter.
The second concern of workplace autonomy in this research is to what
extent workers determine their work content, such as choosing their own
projects. Some workers believe they have a high level of such autonomy,
because they have the freedom to determine their projects.
If I didn’t want to do some projects, I could just tell my leader directly. Most
of the time, he would agree. (Louis, former technical worker in the Open
Platform Department at Campus, 18th December 2011, interview)
Most internet companies are quite free [in terms of deciding projects]. For
example, most of the time I can completely take charge of a project, which
means I can decide when and how to finish a certain part of a project. The
leader would just give me a deadline to submit the final version of the project.
(Walter, technical worker in the Advertisement Department at Campus, 25th
August 2011, interview)
However, some workers indicate that such determination only works in
certain cases, and they have limited autonomy most of the time.
… If the project is small, which just needs two workers to work for two
weeks, then I could just discuss this with my leader, and most of the time, it
works. But if the project needs five workers to work for one or two months, then
it needs to be decided by the managers. It means we could just submit our
ideas and wait for the approval from the company… Indeed, there is little
chance we could determine some projects for ourselves, as we usually are
busy with the projects given to us by our leaders. There is little time for us to
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think about new ideas… (Louis, former technical worker in the Open Platform
Department at Campus, 28th August 2011, interview)
In these cases, workers’ freedom in terms of deciding projects depends on
the size of the projects and the time given to workers for thinking about new
ideas. In other words, workers are given limited freedom in deciding which
project they want to conduct.
In some cases, internet workers are even forced by companies to conduct
some projects that they are not good at. For example, during my observation,
all workers in some technical departments in Grand, no matter what areas they
were specialised in, were encouraged to learn Android – an open source
operating system designed primarily for smartphones and tablet computers,
which was the next key project for the company. It seemed that workers were
‘encouraged’ to select this option, but most workers were actually forced to do
the work in relation to the program. The company issued a new rule to process
the program: department leaders would have deductions from their salaries, if
30% of the employees in their departments could not pass the Android test.
Put simply, the workers were forced to learn new technologies and conduct
new programs without any consideration of their capabilities and interests.
Two workers in the operations department told me that they needed to conduct
the Android project at the same time as learning the skill, which was quite
stressful for them. Therefore, the workers involved in the Android project did
not have any freedom to decide which projects to carry out.
To sum up, some workers in both internet companies did have certain
freedoms to decide which projects they wanted to work on, but some workers
had limited or no freedom for determination. As a result, I argue that although
the internet industries are characterised by the autonomy of determination,
some workers experience limited autonomy in their work.
The limited workplace autonomy in full-time workers’ experiences,
especially the limited autonomy in terms of deciding projects for oneself, then
encourages some workers to set up their own businesses.
The freedom brought by running my own business is quite important to
me. I could develop any program that I think is valuable, rather than waiting
for approval from the company I am working [for] now. (Walter, technical
worker in the Advertisement Department at Campus, 25th August 2011,
interview)
… Another motivation is to control all the resources myself. As an
employee in a big company, I am only working for my boss, say, selling my
labour to my boss. But if I set up my own business, it means I can control all
the things by myself… (William, technical worker in the 3G Department at
Campus, 26th August 2011, interview)
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I hate to be controlled by the company, who even set my working time. I
want to be free, not only physically, say, I could have a rest whenever I want;
but also mentally, say, I could develop any programs I want… (Galeno,
technical worker in the Product Adminstration Department at Campus, 24th
August 2011, interview)
Freedom of working hours and determining projects for oneself, partly
explains why workers choose to start their own businesses. Admittedly, there
are other important reasons that push workers to set up their own businesses,
such as earning more money, which I will discuss later, in Chapter Seven.
However, workplace autonomy is also an important issue, and the limited
workplace autonomy allowed by the internet industries, means workers
sometimes choose to set up their own businesses, in order to enjoy a higher
level of workplace autonomy.
Some theorists, such as McGuigan, may understand such setting up of
one’s own business as practices of entrepreneurial capitalists in the making,
and autonomy, as a motivation here, as eroded by capitalism. However, it is
vital that such practices still indicate a sort of free choices, which might be
subsumed into the capitalist production later. I will turn back to this free choice
in Chapter Seven, in which I further evaluate the agency of workers. I argue
that some internet workers may experience limited workplace autonomy, whilst
such limited autonomy still indicates certain the existence of a certain amount
of choice and free thinking, though under structuring circumstances that
cannot be fully controlled. This freedom, I will argue, may later be transformed
into a potential for improving the existing industrial working conditions and
changing existing social orders. I will turn back to this potential in Chapter
Eight,
Both interns and code farmers have limited autonomy to determine
projects on which to work, because both groups mostly follow full-time workers’
instructions. In contrast, self-employed workers have a higher level of
autonomy in terms of determining projects: this work group can decide which
project to carry out, though sometimes they cannot say no to certain projects,
due to economic pressures and considering getting offered future projects. It is
the high autonomy and high pay that attract workers to be self-employed. For
example, my interviewee, Walter, a technical worker in Campus’s
Advertisement Department, joined his friend’s self-employed team two months
after I interviewed him in August 2011. He indicated his interest in being
self-employed by saying:
… I want to indulge myself, which means I could have the space to do the
work I am good at, have the freedom to develop the projects I am interested in,
and have the chance to take charge of a project completely [rather than
finishing a piece of the project]. (Walter, technical worker in the Advertisement
Department at Campus, 25th August 2011, interview)
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At the time of stating this, Walter might not have planned to be
self-employed, but, the issues he mentioned above, such as freedom and
autonomy, probably later became an important reason for him joining his
friend’s team as a self-employed worker. But again, as I emphasised earlier,
such high levels of autonomy and high rewards are based on high work
intensity: unlimited overtime. These self-employed workers may have the
freedom to choose which project to conduct, but they do not have the freedom
of such determination when they face economic pressures. This high level of
autonomy based on a high work intensity should be criticised as a result of
exploitation. As I claimed in section 4.2.4, the new labour law issued by the
state changes the outsourcing form from labour dispatch service to labour
outsourcing service. This enabled self-employed workers to receive more
projects, whilst also enabling the commissioning companies, such as internet
companies here, to ignore the previous benefits that self-employed workers
received, such as their overtime rewards. In other words, these self-employed
workers are forced to be responsible for their own benefits and working
conditions, which the state and internet companies are supposed to take
charge of. The high level of workplace autonomy in self-employed workers’
experiences cannot override this sort of exploitation.
In Chapter One, I asked questions in relation to a special issue in the
context of the Chinese internet industries: are the internet industries outside of
the influence of guanxi? Do the Chinese internet industries provide more
opportunities for success to ordinary people than other industries? Can
internet workers with weak guanxi receive equal chances as those with strong
guanxi? Can workers achieve promotions only through hard work, rather than
using guanxi? Such possibilities of escaping from the influence of guanxi, here,
are understood as an issue in relation to workplace autonomy; to what extent
do internet workers have the chance of gaining promotion in the workplace
without their family background and social networks having an influence?
Admittedly, many internet workers are from ordinary families, and they
believe that promotion and success in the internet industries are possible
through hard work. Compared to SOEs and civil service posts, more
individuals succeed in the internet industries through their hard work. For
example, most Chinese internet companies are privately owned by individuals
who have succeeded through years of hard work, such as Jack Ma, the owner
of Alibaba, one of the most popular Chinese internet companies,43 who
43 Jack Ma failed the college entrance exam twice before he entered a third-grade
college. He worked as an English teacher in a third-grade educational institution
before he founded the company. In the beginning of his business, he worked very
hard and faced a lot of difficulties. Eventually, he has become an idol among youth in
the internet industries, as he is the first mainland Chinese entrepreneur to be on the
cover of Forbes Magazine and is noted as one of the world’s billionaires.
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succeeded through early struggles in his life. All these individual idols in the
internet industries started from scratch, as most workers in the industries do.
These stories encourage lots of workers to believe that the internet industries
are there for ordinary Chinese people to achieve individual success, and to be
the next Jack Ma. This is exactly what the American notion of ‘bootstrap’
capitalism refers to – pulling yourself up by your bootstraps.
However, as I asked above, do the Chinese internet industries provide
opportunities for success to ordinary workers? And can these workers get
promotion only through hard work? The answer is not as positive as Jack Ma’s
case would indicate.
Compared to the small number of successful individuals, large numbers of
ordinary internet workers are struggling with long work hours and poor pay.
More workers leave the industries without success, because of the difficult
working conditions. Some workers even die from exhaustion on their way to
being the heroes (such as the two cases of dying from exhaustion which are
discussed in Chapter Six). As Qiu (2009: 237) discovers in the IT industry (the
hardware market), many workers there suffer dangerous working conditions
with little protection. This becomes the reason for the fast capital accumulation
in the Chinese IT industries. The same situation also appears in the internet
industries, where workers suffer from difficult working conditions without any
help and support from labour unions. As Ross describes (2005: 127-130), the
unions in China do not work as well as in Western countries, such as the UK
and USA, though union power is deteriorating in these countries. The Chinese
unions, either in SOEs or in private enterprises, stand much more with the
companies rather than with their workers. The union usually persuades
workers to accept difficult working conditions, sometimes even helps the
companies to control their workers, rather than helping workers to bargain with
the companies. In other words, large numbers of workers in the internet
industries are struggling in difficult working conditions, and dreaming of being
the next hero, while only a small number of individuals ever achieve the dream.
In my study, internet workers’ promotion is still influenced by guanxi,
although this is less of a serious trend than in other industries. For example,
Janet told me that one of the drivers for shuttle buses at Grand was introduced
by his relative, who was an executive there. This driver was known for his bad
service to workers, whilst he still kept the job, just because his strong guanxi in
the company. In Campus, workers’ KPI (Key Performance Indicator), one
indicator that contributes to the mechanism for deciding how much workers will
get paid, are evaluated by their relationships with their superiors. Workers who
have good relationships with superiors gain a high score in their KPI, which
directly leads to more monthly bonuses. Workplace politics (bangongshi
zhengzhi) – a term referring to the negotiation of power within an organisation
for the advancement of personal interests, without considering the effects on
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the benefits of the organisation – are also prevalent in the two companies
studied in this research; some department leaders reject cooperation with
other departments, because it will bring more profits to others rather than to
their own departments. These leaders privilege their personal interests, such
as personal appreciation from executives and the achievement of their own
departments, and initiate internal competition between different departments,
which eventually influences the companies’ benefits.
The story about how four interns at Grand get their jobs is a good example
of how guanxi works in the industries. Janet, Lily, Cathy and Shelly, as interns
at Grand, all wanted to be recruited as full-time workers after graduation. But
only Cathy and Shelly were recruited after four rounds of interviews, even
though Janet received the highest score. Cathy was even rejected in the first
round, but later was helped by her team leader, who negotiated with
executives, for Cathy to get the job. This was not only because of Cathy’s good
relationship with the team leader, but also because the leader, who had just
joined the department, needed someone who would be loyalty to her. Shelly
was rejected in the third round, and was also helped by her team leader,
because one of the executives was interested in her. The team leader wanted
to please the executive by helping Shelly.
This example shows how guanxi shapes working life. It shows that
workers with strong guanxi have better opportunities than workers with weak
guanxi, no matter what skills and motivation the latter may have. Guanxi here
refers not only to relationships with executives, but also to workplace politics:
the worker gets the job because of her ability to help the manager to ensure
his/her personal interests.
Put simply, workers with weak guanxi in the internet industries may have a
higher possibility of promotion, compared to those in SOEs and civil servants,
yet the internet industries still cannot avoid certain features of guanxi. Ordinary
workers in the internet industries, especially technical workers, believe that
promotion and success is a result of their hard work; by contrast, guanxi still
plays an important role in workers’ promotion, as it always does in Chinese
society.
To sum up, some internet workers in the two companies do enjoy freedom
in terms of deciding their projects, but some of these workers do not really
have any flexible working hours, nor they can completely escape the influence
of guanxi in their opportunities for promotion in workplace. I argue that, even
though some work in the internet industries allows workers a degree of
workplace autonomy, such as self-employed workers’ experience, it is
necessary to critically analyse such experience, because there is a sort of
exploitation behind this high level of autonomy.
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5.4 Professional autonomy
As I emphasised in section 2.6, based on Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s
work (2010), I define professional autonomy as workers’ freedom for
determination in their work practices, and creativity, under the pressures that
are exerted by the state and companies. Thus there are two components that
determine workers’ professional autonomy: pressure within firms and pressure
from the state.
According to my interviewees, some pressure within firms comes from the
difficulty of cooperation between different departments.
It’s hard to conduct some work, as it depends on the cooperation between
different departments, which doesn’t always work well. For example, I want to
conduct a project and need to co-work with another worker in another
department, but as this project would not benefit him, he would most likely just
reject the project… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration
Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
Indeed, the difficulty with cooperation is because of the bonus system in
Campus. This system states that workers can only receive a bonus if they can
finish more projects than in the previous year. This then encourages workers
to select the projects benefiting themselves as their first choice, and delay or
even reject projects benefiting others, in order to save time. Such rejection or
delay of projects, wastes workers’ time, as they have to wait, which then
restricts their practices. In particular, as most of my interviewees said, they did
not prefer teamwork, especially teamwork between different departments.
Teamwork is tricky: there are always some buck-passers in a team. They
are used to looking for someone else to put the blame on. A teamwork meeting
always ends up with arguing. I was really unhappy with teamwork… (Louis,
former technical worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 18th
December 2011, interview)
Such difficulty of cooperation between different departments then blocks
workers’ practices: workers need to spend extra time on negotiating with
colleagues, in order to finish the projects, which makes it harder for these
workers to finish their projects. In other words, workers have limited freedom to
decide the progress of their practices, which is influenced by the cooperation
of their colleagues. These workers, who face difficulties regarding cooperation
with workers in other departments, then evaluate their experiences of
professional autonomy by suggesting that they have low degrees of such
autonomy.
Additionally, internet workers also struggle in their expectation of
intervention contradicting the copycat culture at the present: some internet
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workers indicate a desire towards doing innovative and creative work in the
industries, compared to the widespread copycat culture in the industries.
During my fieldwork, I heard from more than one of my interviewees that
he/she had certain senses of innovation, just as workers in American internet
industries do. Most workers told me that they are different from workers in
other industries, as they are creative and ambitious. They join the internet
industries to create something through practices of innovation, rather than by
simply producing something. Ross (2005) points out that China joined the
world market in the beginning of the 1980s with its cheap labour, and it has
become an effective competitor to many Western countries with its highly
skilled workers, especially workers in the ICT industries (the hardware
industries). It then becomes interesting to ask whether the internet industries
are able to remake China with the new label ‘created in China’, and to what
extent workers in the industries are as creative as they state.
The Chinese internet content market, the part of the internet industries
which I focus on in this research, is shared by monopoly enterprises. For
example, Sina, Sohu and Netease monopolise the portal market; Alibaba
dominates the online commerce market; and Tencent is the main player in the
instant messaging market. These monopoly companies tend to copy ideas and
technologies from American internet companies, rather than creating their own.
For example, Alibaba provides the same service as Ebay and Amazon;
Tencent copies the majority of its programs from ICQ and MSN; and Renren is
branded as the Chinese Facebook. Their monopolistic position in the
industries builds a ‘copycat culture’ rather than a label ‘created in China’.
These facts evidently are in conflict with the creativity and innovation
workers expect from and express about their work. It then becomes the
responsibility of the workers to balance their expectation of innovation and the
copycat culture in the industries. Some workers choose to carry out minor
innovations based on copying code from American companies. For example,
some of them creatively modify the copied code, so the new program fits into
the Chinese market. Despite their desire to be innovative, some workers make
a compromise because of the copycat culture, and choose not to spend time
on innovation: their pay cannot meet the high living costs in big cities, where
most internet companies are based, when their ambitions to innovate are not
supported by the companies.
Compared to peasant workers – peasants that rush into big cities to be
cheap labourers – and peasants, most internet workers are better rewarded,
but this does not guarantee that they can enjoy a middle class life in big cities,
such as Beijing and Shanghai. For example, during my fieldwork, one of my
participants said that she hesitated to have a baby, although she was already
30, a late age to have baby in China. The high cost of buying a house and
caring for a baby in Shanghai made her postpone her plan; the cheapest old
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flat in Shanghai, with a size of 80 square metres, is around £3,000 per square
metre, a total of £240,000. It needs an initial payment of £60,000, compared to
her monthly salary of £1,200. In other words, the initial payment would be 50
times her monthly salary, and the total cost would be 200 times her monthly
salary, compared with 108 times people’s monthly salary in UK.44 Therefore,
the high expenses in Shanghai prevent her being a mother, not to mention
having a middle class quality of life.
In fact, it is not only the workers who cannot afford to spend time on
innovation, but also the internet companies that need to profit quickly;
otherwise, they will be eliminated from the fast developing industries, because
of the high costs in big cities. Louis, a former technical worker at Campus, who
ran his own internet company in Beijing at the time of my writing, says that the
rent of his office is more than £1,800 per month, which is equal to the monthly
salary of a senior manager with five years’ work experience. Put simply, the
costs of running a business in the big cities is so high, that most internet
companies could not afford to wait for profits from innovation. Instead, they
choose the cheapest and easiest way of profiting: by copying. In other words,
the difficult urban life pushes workers to compromise with the fast profit system,
which is based on a copycat culture, and halts their dreams of innovation and
creativity.
But this compromise does not mean that all workers in the industries give
up innovation by working as a silent cog in the fast-developing internet
industries. As an alternative, some workers still hold the dream of building up
the internet industries with the label ‘created in China’. As I showed earlier,
with the dream of ‘created in China’, some workers choose to start their own
business. Reasons for starting individual businesses are varied: some intend
to achieve individual success by earning money and upgrading social status;
some seek a large space for workplace autonomy; some wish to open a space
for ordinary Chinese people to speak out; and some aim to promote a culture
of innovation. Taylor (2012) claims that ‘the association with the arts’ shapes
‘the expectations workers bring to a creative career and their willingness to
endure its difficulties’ (p.55). Here, it is the association with an expectation of
innovation that motivates workers towards self-entrepreneurship. (I discuss
self-entrepreneurship in Chapter Seven). It is unquestionable that a potential
for innovation is currently emerging, under the copycat culture of the Chinese
internet industries.
However, in both internet companies, there are also workers who consider
themselves to have a considerable degree of freedom to determine practices
and creativity, such as workers in the online novel department in Grand.
44 Daily Mail, 20 May 2013
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The main job of workers in the online novel department is online editing.
Their work includes managing online writers’ writing and emotions. For
example, when online writers face difficulties writing novels, these online
editors are responsible for cheering them up, providing ideas, searching
writing materials, and even suggesting structures for their stories. These
editors are allowed a high level of freedom in determining these practices,
such as deciding when and how to manage the writers and novels. Sarah, the
manager, whom I mentioned earlier, never intervenes in the practices and
relationships between the workers and the online writers.
Sarah then promotes a high level of autonomy as a successful
management strategy amongst all departments in Grand. This is
conceptualised as creative management in some theorists’ work. For example,
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 83-86) claim that creative management is a
soft and indirect management, which authorises relative autonomy to workers
involved in cultural production. Based on Ryan’s work, which defines creative
management as ‘a muted and accommodating style’ (1992: 121) of managing
creative labour, Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010: 85-86) argue that such
creative management indicates the specificity of creative labour. They later
examine how managers carry out such creative management, and how
creative workers understand it, by showing tensions, conflicts and anxieties
surrounding such creative management in the three cultural industries: the
television industries, music recording industries and magazine publishing
industries.
Banks (2010) claims that governmentality approaches usually argue that
creative management can train cultural workers to ‘accept and reproduce for
themselves the precise conditions of their subordination’ (p.256). He (2007)
argues that such creative management, which offers some relative autonomy
to creative workers, aims to ‘override any misgivings, constraints or
disadvantages that might emerge in the everyday reproduction of this highly
competitive and uncertain domain’ (p.55). As I discussed in section 2.6, some
governmentality theorists discuss creative autonomy using the concept of
self-exploitation (McRobbie 2000, Ursell 2000).
McRobbie (2002) points out that the dream of self-realisation seduces
cultural workers to devote themselves to cultural work with little return. For
example, she states that most cultural workers now self-exploit themselves by
long working hours, lacking union and other forms of protection, and with low
pay. All these difficult working conditions are ‘in the hope of talent paying off’
(p.101). She then identifies this kind of activity as the ‘Hollywoodization of the
UK cultural labour markets’ (p.109). The relative creative autonomy here is
also understood as an incitement that attracts workers to devote themselves to
the work.
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Ursell (2000) understands self-exploitation using Nikolas Rose’s work.
She writes of how television workers seek identity in work, and how their
‘subjective desires for self-actualisation are … harnessed to the firm’s
aspirations for productivity, efficiency and the like’ (Rose 1999: 244 in Ursell
2000: 810). In other words, self-exploitation refers to creative workers who
‘give a great deal for little return’, because of ‘a personalised and individualised
identity project’ (Taylor 2012: 43).
The work of these theorists is useful in highlighting poor working
conditions in cultural production. In this case, the authorisation of high levels of
professional autonomy covers some disadvantages within the work: the
workers need to work day and night without receiving appropriate rewards. In
order to maintain good relationships with the online writers, who usually start
their writing at night because they are only part-time writers, these editors
need to work until late at night. Surprisingly, although they carry out such day
and night overtime, these editors receive just £300 a month without any
overtime pay (compared to other full-time workers’ £1,000 monthly pay).
Meanwhile, some of these theorists’ work, such as McRobbie, is also valuable
to bridge structural explanations rooted in a theory of exploitation, and the
kinds of worker-centred experiential accounts that I am keen to elaborate in
this research, as it recognises that people have autonomous capacities to
choose for themselves under the structural constraints, albeit sometimes in a
negative way.
But Banks (2010) points out that these arguments about self-exploitation
overemphasise ‘the capacity of capital to determine the conditions of cultural
production’, and underrate ‘the extent to which autonomy is shaped by the
somewhat more open dialectic of creativity and constraint that underpins what
Bill Ryan (1992) has termed the “art-commerce relation”’ (p.259). Taylor (2012)
also points out that McRobbie underestimates the drive to be creative, such as
‘a passion for developing their skill or craft rather than commercial motives’
(p.44). Taylor’s work usefully indicates people’s ability to exert independent
agency or autonomy within difficult workplaces.
Sarah claimed that the online editors focused on the moral contribution
rather than the economic rewards. For example, they perceived success of the
online novel industry, as an online novel website providing a good reading
experience to its online readers. Such idealism motivated them to work
overtime, Sarah claims. This recalls Taylor’s claim that cultural workers are
strongly motivated by ‘the association with the art’ (p.55). Both Taylor and
Banks agree that it is the desire to choose one’s life/career and fulfil one’s
personhood that motivate cultural workers to exert independent agency, of the
kind I will discuss in Chapter Seven. The high level of relative autonomy
showed by the online editors’ case indicates a degraded kind of agency:
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people have autonomous capacities to choose for themselves, nonetheless it
leads to a negative result, bad working conditions.
However, Ursell (2000: 810-811) argues that the capacities of
self-actualisation between people are unequal. And this inequality needs to be
understood via structural factors, such as work and market exchange.
Likewise, here, there is another side to the coin: this overtime means some
workers are forced to work until late at night. Sarah states that the leaders of
these online editors, have a roll call every night on their QQ groups – the online
instant message groups run by Tencent, where users can organise their own
online groups to chat, share files and play online games – in order to confirm
that all online editors are still working. In other words, part of these workers’
motivation for overtime work come from their ambition to provide good online
novel-reading experiences to readers, whilst the other part comes from their
leaders, who push them to work overtime at night.
Here, poor working conditions, such as unrewarded overtime, in some
sense involves compulsion. It directly indicates a necessity to emphasise the
structural factors behind these difficult working conditions: due to their low
class position, these online editors are still controlled by the company, which
accumulate capital by appropriating the labour efforts. This indicates a sort of
exploitation as a force behind these internet workers’ complex working-life
experiences: they enjoy a high level of relative autonomy, which shows a sort
of agency; but the bad working conditions along with this high level of
autonomy also show the structural forces behind such experiences – their low
class position leads to exploitation. Even though some work in the Chinese
internet industries is granted a high level of autonomy, it is vital to recognise
the poor working conditions behind such autonomy, and to criticise the
structural constraints shaping such experiences.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, Chinese internet workers’
professional autonomy is characterised by pressure from the state, which
distinguishes their working-life experiences from the experiences of workers in
other geographical and political contexts. Such tensions between workers’
determination regarding creativity and the state’s intervention, relate to the
complicated relationships between internet firms and the state, which I have
discussed in section 5.2: internet companies sometimes contradict the state’s
desires in terms of determining the extent of internet users’ online freedom. A
large space for online freedom would attract users, who would bring economic
benefits to the companies, whilst such large space would also attract the
state’s attention, who have the power to easily stop the companies.
Here, internet companies’ practices of creating a free online space, which
contradicts the state’s interests, certainly involves the internet workers’
creativity. As a result, the state not only intervenes in the firms’ business via
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certain policies, but also intervenes in the workers’ daily practices, in order to
restrict the freedom given to them by their companies.
For example, according to Leo, an interviewee from the first interview
group I did in February 2010, who worked in the Open Platform Department at
Campus, officials from The State Administration of Radio, Film and Television
visit Campus every month, in order to have regular meetings with workers in
the Security Department. In these meetings, officials inform the workers about
recent sensitive issues, which are usually related to politics and pornography,
and ask the workers to delete references to these issues from all Campus’
online products, such as forums.
Take the 1989 Tian’anmen Square Protests as an example: according to
Alex, another interviewee in the first interview group I did in February 2010,
who also works in the Open platform department at Campus, at the end of
April every year, the company starts to organise a number of meetings to
prepare for the coming 4th June, where lots of internet users usually organise
various online activities for the anniversary of the protests. The company
makes great efforts to stop these online activities, obeying the rules set by the
state. Normally, there are two ways the company filters information relating to
this sensitive issue: filtering key words using censorship technologies and
filtering pictures by manual examination.
The User-generated Content Department and the Security Department
take charge of filtering key words, such as ‘explosion’ and ‘bomb’. The state
provides a list of sensitive words as a guideline, which includes millions of
words relating to the Tian’anmen Square Protests, and asks the company to
delete them from its website. Alex’s roommate, who worked in the security
department, told him that such lists included 7,300 words relating to AV (Adult
Video) actresses, not to mention numerous words relating to the Tian’anmen
Square Protests, which remains one of the most sensitive political issues in
contemporary China. Moreover, such prohibited words on the list include not
only those written in Chinese, but also words from many other languages.
The manual examination of sensitive pictures requires efforts from lots of
workers. According to Alex, almost all workers, including full-time workers and
interns, and even the boss of Campus, work day and night around 4th June, in
order to filter pictures posted by internet users and delete the sensitive ones.
Normally, online pictures are examined after users have posted them, but,
during this special period, these pictures need to be examined before being
shown on the website. Thus, more workers are required to work overtime in
order to filter all the pictures. The workers, who usually work in relays, are
required to work together at the same time around 4th June, in order to deal
with the mountain of work. In other words, the workers are forced to work
overtime because of the state’s requirements concerning sensitive issues. And
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such overtime is not rewarded, as usual, which indicates another sort of
exploitation behind these experiences.
Generally, the officials do not provide the workers with lists of sensitive
words and pictures that need to be deleted; rather, they give general
information about the issues, and the workers need to decide for themselves
what kinds of related words and pictures should be deleted. If the workers fail
to delete the right things, the company may be punished by the state, through
fines, and even through closure. This then creates another way that the state
intervenes in workers’ daily practices: the state directly stops workers’
programs or products, because they may still include certain sensitive issues
after the workers have filtered the information.
For example, Leo, the former interviewee from the Open Platform
Department at Campus in 2010, said that the popular online game, Godfather,
created by the department in 2010 and ranked as one of the top 10 most
popular online games by users, was stopped by the Ministry of Culture,
because it was perceived to contain sinister gang and gambling-related
content. In this case, the workers’ creativity was directly intervened with by the
state, when they stopped the product because of sensitive issues.
This is China, where all businesses need to consider political issues.
Some companies are closed because of political reasons, such as Fanfou [a
Chinese website similar to Twitter, which was closed by the state in 2009,
because large numbers of internet users discussed sensitive political issues,
such as the Tian’anmen Square Protests, on the website] … Actually, the
Tian’anmen Square Protests is not the only case reflecting intervention by the
state; the Xinjiang riot [ethnic violence erupted in Xinjiang Province, a western
province in China, in early July 2009. Thousands of people were killed and
hundreds were injured in the violence] is another sensitive issue that needs to
be deleted from websites. (Alex, former technical worker in the Open Platform
Department at Campus, 27th February 2010, interview)
Galeno also provided me with some examples of such direct intervention
from the state:
… Netease, one of the most popular news websites, was suddenly
stopped by the state, because it reported the scandal of the President’s son
bribing… We have had a similar experience: there was a hot topic on our
website that civil servants in Beijing were being offered houses for £7.70 per
month. Then, we [all the workers in Campus] were asked to have a meeting,
as the leader [of China] was quite furious about this news, and asked us to
immediately delete all the related news on our website… (Galeno, technical
worker in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December
2011, interview)
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In these two cases, workers’ practices were directly stopped by the state,
because these practices ‘hurt’ the state. Put simply, the state assigns the
responsibility of filtering sensitive issues to internet workers, by requiring them
to delete sensitive words and pictures in relation to certain issues without
giving detailed lists. This increases workers’ work intensity. When the state is
unsatisfied with workers’ practices or programs, it easily stops them. Such
rough intervention from the state not only influences workers’ practices and
creativity, but also increases their work intensity, as the Tian’anmen Square
Protests case indicated. Therefore, it is now worth discussing how workers
themselves understand such intervention.
Some workers regard such intervention as a rule of a game:
It is a rule of the game [played in the context of China], if we want to join in.
We don’t care about it too much… (Leo, former technical worker in the Open
Department at Campus, 25th February 2010, interview)
Admittedly, the state’s intervention affects our creativity more or less. But
it is fair in the industries, because the practices that I cannot do also apply to
others. It [the intervention from the state] is just like a circle to all of us [the
internet workers], within which we are allowed to compete with each other.
Even companies with foreigh investment, which enter the market, such as
American internet companies, are still required to obey the rules. It then
becomes a fair game to all of us… (George, former worker in the
User-generated Content Department at Campus, 26th February 2010,
interview)
Both Leo and George regard the state’s intervention as a characteristic of
the Chinese context, which they still think guarantees a fair business
environment. These workers choose to accept such rules as a special
condition of their work. However, other workers regard such intervention as
influencing their practices and creativity in an unacceptable way:
We [workers] definitely don’t like the rule. We prefer to stand with users,
who could bring us money. But, as the state could easily stop our service, we
still need to follow the rules in certain ways… (Galeno, technical worker in the
Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December 2011,
interview)
On the one hand, Galeno shows the necessity of balancing the state’s
requirement and internet users’ needs for free space in his daily practices; on
the other hand, he states that most workers feel unsatisfied with the state’s
intervention. Thus, these workers, who are unsatisfied with such intervention,
apply their professional knowledge and skills to acts of negotiation and
resistance, in order to gain more professional autonomy. Such acts of agency
indicate the need to address Banks’ question about autonomy: ‘what is the
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political potential of the intrinsic “permission to rebel” that characterises
cultural industries production?’ (Banks 2010: 261).
After emphasising the complicated context of autonomy and the
art-commerce relation, Banks (2010: 261-265) introduces two possibilities of
autonomy: radical autonomy and negotiated autonomy. The radical autonomy
highlights the possible transformations initiated by the ‘inherent tension in the
art-commerce dialectic’ (ibid.), such as autonomist Marxist theorists’ work
(Hardt & Negri 2001) that predicting social revolutions initiated by the ‘digitally
integrated and networked “multitudes” of precarious labour’ (Banks 2010: 262).
However, Banks argues that such accounts of the political potential of the
multitudes of precarious labour are far-fetched and utopian. However, he
suggests that there remains a vital but often overlooked possibility, negotiated
autonomy – ‘workers find themselves engaged in a quotidian “struggle within”
to try to mediate, manage or reconcile the varied opportunities and constraints
of the art-commerce relation’; and such autonomy is ‘a resource for
underpinning a variety of practices and courses of action’ (p.262). This
‘quotidian struggle-within’ refers to how internet workers in this research
struggle within the intervention from the state and companies and how they
realise creativity under such constraints. These quotidian struggles enable
internet workers to be consciously involved in certain ‘political activities’, such
as practices in relation to socio-politics. I turn back to this point in Chapter
Seven, where I discuss workers’ acts of negotiation and resistance towards
internet companies and the state, by continuing Banks and other theorists’
arguments.
In this section, I have discussed two issues that restrict workers’
professional autonomy: pressure within companies and intervention from the
state. The difficulty of cooperation between departments partly decreases
workers’ freedom of determination. And the difficulty of realising their own
innovation and creativity in the workplace also worsens their experiences of
professional autonomy. In comparison, some workers still have a high level of
freedom to determine their work practices and creativity, such as the online
editors in Grand, nevertheless, such autonomy is authorised with some bad
working conditions. It is necessary to recognise the agentic desires behind
these workers’ autonomous capacities to choose for themselves. Yet, such
agency drives to a negative result – workers ‘choose’ to work themselves
extremely hard.
Moreover, the internet workers’ experiences of professional autonomy are
characterised by intervention from the state, which directly intervenes in their
daily practices and creativity at work. Such intervention certainly restricts
workers’ freedom to determine their practices and creativity, which indicates a
low level of professional autonomy amongst most workers. But workers do not
passively accept these restrictions. This then addresses the necessity to
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discuss workers’ reactions, such as acts of negotiation and resistance, which I
consider in the later chapters of this thesis.
5.5 Conclusion: Power dynamics within workers’
experiences of autonomy
In this chapter, I have shown how the bureaucratic capitalist class
emerges in the Chinese internet industries, by discussing the complicated
relationships between internet companies and the state. Both groups in this
class, internet companies and the state, do not only cooperate with each other
in order to maximise their economic and political benefits, but also conflict with
each other, especially in terms of determining the extent of online users’
freedom. Practices regarding this cooperation and contradiction create a
complicated context in which internet workers have ambivalent experiences of
autonomy.
I argue that Chinese internet workers’ experiences of autonomy are
different from cultural workers’ in other geographic contexts: their professional
autonomy is not only interfered with by internet companies, but also by the
state. The state’s intervention focuses on internet users’ freedom and the
extent to which they are given the freedom to speak out online. This type of
intervention not only works at a macro level, such as issuing cultural policies,
but also at a micro level, such as directly influencing workers’ daily practices.
Intervention in the work practices of internet workers from both the internet
companies and the state is another example of how the bureaucratic capitalist
class dominates the lower middle class. The state can easily stop internet
workers’ creative practices, because it controls them. The companies can also
force workers to accept limited workplace autonomy and professional
autonomy, by making them accept the widespread copycat culture in the
industries. Some workers struggle to realise their creativity and innovation,
because the companies control the workers’ skills, which workers can only sell
in the capitalist market to survive.
But this does not mean that all internet workers have low levels of
autonomy. Some internet workers do experience a high level of autonomy:
either workplace autonomy or professional autonomy. For example, some
workers have a high level of workplace autonomy, because of their strong
guanxi within the workplace. Full-time workers in the online novel department
in Grand have a high level of freedom to decide their creativity and practices.
However, such freedom is based on unrewarded overtime work. In particular,
some of them are forced by the company to accept bad working conditions: to
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work day and night without reasonable pay. This is an important issue in the
Chinese internet industries that needs to be criticised.
These ambivalent experiences of autonomy indicate affective concerns
and agentic desires, such as feelings and emotions relating to the fulfilment of
personhood, that drive these workers to self-exploit, a concept that
emphasises how workers operate under structural constraints that cannot be
fully controlled. This suggests the need to think critically about autonomy,
which can be seen as a kind of agency within the working life, precisely
because that agency is sometimes used negatively. The potential of such
autonomy is a key question for this research. As Banks (2010) points out, the
extent to which cultural workers are able to ‘offer an alternative vision of life or
politically challenging worldview’ (p.267) via the exertion of their own agency is
an important question. So although I argued that internet workers experience
exploitation in the previous chapter, here I am arguing that this is only part of
the picture. In addition to that exploitation, we can see that workers have the
possibility of acting with autonomy or agency, however limited or negatively
applied that autonomy might be. I turn back to these questions of agency in
Chapter Seven. First, in the next chapter, I turn to experiences of risk and
insecurity in the working life, as a final example of the difficult conditions that
workers experience in the Chinese internet industries.
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Chapter Six: Risks and insecurity
6.1 Structure of the chapter
In the last chapter, I discussed internet workers’ ambivalent experiences
of autonomy. I argued that some workers experience limited or low autonomy
in their work, despite the internet industries being fetishized as ideal
workplaces for providing high autonomy. Some workers may experience a
high level of autonomy, but it is vital to recognise a form of exploitation behind
such autonomy. In this chapter, I continue my argument about the working life
in terms of workers’ experience of risk. I argue that all workers experience
precarious and risky working conditions, which indicates what I have described
as the lower middle class problem in the Chinese context: that is, the
increased proletarianisation of this class. In section 6.2, I discuss four issues
regarding full-time workers’ experience of risk in the industries: job-hopping,
lay-offs, health problems and pension problems. As in Chapter Four, I argue
that some issues, such as problems relating to pension and health, are the
result of a form of structural exploitation. However, some issues are a result of
domination, not exploitation – again this shows that whilst useful, the concept
of exploitation does not fully explain workers’ experiences in the Chinese
internet industries. In section 6.3, I provide data about rural students, which
was collected from my fieldwork, in order to show the precarious and unsafe
situation that large numbers of interns experience in the internet industries. I
argue that these experiences indicate the difficult situation of university
students, who are an important part of the lower middle class in China. These
students become the victims of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy and
the reform of Chinese education. In section 6.4, I discuss risks in agency
workers’ experiences. I argue that agency workers are forced to take on
responsibilities in their working lives, which have formerly belonged to the state
and companies. They are forced to accept an insecure and unsafe future in
their working lives, which is becoming a general problem of the lower middle
class. In section 6.5, I conclude by arguing that members of the lower middle
class experience different levels of precarity in their working life, which
indicates a form of exploitation behind these experiences. Thus like the
previous two empirical chapters, this chapter continues to highlight some of the
extremely difficult conditions that workers endure in the Chinese internet
industries, some of which are the result of structural exploitation, whereas
others are the result of some non-economic factors, such as guanxi.
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6.2 From Karoshi to ‘no future’
There is a wealth of writing in circulation on precarity, precariousness and
insecure work in the cultural industries. For example, Standing (2011: 14-18)
defines precariat as a large number of people across the world living and
working in a precarious status – moving in and out of jobs without secure roles
in the labour market, stable occupational identities, stable social protection,
and social memory or an enduring values framework. He identifies many
varieties of precariat, such as migrants and young people. Standing argues
that these people are increasingly dangerous, because they could produce
anxiety, anomie, alienation and anger in society.
Some studies particularly conceptualise cultural labourers’ working lives
with concepts of precarity and precariousness. Gill and Pratt (2008) distinguish
precariousness from precarity by defining the former as ‘all forms of insecure,
contingent, flexible work’, and the latter as ‘the multiplication of precarious,
unstable, insecure forms of living’ and ‘new forms of political struggle and
solidarity that reach beyond the traditional models of the political party or trade
union’ (p.3). They sum up debates of precarity as research focusing on ‘who
best exemplifies the experience of precarity’ (p.11), debates concerning
‘solidarity across difference’, and debates concerning ‘the aims of precarity
activism’. They argue that the overlap between research on cultural labour,
autonomist Marxism and precarity activism involves ‘effect, temporality,
subjectivity and solidarity’ (p.14). For example, autonomist Marxists regard
precarity as ‘a form of exploitation which operates primarily on the level of time,
evaporating distinctions between work and leisure, production and
consumption’(p.17). In relation to the research on cultural labour, such
precarity highlights free time and free labour generated in the ‘participation
economy’ (ibid.) – people producing and uploading contents on social
networking services, such as Facebook and YouTube.
Neilson and Rossiter (2008) claim that precarity usually highlights
‘economic and existential experiences of risk and uncertainty’ (p.54). They
describe precarity as an experience that ‘cannot exist without a transversal or
transpositional movement between the theoretical and the practical’ (p.63). It is
‘an experience from which differential capacities and regimes of value emerge’
(p.64). They argue that varied work of creative labour shows diverse degrees
of precarity. And precarity across varied values, such as ‘surplus value of
precarious labour, scarcity value of intellectual property rights, cultural and
social values of individual and group identities’ (ibid.), registers the movement
of relations. The ‘internal variations, external impositions and mutual
inconsistencies’ within capitalism and Fordism, which are shaped by ‘national,
geocultural and historical contexts as well as institutional practices’, enable the
‘multiplicity of precarity’ (p.54), such as varied labour conditions. Thus, it is
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possible to address different levels or experiences of precarity amongst
different kinds of workers.
All the research also answers why precarity increasingly spreads across
the world, such as Chinese internet workers’ varied experiences of
precariousness shown in this chapter. Generally, autonomist Marxists
understand neo-liberalism as an important factor shaping precarity. Standing
(2011) argues that precariat, an emerging class, is growing because of the
increasing globalisation and the associated rise in neo-liberal institutions,
policies and perspectives. Here, precarity is a significant concept to theorise
internet workers’ insecure and risky experiences, because it signifies varied
experiences of precariousness amongst different internet workers, and,
simultaneously, possible political subjectivity. As Neilson and Rossiter (2008)
argue, precarity, as a political concept, has the potential to produce forms of
connection, subjectivity and political organisation. Below, I talk about the
different experiences of precariousness amongst different kinds of workers via
issues of job-hopping, lay-offs, health problems and pension problems.
6.2.1 Job-hopping and lay-offs
The first problem relating to work security is how stable the work is, or how
often workers change their jobs. It is quite common to find job-hopping in the
high-tech industries, such as the internet industries. Ross (2005) points out
that the average turnover rate in the Chinese high-tech industries is about 20
percent. This high turnover rate was reflected in my fieldwork: six out of the
seven interviewees, whom I contacted in 2010, had left Campus by the time I
contacted them again in 2011. Walter, a technical worker at Campus, whom I
interviewed in August 2011, had left to join his friend’s self-employed group
when I revisited the company in December 2011.
On the day I started my internship in Grand, two employees came to the
HR department to resign. After that, during the three months I spent in Grand,
there were several workers who came to the department to resign every day.
As some of my interviewees say, two years is quite a long period to stay in the
same company in the internet industries.
Most workers in my department, almost twenty people, left in just one and
half years… Every time we gathered for team building, I saw new faces…
(Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration Department at
Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
I will not stay in Campus for more than two years. Most people stay in one
company for no more than two years… (Louis, former technical worker in the
Open Platform Department at Campus, 18th December 2011, interview)
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This obviously indicates a high turnover rate in the internet industries.
Some theorists point out certain problems caused by this high turnover rate.
For example, Ross (2007: 34-36) points out that such frequent turnover,
results in high costs for training, because workers usually leave after benefiting
from training, and then new workers have to be trained to replace them. Indeed,
it is also recognised as a problem in Grand, because lots of workers leave the
company after benefiting from training. Ross (2007: 34-36) also claims that
job-hopping becomes a bargaining tool for experienced workers to negotiate
with companies for good pay.
We are all confident about our skills… The shortage of the reserve of
talent in the industries keeps labour prices up. Then, after two years’
experience, you are be capable of being hunted by head-hunters, which
means you can change your job any time you want… (Galeno, technical
worker in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December
2011, interview)
As Galeno points out, some experienced technical workers are confident
enough to request good pay because of their job-hopping capabilities. Another
technical worker in Grand, Tim, told me that he knew he could easily find a
position with good pay in another company, because he understood the value
of his skills. Such confidence certainly indicates that some workers benefit
from frequent job-hopping, because they can receive better pay after
bargaining with companies.
But, indeed, this only applies to certain experienced technical workers,
who have the high skills to bargain with companies. In contrast, most workers
change their jobs because they struggle to earn good money and want an
easier working life.
Now everything’s getting expensive, I need to find another position with
better pay, so that I can survive in this city… But autonomy in work is the more
important reason for me to job-hop… (Walter, technical worker in the
Advertisement Department at Campus, 25th August 2011, interview)
As I discussed in section 5.3, Walter indicated autonomy as an important
reason for him to consider changing his job. Here, he points out that good pay
is also an important reason for him to change job.
As in most countries, working and living in big cities is not easy. Some
workers, most of whom are in middle class locations, choose the new lifestyle
of a ‘weekly couple’ (zhoumo fuqi) or ‘monthly couple’ (yuemo fuqi), which
refers to the family gathering that takes place once a week or once a month,
because of the high living expenses in big cities. For example, Sam is a senior
manager in Grand’s Shanghai office, and his family are based in Najing,
another city two hours away from Shanghai by train. The high cost of living in
Shanghai stops his from family moving there with him, and the terrible traffic
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jams, means it takes Sam more than four hours to go back home, and stops
him from gathering with his family every day. Then, the only choice for Sam is
to be a ‘weekly couple’ with his wife by going back home every weekend. Peter
is another senior manager in Grand, and his family live in Shenzhen, another
big city two and a half hours away from Shanghai by air. Both he and his wife
cannot support the family if either of them quit their job and move to the other’s
city. Therefore, they choose the modern lifestyle, to be a ‘monthly couple’. This
new lifestyle obviously influences workers’ life quality, as it separates workers
from their families. This goes against the traditional Chinese family life, which
is based on living in groups.
It is the high cost of living in big cities that pushes workers to choose this
modern lifestyle and decrease their quality of life. It also indicates the difficulty
of living in big cities for the lower middle class. Thus, such difficulty pushes
workers to consider good pay as an important reason for changing their jobs.
Additionally, there are other reasons for workers to change their jobs,
such as the long hours spent on the way to work. Some workers choose to
move jobs to companies nearer their homes, because of the terrible traffic
problems in China. For example, when I started my internship in Grand,
Megan, an experienced HR worker, resigned from the department because of
the time she spent on her way to and from work, which was nearly four hours
per day.
The long time spent on the way to work is not only because of the distance
from Megan’s home to the company, but also because of the extremely
crowded public transportation. Because of the high costs of buying and
running cars in China, most workers choose public transportation, such as the
underground, to get to work. However, the unbelievably crowded public
transportation (see Figure 6.1) always forces workers to spend long hours
travelling. For example, it is sometimes only possible to get on the
undergrounds after waiting for more than half an hour during peak time in
Beijing and Shanghai, because of the crowds, as shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Crowed underground in Beijing in peak time
Source: News.cn, 15th December 2010
Such terrible transportation problems, means workers spend extra time on
their way to work, and this ultimately results in some of them job-hopping.
Put simply, some experienced technical workers do benefit from the
frequent job-hopping in the industries, because they have high skills to bargain
with companies for good pay. In contrast, many workers choose to change
their jobs because they suffer from bad pay and terrible transportation
problems in their jobs. These workers pursue a good job, with good pay and a
convenient lifestyle, by frequently job-hopping.
Moreover, there is another side to the coin: in some cases, companies lay
off workers.
I had a colleague, who had been at Campus for four years, but he still
received the same salary as me, and I had just joined the company… It was
one way the company forced us to leave… Finally, he left as most new
employees were paid higher than him… If I were my colleague, I would also
choose to resign, as salary is a way to evaluate a person’s talent and to show
respect to that person… It doesn’t matter how much you are paid, but it
matters how much more you are paid than others, especially people whom you
think are less talented than you… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product
Administration Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
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Someone left not because of the low salary, but because his salary was
lower than others, whom he thought were not better than him… (Carl, technical
worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 20th December 2011,
interview)
In these cases, workers are forced to leave by the company in an indirect
way, because the company needs ‘fresh blood’ to bring creative ideas.
Workers, indeed, are laid off in an indirect way.
As I stated in section 4.3.2, three months after I finished my internship in
Grand, I contacted my friends there, and was surprised to find that more than
half of the full-time workers in the HR department had been laid off, because
the company wanted to cut its labour costs. According to the work contracts,
these workers were informed of their redundancy one month before they left
and were paid for one more months’ salary as compensation. These workers
did not have the time to find new jobs in one month, but they had to accept the
situation, because they could not find any way to protect themselves.
Brophy (2006: 630-631) points out US high tech work does not benefit
from union protection, and that workers are hardly unionised. He relates this to
‘an absence of memory of labour organising to draw upon in order to confront
the exploitative relations they face’ (p.630); and a feeling of privilege that
high-tech workers have, which leads them to refuse the kinds of collective
union organisation through unions they associate with factory workers. In
China, the situation is slightly different: like US high-tech workers, Chinese
internet workers have no memory of organised labour. But in any case, unions
in most Chinese industries operate rather differently, taking the side of
companies, by persuading workers to accept unfair working conditions, rather
than protecting workers, which I pointed out in Chapters One and Two.
In both examples I stated above, workers were laid off in an indirect or
direct way, without any protection from the unions. Companies can easily
decide to lay off workers, because they have the state, including the unions, as
their supporters. This obviously indicates cooperation between capitalists
(internet companies), and bureaucracy (the state). The experiences of these
unprotected workers show how the bureaucratic capitalist class dominates the
lower middle class.
This then highlights an insecure situation in the internet industries: some
workers are unreasonably laid-off by companies without any protection, such
as job security and recompense. It is then necessary to pay attention to these
unprotected workers, rather than simply blaming them for their frequent
job-hopping. Some theorists theorise insecure work conditions by using the
concept of precarity. For example, Neilson and Rossiter (2006) define
precarity as ‘an increasing change of previously guaranteed permanent
employment conditions into mainly worse paid, uncertain jobs’, and ‘the
precondition for new forms of creative organisation that seek to accept and
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exploit the flexibility inherent in networked modes of sociality and production’
(p.10). Using the concept of precarity, they highlight bad pay, uncertain work
conditions, and the acceptance of ‘the flexibility inherent in networked modes
of sociality and production’ (ibid.).
Some Chinese internet workers’ experiences affirm this conception of
precarity: some workers change jobs because of the bad working conditions
they experience, some workers are forced to leave without protection from
work unions, because companies want to save labour costs or employ ‘fresh
blood’. Here, as Neilson and Rossiter argue, precarity becomes a useful
concept to criticise creative workers’ uncertain work status and the way
organisations, such as internet companies, subsuming such ‘flexibility inherent
in networked modes of sociality and production’. Thus, such inequality and
injustice in terms of job-hopping and lay-off remind us of the precarious
working conditions with certain good parts of the internet work, such as high
level of autonomy which I discussed in the last chapter. I discuss other issues
in workers’ precarious experiences below.
6.2.2 Work until death
According to Gill and Pratt (2009), McRobbie argues that long working
hours in creative industries result in a lot of health problems, such as
‘exhaustion, burn-out, alcohol and drug-related problems, premature heart
attacks and strokes, and a whole host of mental and emotional disorders
related to anxiety and depression’ (Gill and Pratt 2009: 18). These health
problems in relation to excessive working hours are also popular amongst
Chinese internet workers. For example, according to a survey conducted by
Tencent News – a news website run by one of the largest internet companies,
Tencent – 98% internet workers feel their health getting worse after accessing
the industries, and more than 80% internet workers suffer from mental and
emotional problems, such as anxiety and depression, because of high
pressure and excessive working hours.45
In Grand and Campus, it was common to find some internet workers
experiencing problems with their health, such as hepatopathy – a liver
dysfunction that is commonly understood as a result of excessive working
hours46. Janet, the intern who is in charge of new employees’ health checks in
Grand, said that, if the company regards workers with liver problems as
unhealthy people and rejects them, then the company could not recruit any
employee. In other words, liver problems are a common health problem, which
45 Tecent News 2007
46 Xinhua News 2011
179
lots of internet workers relate to the long working hours and high pressure they
suffer from the industries.
As I argued in Chapter Four, internet workers experience unrewarded
excessive working hours because of the structural exploitation. Here, the
argument is enriched by examining their well-being: internet workers suffer
health problems, because they are pushed by the high pressure to have
excessive working hours without reasonable rewards.
Moreover, there is another striking issue in terms of the workers’
well-being in the industries that is caused by the difficult working conditions:
karoshi, a Japanese term meaning death from exhaustion. Such extreme
cases are usually caused by high pressure, which is a result of the long
working hours, low pay and high competition in internet work. In December
2013, a report from People.com – one of Chinese government’s official
websites – reveals that more than 600,000 Chinese workers die from
exhaustion every year, which means around 1,600 workers die from
exhaustion every day. This number has become bigger than Japan, which
used to be the country with the largest number of people dying from
exhaustion. Most workers experience karoshi were working in high-tech
industries, such as internet industries.47 Some of the karoshi cases mentioned
in this report were heard in my fieldwork, which I talk about later. But one
karoshi case that surprised me was Peasant Dai, the private entrepreneur,
whom I mentioned in the beginning of this thesis. He was reported to die from
exhaustion on 25th July 2013. This report48 states that most cases of karoshi
are related to long working hours, irregular meals, and high pressure.
During the time I spent in Grand, I heard of two cases of karoshi. One was
in Tencent, one of the main portals in China with the famous instant
messenger system QQ, where an online editor died because of overtime work.
The news was circulated on microblog sites, because the editor talked about
his overtime situation on his microblog. Janet showed us the microblog, in
which the editor stated that he was tired of excessive working hours. Some of
his posts showed that he even worked until 8am in the morning. According to
Xinhua News, this editor had excessive working hours for a few days to
develop an important new project before dying from cerebral apoplexy. Thus,
he was believed to die from the excessive working hours and high pressure
caused by the new project.49
Another karoshi case was in Baidu, the main search engine company in
mainland China, where a member of staff in the online game department died
47 People.com 2013
48 Ibid.
49 Xinhua News 2011
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from exhaustion on 14th November 2011. 50 According to this news, the
average age of death from overtime in the internet industries is just under 38.51
Sam, the senior manager in HR department in Grand who I mentioned earlier,
says that it is not unusual to find cases of karoshi in the internet industries.
According to him, there were some cases of karoshi in Grand before I joined,
but they were covered up by the PR department.
Such extreme cases of karoshi call for urgent attention to the high
pressure that is pushing internet workers to experience excessive working
hours, nevertheless there are other reasons for workers to have long working
hours, such as rewards, work ethics and the expectations of their parents.
McRobbie (2000: 256-262) claims that the contemporary neo-liberal condition
results in the self-responsibilisation: individuals are required to ‘take
responsibility for him or herself as an individual worker’ (p.256), because of the
1980s’ neo-liberalism and the post-industrialisation in the West.
However, as Taylor (2012) points out, McRobbie fails to answer ‘how an
association with the creative arts shapes the complex lived experience of
creative working’ (p.44). Likewise, as I addressed in Chapter Two, some
workers’ subjective experiences need to be understood in relation to certain
structural factors. For example, as I highlighted in Chapter Four, such high
pressure, from internet companies and the state, part of the bureaucratic
capitalist class, indicates a form of compulsion in the workers’ long working
hours. This then implies that the unrewarded overtime work is a result of
exploitation, in which the lower middle class’ labour efforts are appropriated
with a form of compulsion.
Here, this form of exploitation seriously affects internet workers’ well-being,
and in extreme cases, causes their death. It is said that there is a great
difference between manual labour and mental labour. Marx particularly
criticises the exploitation of manual labour in factories. However, in this case,
the internet workers, an important group of mental labourers, experience the
same difficult working conditions as manual workers in factories: both groups’
labour efforts are appropriated by the capitalists (and the state in the Chinese
case); and the excessive working hours and the creation of a sense of
competition among workers sometimes even results in their death. In other
words, I argue that the internet workers are a sort of sweatshop worker in the
new media industries, who are forced to work until death, as the title of this
section indicates. These difficult working conditions caused by the form of
exploitation need to be acknowledged in current research concerning the new
media industries.
50Tencent Technology, 2011
51 Ibid.
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6.2.3 Life after retirement
As I have discussed in the last two sections, internet workers experience
instability and health problems in their work. But this is not the complete picture
of their working life. Rather, they also experience insecurity of life after
retirement.
Similar to most countries, in contemporary Chinese society, certain types
of retired workers are protected by the pension system. For example, internet
workers are required to pay 8% of their salaries into a pension fund, to which
the companies give an amount equal to 20% of workers’ salaries. The workers
will receive a certain amount of this money every year after retirement.
Compared to the pension system in which internet workers (employees in
private enterprises) participate, SOE workers and civil servants benefit from
another pension system, in which they do not need to pay into the pension
fund, but will be given more money than private enterprises’ employees after
retirement. According to a report from Guangzhou Daily, SOE workers and civil
servants receive 3 times higher pension fund after retirement than private
enterprise workers.52
Such inequality surrounding pension systems points to injustice between
internet workers and SOE workers: internet workers experience difficult
working conditions, such as excessive working hours without reasonable
rewards, whilst needing to pay into their pension fund. In contrast, SOE
workers have good working conditions and benefit from a state-secured
pension. In this sense, the higher middle class, such as SOE workers, seems
to have better working conditions than the lower middle class, such as the
internet workers, because of the support they receive from the bureaucratic
capitalist class. It might be arguable to criticise such injustice with concepts of
domination and exploitation, as some jobs provide better working conditions
than others.
But, this does not mean that such injustice reasonably exists as a natural
result of social development. Instead, this needs to be criticised because it
indicates the polarisation of the middle class in contemporary Chinese society:
the higher middle class have a good working life, because they are protected
by the bureaucratic capitalist class, especially the party-state, as they have
similar interests, both economically (to ensure they control most of the
economic resources and receive most of the economic benefits) and politically
(to ensure they control the lower classes). In contrast, the lower middle class
suffer from difficult working conditions, similar to the working classes, as the
cost of offering good working life to the higher classes.
52 Guangzhou Daily 2013
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Another pressing issue in terms of workers’ lives after retirement is
pension reform: workers need to work longer and pay more into their pension
funds than they have done before. Workers deposit part of their salaries as a
pension fund, in order to guarantee their quality of life after retirement.
However, in China, this amount of money is shrinking, due to the failure of
investment in pension funds in recent years. It is reported that the growth rate
of pension funds is much slower than the growth rate of the CPI (consumer
price index).53 In other words, the pension that workers will receive after
retirement will no longer cover their living costs. This indicates the insecurity of
workers’ lives after retirement.
Moreover, in the Chinese context, there are scandals regarding pension
corruption. Workers are worrying about their lives after retirement, even
though they pay into a pension fund every month, because government
officials might embezzle their pension before their retirement. For example,
there were several scandals regarding pension corruption from 1993 to 2010:
around £8.90 million of pension money was embezzled in Guangzhou in
1993;54 0.86 million pension money was embezzled in Taiyuan in 2003;55 and
£32 million pension money was embezzled in Shanghai in 2006.56
These news reports make workers feel unsafe and insecure about their
work, especially about life after retirement. As Monica, my friend in Grand
says:
‘I’m not sure whether I could get back my pension after retirement,
because it is possible that some officials have already embezzled it before I
retire’ (Monica, HR worker at Grand, observation journal).
I don’t know when I could benefit from my pension. The only thing I know
is that I must pay it every month… You never know where and how the
government spends this money… (Lara, non-technical worker in the
Advertisement Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
This pension corruption indicates that workers’ labour efforts, shown as
the money they pay into their pension fund, are appropriated by government
officials: the bureaucratic capitalist class. This certainly implies a form of
exploitation: the bureaucratic capitalist class appropriates the labour efforts of
the lower middle class due to their political authority. This form of exploitation
then makes working conditions in the internet industries worse, and makes
internet workers feel anxious about their future. Some of my interviewees even
state that they could not imagine their lives after the age of around 40 in the
internet industries:
53 Chinese Economics, 9th July 2013
54 Youth Times, 11th June 2012
55 Ibid
56 Ibid
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We [internet workers] sometimes made jokes that we might die before [our]
40s… To be honest, I cannot imagine my life after [my] 40s. Maybe I will leave
the industries… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration
Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
Internet industries are really developing fast: we can see the emergence
of Group Purchase in just one year, and we can also find the success of a
dominant company in just five years. Five years’ development in the internet
industries means fifty years’ development in other industries. It becomes so
easy to find a chance in the fast developing industries… But this fast
development brings the problem of risk, as my friend said, if she chose to work
in the internet industries rather than being a singer, it would be a real risk in her
life… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration Department at
Campus, 11th January 2011, Self-observation journal)
Galeno’s recognition of high risks in the Chinese internet industries
echoes Gill’s (2002) findings in her study of new media industries in six
European countries: work in new media industries is characterised by issues of
insecurity, low pay, and long working hours. Taylor (2012) also points out that
creative workers are ‘strongly motivated yet often precariously employed and
poorly paid’ (p.42). Brophy (2006: 620-621) defines precarity as an important
character of most knowledge work. In his understanding, precarity refers to
‘the growing insecurity brought on by the flexible management of the global
work force within post-Fordist capitalism’, and it entails a range of labour
conditions, such as ‘informal and part-time work; short-term contracts – or no
contract at all; self-employment; little, if any, job security; volatile shifts; lack of
unionisation; no benefits; and more’ (p.621). Some of the unsafe and insecure
working conditions discussed in this section, such as lay-offs, health problems,
karoshi because of high pressure, and unguaranteed pension funds, thus,
make internet work precarious, which requires urgent academic attention.
Indeed, the precarious working-life experiences of workers in the internet
industries, not only reflect the general problems of contemporary cultural work
in the world, such as precarity discussed by Taylor and Brophy, but also
indicate the lower middle class problem in the Chinese context:
proletarianisation. Nevertheless there are different levels of precariousness
amongst different workers. These difficult working conditions not only cause
internet workers, the lower middle class, to suffer from excessive working
hours with the same unreasonable pay as the working class, but also cause
them worry about an insecure future as the working class do. As I argued in
Chapter Two, precariousness in internet work highlights the proletarianisation
problem of the lower middle class in the Chinese context, which is understood
as a result of a form of structural exploitation. However, different workers
experience different levels of precariousness in the working life. Below I show
interns’ different experiences of precariousness.
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6.3 Rural students come to urban companies
Gill and Pratt (2008) sum up certain features of precarious work based on
some recent studies: ‘a preponderance of temporary, intermittent and
precarious job; long hours and bulimic patterns of working; the collapse or
erasure of the boundaries between work and play; poor pay; high level of
mobility; passionate attachment to the work and to the identity of creative
labourer (e.g. web designer, artist, fashion designer); an attitudinal mindset
that is a blend of bohemianism and entrepreneurialism; informal work
environments and distinctive forms of sociality; and profound experiences of
insecurity and anxiety about finding work, earning enough money and ‘keeping
up’ in rapidly changing fields’ (p.14). Some of these features have been
discussed within full-time workers’ experiences in the last two chapters, some
features I discuss here with interns’ different precarious experiences.
As discussed in Chapter Four, interns in internet companies are university
students, and most of them are postgraduates. Thus, interns’ working
conditions not only depend on the internet companies where they work, but
also relate to the universities where they study and live. The story I address in
this section is about precariousness in interns’ working-life experiences, and
concerns Janet, the intern in Grand, and her friends. Meanwhile, I also point
out two issues that generally cause interns’ precariousness: high tuition fees
and employment difficulties, where both internet companies and universities
play important roles.
Perlin (2011) argues that internships enable those who already have
some enabling, because, in the USA for example, only certain classes, such
as the higher middle class, can afford to take internships, as these are often
not paid. Such an argument cannot be applied to the Chinese context,
because internships in China are like part-time jobs. Internships in China are
rewarded with a certain amount of money, though the pay is still low. Indeed,
companies usually recruit interns as part-time workers, and ask them to do the
same work as full-time workers, in order to save labour costs, a situation I
addressed in Chapter Four.
As a result, most university students do internships to enrich their CVs
before accessing the job market, and to earn money for living expenses.
However, the pay is low. For example, interns in Grand are paid £12 per day,
which means they earn around £240 per month (compared to full-time workers’
monthly pay £1,000). It is quite low pay considering the work they carry out,
which is usually the same as full-time workers. But, it is a large amount of
money to most university students in China, because it is equal to their
monthly living expenses in the big cities, such as Shanghai. In other words,
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internships in China enable university students, especially students from
low-income families, to support themselves.
Janet, a postgraduate from a famous language university in Shanghai, is a
typical student from a low-income urban family and is doing internships to
support herself. Although Janet’s family is from the middle class in a
developing city in the middle part of China, it is still hard for the family to fully
support Janet to live in Shanghai, because of the high tuition fees and living
expenses. Thus, as a girl who cannot afford a £3 lipstick in modern Shanghai,
Janet was forced to enter the labour market as an intern earlier than other
students, in order to earn money to help cover her living expenses.
In recent years, the rise of tuition fees has become a difficult issue for
most Chinese families, especially families in the lower middle class and
working class. In 2005, according to a report concerning Chinese youth
development, university tuition fees had increased by twenty-five times since
the 1980s (Yahoo Economics, 2007). By 2005, tuition fees for most four-year
undergraduate courses in Shanghai universities had risen to over £7,500 in
total (see Figure 6.2). This figure might be lower than in some developed
countries, but, compared to the average residents’ incomes (the increasing
rate of tuition fees in China was ten times more than the increasing rate of
residents’ incomes),57 it still causes a lot of families to be in debt.
57 Yahoo Economics, 2007
186
Figure 6.2: Tuition fees in some universities in Shanghai in 2005
Source: partly translated from Sohu Education, 2006
In 2011, the education forum on Netease, one of the main portals in China,
edited a special report about the rise of university tuition fees, which was
based on an online survey conducted amongst its users.58 The results showed
that the new century’s university students suffered from high tuition fees, fast
growing living expenses, and non-guaranteed futures, compared to university
students in the 1980s and the 1990s, who were guaranteed jobs by the state.
In this report, lots of internet users from rural families and low-income urban
communities, who did BAs in the 2000s, had difficulties paying the high tuition
fees. For example, some of their families borrowed money from relatives to
pay the high tuition fees, but could not pay back the money until the graduates
found jobs. This is the experience shared by Janet and her friends, who are
from rural China.
Olivia, Janet’s friend, is from a rural family in Xi’an, a developing area in
China. Before she came to Shanghai, her family borrowed money from all
relatives, in order to pay the high tuition fees, but she could still not cover the
high living expenses in Shanghai. Olivia then spent most of her free time doing
58 Netease Education, 2011
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internships, which are similar to part-time jobs in the UK, during her six and a
half years’ study (four years’ undergraduate and two and a half years’
postgraduate), in order to cover her own living costs. Because she could not
find a job soon after her graduation, due to the recent employment difficulties,
she did not even have any money for food. When Janet told me that Olivia had
asked her whether she could share some of the porridge she (Janet) had
cooked, because she had no money for dinner, I felt so depressed that I
developed a sense of responsibility to explore the struggles of these rural
students in good universities.
Hebe is another friend of Janet. She also came from rural China, and
struggled to pay the high tuition fee before she came to the university. In order
to support herself, she did an internship at a journal during her undergraduate
degree. But, she was fired near her graduation, because of the closure of the
company. At that time, she was quite anxious, because she could not find a job
to meet her living costs. Then she made a joke with Janet, who had an
internship in Grand, that if she could not find a job after graduation, she hoped
Janet would share her lunch with her, as she would not have any money to pay
for food.
Butler emphasises that ‘precariousness is an ontological and existential
category that describes the common, but unevenly distributed, fragility of
human corporeal existence’ (quoted in Neilson and Rossiter 2006: 11). My
fieldwork affirmed the ‘unevenly distributed’ nature of precariousness among
different kinds of workers. Interns experienced a different level of
precariousness from full-time workers. The following two cases show interns
struggling to support themselves through education and to find jobs that would
allow them to pay off debt and earn a living. Full-time workers obviously
receive much better pay than interns, albeit still unequal to their work efforts.
Inequalities of precariousness between interns and full-time workers derive not
only from different kinds of work, but also because universities play an
important role, which I suggested in section 4.4 and will now explore.
Compared to the struggles of rural students, which are shown in the two
cases above, huge numbers of Chinese students, whose families are in the
bureaucratic capitalist class, pour into the UK and the USA to receive an elite
education: it is not uncommon to find these Asian faces in most UK campuses.
There was a report in the Sheffield Newspaper, which stated that overseas
students, especially wealthy Chinese students, have pushed up the cost of
housing in the city.59 The sharp contrast between rural students in big cities
and these wealthy Chinese students in western university campuses highlights
inequalities between classes in China, such as the inequalities between the
lower middle class and working class, and the bureaucratic capitalist class.
59 Sheffield Telegraph, 30th August 2012
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Such inequalities generate important social problems: some government
officials collect huge amounts of money, which enables them to send their
offspring to receive an elite education in the UK and the USA, via corruption,
because they own the means of production and have the political authority to
allocate these means of production. This enables them to exchange such
resources with capitalists for the money they need. For example, according to
a special issue on the corruption problem in China on Tencent News – a news
website run by one of the largest internet companies, Tencent – the money
embezzled by government officials from 1988-2012 (around £241 billion), was
more than the state revenue in 2003 (around £217 billion).60 This amount
money is only calculated from the corruption cases reported in these years. In
other words, the real figure must be more striking than this. In contrast, many
in the working class and the lower middle class, such as interns, are struggling
to cope with a difficult working life, and this is affected by corrupt exchanges
between capitalists and government officials. Here, the bureaucratic capitalist
class have collected large amounts of money via corruption, meaning
government officials and capitalists can easily afford to send their children to
have an elite education in developed countries. In comparison, as a result of
the profit-oriented education reform, the lower middle class and the working
class struggle to pay their high tuition fees by selling their labour efforts and
skills, all at an unreasonable price.
If the high tuition fees have frustrated large numbers of rural students,
then the employment difficulties in recent years breaks these students’ dreams
about the future. During my three months in Grand, I found that all interns who
were close to graduation, usually found excuses to be off work to attend
interviews for new jobs. But these efforts did not always bring new jobs to them.
Indeed, job opportunities are fairly limited, due to the recent economic crisis.
For example, Janet sent out hundreds of copies of her CV to different
companies, although she did not find any opportunity until I left Grand. In one
of her interviews, she was told by the interviewer that he only got that job after
applying to eighty-seven companies. This indicates the high competition in
today’s job market.
Qiu (2009) blames the education reform, which resulted in large numbers
of graduates, as a reason for the employment difficulties, because the job
market was not prepared to accept such large numbers of graduates. I
discussed this in section 4.2.3: I acknowledged that the problematic education
system resulted in huge numbers of low quality university graduates, which
became a force behind these employment difficulties.
However, compared to the employment difficulties faced by university
graduates, the official statistics regarding graduate employment are quite
60 QQ News, 14th January 2013
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encouraging: the employment rate of university graduates in 2011 was
90.2%.61 The sharp contrast between official figures and my observation in the
internet industries, suggests a necessity to find out how universities and the
state operate with regard to employment, and how students, in particular
interns in the internet industries, experience risk in terms of employment.
As I found in my fieldwork, two issues contribute to the encouraging
official employment rate: universities’ activities regarding beijiuye, a term I
explain below, and the alliance between employment rates and graduation
rates.
In 2009, a new term, ‘to be worked’ (beijiuye), became popular amongst
university students. It is a term that refers to the situation in which ‘a person is
given a job without his knowledge’ or ‘a person is given a job that may not exist
at all’. The term was used by some graduates to criticise their universities, who
falsified work contracts for students without informing them. For example,
some universities created fake work contracts for students who could not find
jobs, which were signed by some cooperative companies, in order to produce
encouraging figures for the National Education Department, who would then
publish these distorted figures to the public, as the figure of 90.2% above
shows. Obviously, the cooperative companies did not employ these students;
rather, they were just used to create a striking figure to cover the difficult
employment situation.
Some universities forced graduates to find companies providing fake work
contracts. Otherwise, these students would not be issued diplomas. With these
activities of ‘to be worked’, the real employment difficulties were covered by
the encouraging official figures. In comparison, university students who need
to face these employment difficulties, become the victims. As some graduates
satirise, university graduates nowadays are guaranteed jobs as graduates in
the 1980s were, whilst the only difference is that such jobs are without salaries
and benefits and do not actually exist.
Moreover, universities connect the number of graduates to the
employment situation in that year as another way to increase the official
employment rate. For example, the National Education Department makes it
harder to graduate, for example by making stricter standards for dissertations
and vivas, aiming to reduce the number of graduates, which then produces the
figure of 90.2% as the employment rate. All interns I knew in Grand stated that
it was harder to graduate in 2011 than before, because of the stricter
standards for dissertations and vivas. For instance, Janet received the
updated dissertation standards, which stated that a dissertation with twenty
misused punctuation marks would be failed. Shelly, another intern in Grand,
stated that it was quite common for all universities to stop too many fresh
61 China News, 2012
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graduates pouring into the job market by making it more difficult for them to
graduate, because of the bad situation regarding graduate employment in that
year.
However, the huge amount of graduates in 2011 was exactly the result of
the temporary solution used to solve the employment difficulties in 2008:
postgraduate programmes, which were two-year courses before 2008, had
been extended to three years in most universities, because of the employment
difficulties that year. For example, Lily, the intern in Grand, accepted the two
years’ postgraduate offer in 2008, but was informed that she had to spend one
more year at university on the day she started her course. In other words, the
expansion of postgraduate programmes in 2004 and the extension of the
courses in 2008, led to a tremendous increase in graduates in 2011, which
created new employment difficulties. The alliance between employment
difficulties and the expansion of postgraduate programmes then becomes a
vicious circle, where graduates again become the sacrifice.
Put simply, by using the activities of ‘to be worked’ and by connecting
graduate rates to employment rates, universities try to hide the employment
difficulties, rather than solving them. As a result, university graduates become
victims, and experience an insecure future after graduation. This again
highlights a vital issue within Chinese interns’ precariousness: the state and
universities collude with each other in shaping precarious experiences.
However, as I argued earlier, companies such as internet companies, also
play an important role in generating precariousness among these graduates.
On the one hand, as I stated in Chapter Four, internet companies recruit
university students as cheap labour via internships; and on the other hand,
internet companies do not guarantee full-time positions for these interns after
appropriating their labour efforts for one year.
As I stated in section 4.2.2, an intern who had worked in Grand for more
than three months was guaranteed a full-time position at the beginning of her
internship, but she was sacked later without any chance of finding a job that
year. Such cases are common in the internet industries, although some
internet companies do prefer to recruit their interns, because they have
relevant work experience and are familiar with the company.
In Grand, most interns would not become full-time workers after finishing
their internships; nevertheless, some of them were told that they had priority
over others to apply for full-time positions there. Indeed, Grand prefers to
recruit fresh graduates from its on-campus recruitment programme, which
helps to promote its products, such as online games, amongst university
students at the same time. These full-time positions that are open to fresh
graduates, do not usually require previous work experience in the internet
industries. Thus, interns with work experience do not have any priority over
other fresh graduates in terms of applying for these positions. In other words,
191
interns in Grand have their labour efforts appropriated through unrewarded
working hours in their internships, whilst they are not guaranteed full-time jobs
after finishing their internships. Brophy (2006) discusses similar precarious
experiences faced by agency contractors in Microsoft. These temporary
workers also lack ‘the basic forms of security that ‘the permanent employees
they worked next to enjoyed’ (p.624). Likewise, as I stated in earlier chapters,
interns usually have the same workload as full-time workers, whilst only
receive half pay without extra benefits. This also echoes my argument earlier
in this chapter: interns experience a different level of precariousness from
full-time workers. And it also shows the variety and disunity within internet
workers, which I addressed in Chapter Four.
Such an insecure future, caused by both companies and universities,
sometimes results in extreme cases amongst graduates, such as suicide. For
example, Janet told me that one day she heard a girl, who was living upstairs
in her student accommodation, crying for more than two hours, because of her
difficulties in finding a job. She guessed it probably also related to the recent
suicide cases in the university, which were caused by the employment
difficulties. It was quite surprising for me to find Janet talking about suicide in
an indifferent tone, as if it was common to hear news of suicide on campus.
When I shared my surprise with my interviewees after I finished my fieldwork,
most of them showed a similar attitude to Janet:
It is understandable that these students choose suicide. Some students
are from rural families who are in debt because of high tuition fees. But when
they realise how difficult it is to find jobs and even support themselves in big
cities, after seven years’ of hard work, they must feel hopeless. (William,
technical worker in the 3G Department at Campus, 19th December 2011,
interview)
Every year, in every campus, there are some graduates choosing suicide
because of the difficulty of finding jobs… (Lara, non-technical worker in the
Advertisement Department at Campus, 19th December 2011, interview)
These quotations make clear a sense of depression and desperation
surrounding university students’ insecure futures. Cedrstrom and Fleming
(quoted in King 2012/4) argue that workers’ suicide cases are ‘failed escape
attempts’. For example, they show the example of highly-paid bankers, who
killed themselves in dramatic way – ‘jumping, for instance, from a prestigious
restaurant with glass of champagne in hand’ (King 2012/4: 455). In contrast,
interns here, do not, and cannot (some of them even cannot afford a glass of
champagne), choose to commit suicide in such a ‘romantic’ way. Neither do
interns have a way of escaping from self-exploitation.
Rather, interns are low-qualified university students who are not accepted
by the job market, as a result of education reforms. They are forced to become
cheap labour in internet companies, in which their supervisors and universities
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appropriate their labour efforts, because they need to pay increased tuition
fees and high living expenses. They are not guaranteed a stable future,
nevertheless they work hard with unrewarded excessive working hours, and
most of them experience insecure internships without the guarantee of a
full-time job. All these precarious working-life experiences result in their
helpless choice: suicide.
This, I would argue, is another form of ‘failed escape attempt’, based on
‘helpless choice’, forced by the state, universities (including supervisors), and
companies, who collude with each other to maximise economic benefits from
these poor students. These Words from Janet’s friend, Olivia, capture this
problem:
… I thought I was lucky when I received the offer from the university, since
I thought I had found a chance to change my fate. I was quite confident
studying, working and settling down here, in the big city, and changing my life
via my university degree. But, now, I realise that it is impossible and my dream
is broken… (Olivia, a rural student in Shanghai, 14th December 2011,
observation journal)
The hopelessness and helplessness I felt from Janet and her friends
again indicated to me an urgent need to focus on these university students’
working-life experiences in both the internet industries, and generally in
Chinese society. Most of these students are from families in the lower middle
class and working class, and some of them stay in these classes even after
being recruited and after they have graduated. These lower class people
experience a different level of precarious working life after being recruited as
full-time workers in the internet industries: some of them are struggling to
separate from family members because of the high living expenses in big cities;
some of them are driven to death through overwork; some of them face health
problems due to excessive working hours and high pressure. All these
examples of precariousness, albeit in different ways and to different degrees,
suggest the proletarianisation of the lower middle class.
6.4 High risk with no future
I addressed some code farmers’ experiences in Chapters Four and Five,
where I argued that code farmers were not reasonably rewarded for their hard
work, and were given limited workplace autonomy in their daily practices. Here,
I suggest another more striking issue in their work: unprotected benefits and
insecure work status. This makes their working conditions even more
precarious than those of full-time workers.
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As I pointed out in section 4.2.4, commissioning companies, such as
internet companies in this research, prefer the labour outsourcing service
rather than the labour dispatch service, because the former costs less. There
is also another reason for these companies choosing the labour outsourcing
service: the commissioning companies are not responsible for key elements of
the working conditions of code farmers, such as their social welfare insurance,
personal files, and household registration (hukou). This reduces the labour
costs for commissioning companies, whilst degrading the working conditions of
code farmers.
Monica, a full-time worker in Grand, who had worked in several internet
companies over the years, said that most internet companies nowadays prefer
the labour outsourcing service for certain projects, because they do not need
to take charge of workers’ benefits. The outsourced projects usually require
new technical skills, which are not possessed by the company’s full-time
employees or require more workers to contribute their working hours. This then
requires the companies to recruit new employees to conduct the projects.
Compared to recruiting full-time workers, outsourcing these projects to
outsourcing companies in the form of the labour outsourcing service can bring
many more benefits to the internet companies. Using the labour outsourcing
service, these internet companies only need to pay the outsourcing companies,
without being concerned with the code farmers’ working hours or their benefits.
In other words, code farmers experience insecure and unprotected
employment in internet companies.
Brophy (2006: 624-625) explores the unprotected employment status of
the agency contractors in Microsoft. He points out that these agency
contractors suffer difficult working conditions because of Microsoft’s
labour-control strategy. This includes some experiences, such as temporary
workers cannot enjoy benefits (healthcare, paid vacation and sick leave), as
permanent employees, who have the same workload as them; temporary
workers have a feeling of vulnerability, because the company enforce varied
forms of exclusion to ‘create a barrier between permatemps and full-timers’
(p.624). As a result, these agency contractors initiate the ferment ‘Washington
Alliance of Technology Workers’ (WashTech) to against the strategy.
All these material and emotional disadvantages are shared by code
farmers in Chinese internet companies. For example, in both internet
companies in this study, it was common to find that code farmers were far
removed from all benefits, such as holiday gifts and quarterly bonuses. This
distinguished code farmers from the group of full-time workers, which again
reinforced their inferior positions in the internet companies, as I argued in
section 4.2.4.
Meanwhile, Monica mentioned that code farmers who were assigned to
core projects with key technologies were required to sign non-disclosure
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agreements. Such agreements prohibited these code farmers from working in
another internet company half a year after leaving Grand, due to concerns
relating to intellectual property. This guaranteed internet companies’ benefits
by protecting their key technologies, but also limited the possibilities for code
farmers to work, which degraded their quality of working life.
Based on her findings in the UK television labour market, Ursell (2000)
argues that institutions of capitalism lead to ‘an aggressive degradation of the
terms and conditions of employment’ and ‘a more aggressive exploitation of
labour power’, in order to stop the ‘falling rates of profitability’ (p.807). Here,
internet companies adopt the aggressive employment form in order to
maximise their profitability. This then degrades the terms and conditions of
code farmers’ working life.
According to the new labour law, it is required that the outsourcing
companies take charge of code farmers’ benefits. But, evidently, these
benefits are less stable and secure than the ones in internet companies. For
example, most code farmers are not guaranteed household registration in
Beijing or Shanghai (Beijing/Shanghai hukou) by the outsourcing companies.
Neither do they receive holiday gifts or quarterly bonus from the outsourcing
companies.
… These workers’ [code farmers’] low pay can only support them to live in
the lowest caste in the big cities. Their low living quality suggests that they are
the big-city equivalent of farmers… (Carl, technical worker in the Open
Platform Department at Campus, 20th December 2011, interview)
Put simply, code farmers do the same work as full-time workers, whilst
they are unreasonably rewarded with low pay, unprotected benefits and
insecure work status. This then degrades the quality of their working lives, and
ultimately results in their inferior positions in internet companies.
Current research has highlighted the working conditions of freelancers
and self-employed workers. For example, Fudge (2003) investigates
freelancers’ working conditions in Canada. According to his survey,
freelancers suffer from long working hours, and are not guaranteed a safe
career with professional training, social welfare insurance, and reasonable
holidays. In other words, such self-employed work is highly risky with insecure
benefits and career prospects, when compared with regular employment.
Likewise, self-employed workers in the internet industries suffer from such
insecure working conditions, such as lacking professional training, benefits
and bonuses.
… There is no future for self-employed workers. On the one hand, they
need to live with the risk of failure, which in our case is carried by companies.
On the other hand, they are not guaranteed any benefits, such as health
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insurance… (William, technical worker in the 3G Department at Campus, 19th
December 2011, interview)
According to William, self-employed workers need to carry risks and
responsibilities, which previously belonged to companies and the state, in their
work. For example, they need to carry the risk of failure themselves, because
there is no company to take care of it. Compared to full-time workers, whose
benefits are guaranteed by their companies, self-employed workers also need
to work hard to earn more money, because they need to pay for their own
benefits, such as social welfare insurance.
As Neff et al. (2005) and Ross (2005) claim, in a post-industrial society,
where the idea of ‘winner-take-all’ (Neff et al. 2005: 310) is widely circulated,
precarious employment conditions, such as outsourcing and self-employment,
encourage individuals to carry a much more ‘profit-oriented-risk’ (ibid.).
Individual workers, in particular workers in precarious employment, are forced
to take on more responsibilities that did not previously belong to them, such as
managing the success of company projects and paying for their own benefits.
Such self-responsibilisation is criticised by Ross (2008: 8-9), who criticises
‘lottery economy’ in U.S. new media work: ‘the winners take all and the others
work in a ‘labour-intensive workplace’ which, like many other, less prestigious
environments’ (p.9). Gill and Pratt (2008) also claim that cultural workers, such
as new media workers, are representatives of the ‘brave new world of work’
(p.3), who are expected to take risks and responsibilities by themselves. They
are the new ‘precariat’ – referring to precariousness and proletariat to
emphasise experiences of exploitation and new political subjectivity.
Indeed, this precarious work has been largely criticised by autonomist
Marxists (Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Paolo Virno, and Maurizio Lazzarato)
and critical researchers (Gill 2002, 2007, du Gay 1996, McRobbie 2000, 2002,
Banks 2007, Neff et al. 2005, Ursell 2000). Some theorists (Ursell 2000,
McRobbie 2000, 2002) claim that the combination of autonomy and good pay
with precarious working conditions constitute a form of self-exploitation, as I
mentioned earlier. But, as I also addressed in earlier chapters, some critical
theorists, such as Banks (2007), argue that such arguments ascribe too much
power and unity to ‘the system’ whilst ignoring the agency and subjectivity of
workers.
Neilson and Rossiter (2008) claim that precarity is a source of ‘political
subjection, of economic exploitation and of opportunities to be grasped
(Lazzarato, 2004)’ (p.52). Gill and Pratt (2008) distinguish precarity from
precariousness by emphasising the ‘potential for new subjectivities, new
socialites and new kinds of politics’ (p.3) offered by precarity. Put simply,
internet workers’ precarious experiences, nonetheless different levels of
precariousness amongst different workers, also indicate a potential of
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subjectivity to against economic exploitation. I discuss this potential in the next
two chapters.
Some research concerning freelancers and self-employed workers
focuses on the issue of exploitation by arguing that these workers are seriously
exploited in capitalist systems (Fudge 2003, Fuchs 2010, Cohen 2012, Storey
etc. 2005). For example, Cohen (2012) applies Marx’s labour process theory to
understand the exploitation in freelance labour, claiming that freelance labour
is exploited by corporations via the increase of unpaid working hours and ‘the
aggressive pursuit of copyrights’ (p.142). She then argues that self-exploitation
is a cover for exploitation. In fact, in her view, self-exploitation still relates to
exploitation.
Cohen’s research is valuable in terms of providing a critical approach to
understanding freelancers in cultural work, but her use of Marx’s labour
process theory is problematic. Basing one’s analysis solely on Marx’s concept
of exploitation, however valuable, is also potentially reductive. Cultural labour
in Cohen’s research is simplified to being labour power, in order for her to
criticise the exploitation of freelancers. This actually ignores the specificity of
cultural labour generated by workers’ subjective experiences. As an alternative,
based on what I heard from my interviewees and observed in Grand, my
research asserts that the concept of exploitation needs to be discussed in
reference to workers’ subjective experiences, which highlights the compulsion
behind activities of appropriation. As I argued in Chapters Two and Five,
self-employed workers receive high pay and enjoy a high level of professional
autonomy in their work, but it is important to criticise their high work intensity
along with these advantages. Here, it is vital to recognise the compulsion
behind such complicated working-life experiences – unrewarded working
hours with high pay and the high level of autonomy: with unguaranteed
benefits and insecure work status, self-employed workers have no choice but
have to work hard, in order to earn money to secure their working life.
Referring to my argument in section 4.2.4, the new labour law, although
trying to standardise the outsourcing market, degrades the working conditions
of both code farmers and self-employed workers. By encouraging the labour
outsourcing service, the new labour law enables internet companies to
outsource projects to self-employed groups without taking charge of individual
workers’ benefits, such as their social welfare insurance. Such responsibilities,
which previously belonged to the internet companies, are then shifted to the
self-employed workers. These workers are told ‘winner-takes-all’, and have to
become responsible for all risks, such as the failure of their projects, and the
protection of their benefits. This certainly forces the workers to have a high
work intensity – to conduct as many projects as possible. Put simply, the
precarious working conditions of self-employed workers evidently work under
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compulsion, in which both the state and internet companies play significant
roles.
Admittedly, the precarious working life of self-employed workers is similar
to cultural workers in other geographic contexts, such as cultural labourers in
the UK (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010) and the ‘creative class’ in the USA
(Ross 2008). But the difference with self-employed workers’ experiences of
precarious working life in China, is that the Chinese state colludes with the
internet companies to appropriate these workers’ labour efforts.
6.5 Conclusion: indifferent experiences of
precariousness amongst different forms of internet
workers
In this chapter, I have addressed issues of risk and insecurity in internet
workers’ working lives. In the companies I have studied, full-time workers have
the danger of being laid off without protection from a work union, although the
more positive consequence of this phenomenon, job-hopping, has attracted
more academic attention. Admittedly, some workers benefit from their frequent
job-hopping, by receiving higher pay and a higher level of autonomy in their
new jobs. But more workers change their jobs because of the bad working
conditions in their current jobs. Moreover, workers are laid off because the
companies need to save labour costs or need new employees to bring in fresh
ideas. These workers usually accept unfair contracts, which state that
companies can easily lay off employees by giving them one month’s notice
and by paying them one more month’s salary, without workers being given any
protection from a work union. This indicates a form of domination where the
bureaucratic capitalist class controls the lower middle class, because the
former owns the resources of production and has the political power to allocate
these resources.
Meanwhile, some of the experiences of risk and precarity of full-time
workers can be characterised as a result of exploitation. For example, due to
the high pressure caused by unrewarded excessive working hours and high
competition in the internet industries, many full-time workers have health
problems. Some of them even die from exhaustion. Such unsafe working
conditions show that internet workers experience difficult working conditions,
because they are exploited in the same way as manual workers in factories, as
noted in Marx’s work: their labour efforts and skills are appropriated by the
bureaucratic capitalist class in forms of excessive working hours and little pay,
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which even forces a small number of them to work until they die from
exhaustion.
As well as the difficult conditions outlined above, these full-time workers’
lives are not guaranteed after retirement, because of the pension problem.
Compared to SOE workers, internet workers need to pay more into their
pension fund, but are less rewarded after retirement. Additionally, government
officials embezzle some workers’ pension funds, in which case, full-time
workers’ labour efforts and skills are appropriated in terms of their insecure
lives after retirement.
In this chapter, interns’ experiences of risk in the internet industries are
illustrated by some of the data I collected from my respondents. These poor
university graduates’ experiences in both universities and companies is
representative of the general status of large numbers of graduates in
contemporary Chinese society: their families can hardly afford the increasing
tuition fees, which forces them to pour in to the internship market, in order to
cover their living expenses. Some families are in debt because of the high
tuition fees, which can only be paid back after these graduates find jobs.
However, the employment difficulties in recent years put these graduates
under extremely high pressure, and even results in some students’ committing
suicide. In order to survive in the cities, these graduates are keen to do
internships, and accept all risk and insecurity associated with the work, such
as unguaranteed work positions after internships. Nevertheless, they
acknowledge a sort of exploitation there.
Likewise, both code farmers and self-employed workers experience
insecurity in their working life. Both groups need to bear the burden of
responsibilities that previously belonged to the state and the internet
companies: they need to pay social welfare insurance themselves and take
responsibility if a project fails. This ultimately results in these workers’ working
for excessive hours without extra reward. Meanwhile, according to the new
labour law, these workers are not guaranteed a stable work status or future
career by the internet companies they work at. This certainly shows the
insecure working conditions of these agency labourers.
All members of the lower middle class in this research – full-time workers,
interns and agency labourers – experience precariousness in their working
lives, nevertheless in different levels. Some of these are the results of
structural exploitation. For example, full-time workers’ labour efforts are
appropriated by the bureaucratic capitalist class by experiencing unrewarded
excessive working hours, which I argued in Chapter Four. Such structural
exploitation further results in some workers’ experiences of risks and
precariousness in this chapter, such as serious health problems and die from
exhaustion. Full-time workers’ labour efforts are also appropriated by the
bureaucratic capitalist class under coercion via pension corruption: such
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appropriation enables the bureaucratic class to send their offspring abroad to
enjoy luxury life, whilst makes internet workers feel anxious, and even
desperate, about their future.
Generally, internet workers experience precariousness, whilst these
precarious experiences are unevenly distributed amongst different forms of
workers. For example, interns do not only work excessive hours without
reasonable rewards like full-time workers, but also need to struggle to support
themselves through education and to find jobs that would allow them to pay off
debt and earn a living. This different experience of precariousness derives not
only from different kinds of work between full-time workers and interns, but
also because universities play an important role. Therefore, as I argued in the
last two chapters, although working conditions are difficult, they are more
difficult for some workers than others. This can result in tensions and disunity
amongst internet workers.
Some theorists make sense of such proletarionisation with the concept of
precarity, which also suggests the potential of workers’ subjectivity. As I
discussed in Chapter Two, this problem of proletarionisation has two
significant consequences. On the one hand, it results in difficult working
conditions in the internet industries, which causes internet workers’ working
lives to be similar to the working classes. On the other hand, it results in
practices of internet workers’ negotiation and resistance towards the state and
internet companies, which aligns them more closely with the working class.
Such acts can be seen to be related to worker agency, as I have hinted
throughout these empirical chapters, and such agency might give us more
cause for hope than the difficult conditions I have discussed thus far in the
empirical chapters. I discuss this second aspect of the lower middle class
problem, worker agency, in the next chapter.
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Chapter Seven: Agency in the Chinese internet industries
7.1 Structure of this chapter
From Chapters Four to Six, I evaluated the quality of working life in the
internet industries via three key issues: work intensity and pay, autonomy, and
risk. Following the work of theorists like Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010),
Banks (2007), and Ross (2005), I suggested that certain working conditions
are a result of exploitation. I argued that the lower middle class – the internet
workers in this research – face the problem of proletarianisation. Nevertheless
there are different levels of adverse working conditions amongst different
workers. But, as I argued in Chapter Two, the other side of proletarianisation is
worker agency, through which the internet workers stand close with the
working class – defined here as the internet users for whom internet works
build the internet and populate it with content. Therefore, this chapter identifies
acts of agency amongst workers and evaluates these acts in the context of
contemporary Chinese society. In section 7.2, I start by acknowledging some
existing research about worker agency. Some of the research clarifies the
definition of worker agency, some research explains where worker agency
comes from, and some discusses forms and acts of worker agency. In section
7.3, I identify workers’ acts of negotiation and resistance towards improving the
quality of their working life. I explore how workers act in order to improve their
working conditions, and examine to what extent these acts are meaningful,
despite some of them not working. In section 7.4, I acknowledge workers’ acts
of negotiation and resistance as a sort of internet idealism. I argue that these
workers’ practices contribute to the creation of a free online space for ordinary
Chinese internet users. In certain cases, these internet workers work together
with users (who might be seen as the working class) in order to resist
domination by the bureaucratic capitalist class. In section 7.5, I argue that
internet workers’ acts of negotiation need to be understood as an important
part of worker agency in the Chinese context. I conclude by emphasising the
point that these workers’ acts need to be discussed in the context of
contemporary Chinese society. The lower middle class co-working with the
working class can be understood as offering potential for possible
transformation from the bottom to the top in contemporary Chinese social
hierarchy. So whilst the former three empirical chapters have focused on some
of the problematic conditions that Chinese internet industry workers encounter,
this chapter balances the focus by highlighting acts of agency which may give
cause for hope, rather than concern, in relation to internet work. As such, it
highlights that the concept of exploitation, which I have discussed in various
ways in the previous chapters, needs to be used alongside the concept of
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agency, in order to make full sense of the working life experiences of Chinese
internet industry workers.
7.2 Research on worker agency
As I stated in section 2.6, some theorists’ work on class conflict (for
example, Wright 1996, Burawoy and Wright 2002, and Callinicos 2004)
provides a basis for my discussion of worker agency in this research. But this
macro level research, focusing on labour processes, can hardly be applied to
explain working-life experiences – workers’ acts of agency. Therefore, we
need to revisit these arguments.
Thompson (1990: 97-103) claims that the labour process theory usually
focuses on the capital-labour contradiction in production processes by being
concerned only with the control and fragmentation of work. It neglects other
practices in the workplace, such as ‘workers’ resistance to fragmentation’ and
‘the phenomena of consent’ (p.103). For example, Knights (1990) criticises
Braverman, a significant researcher on labour processes, for his ignorance of
worker subjectivity, restricting his focus to ‘the deskilling of labour and the
intensification of management control’ (p.300). By contrast, Knights (1990)
appreciates Burawoy’s research on worker subjectivity, recognising that
‘interests and ideology are constituted on the shop floor and are not simply a
result of class structures or external agencies of socialisation’ (p.310).
However, Knights also claims that Burawoy fails to ‘develop his account of how
labour processes fragment, atomise and turn workers into individuals rather
than members of a class’ (p.311).
But this is not to say that a theory of exploitation does not contribute to an
understanding of worker resistance. Indeed, as Cohen (2012: 151) claims,
antagonism, the core of Marx’s concept of exploitation, indicates that cultural
work is a site of struggle. More recently, some autonomist Marxists (Hardt and
Negri 2000, Lazzarato 1996, Brophy and de Peuter 2007) have theorised
workers’ resistance to capitalist exploitation, which ‘has the potential to escape
capital’s control’ (p.151). For example, Gill and Pratt (2008) point out that
autonomists highlight wage labourers as ‘protagonists’ in order to show the
‘antagonism of capitalist relations’ (p.5). And some autonomists are also
concerned with ‘emergent subjectivities, the possibilities of resistance, the
features of subjectivity that exceed capitalist control and regulation’ (p.19).
Some of the autonomists’ work is helpful to conceptualise internet workers’
experiences of autonomy, as shown in Chapter Five. However, Gill and Pratt
(2008) claim that autonomists’ work fails to specify cultural work, because of
overemphasising the affect in work. It also fails to see both pleasure and pain
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in cultural work, and ‘their relation to forms of exploitation that increasingly
work through dispersed disciplinary modalities and technologies of
subjecthood’ (p.21).
As an alternative, some critical theorists’ work on cultural workers’
subjectivity can be applied to analyse some internet workers’ acts of agency.
For example, Banks (2010) argues that labour autonomy is a ‘structural
precondition for effective capitalist cultural production’ (p.252). He uses Ryan’s
work to claim that ‘capital has no particular interest in fully divesting cultural
workers of their autonomy, for to do so would undermine the very basis of the
value generated in cultural production’ (p.260). Both Ryan and Banks argue
that labour autonomy is intrinsic to cultural production, as artistic freedom
enables commercial production. In this research, as stated in Chapter Five,
there is also a certain scope for autonomy to operate on different levels, which
emphasises agents working under structural constraints that cannot be fully
controlled. This sort of subjectivity has been recognised as a form of workers’
agency in a negative direction – workers choose to work themselves extremely
hard.
But, as Banks (2010) argues, such negative forms of agency still indicate
a sort of self-consciousness and self-reflexivity that motivates workers to be
involved in some political activities, such as ‘social and community projects,
forms of non-capitalist economising, ethical trading and socio-political activism,
and/or may mean a more routine participation in the development of socially
and personally meaningful “practice”-based communities’ (p.265). Here, these
political activities do not only relate to the cultivation of some external rewards,
such as money and power, but also to some internal rewards, such as ‘good
work for its own sake, and contributing to the standards of excellence and
ethical frameworks of the practice in question’ (ibid.).
Moreover, Banks (2010) argues that labour autonomy has a double-edged
character that ‘the necessary unfettering of the work process can also lead to
unintended consequences in the form of a radical decoupling of autonomy
from the instrumental imperatives it was originally provided to serve’ (p.261).
Indeed, such radical decoupling of autonomy is the genuine agency discussed
in this research, which are beyond the bureaucratic capitalist class’s control.
Therefore, cultural production becomes a field where agents, such as free
thinking and choices, expand. Here, the internet industries become a field to
explore this genuine agency – a more hopeful aspect of worker agency than
the comprised agency that I showed in Chapter Five.
Therefore, in this chapter, I develop the theory of worker agency by
exploring some more positive forms of worker autonomy. Below, I first clarify
some issues in relation to the theory of worker agency, such as what worker
agency means in this research, what it consists of, and where it comes from.
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Some sociologists’ work, such as that of Randy Hodson (2001), helps
clarify the definition of worker agency. Hodson divides worker agency into four
categories: worker resistance, workplace citizenship, the pursuit of meaning in
the workplace, and workplace social relations. This research focuses on
workers’ acts of resistance and negotiation, aiming to pursue meaning in the
workplace, and argues that acts of negotiation are an important part of worker
agency.
Most research focusing on worker agency only pays attention to
workplace resistance. For example, Collinson (1994) follows the tendency to
criticise Braverman’s neglect of workplace resistance by identifying strategies
of labour resistance. These resistance strategies are often examined by
distinguishing individual forms of resistance from collective forms of resistance.
Friedman (1977) distinguishes the sabotage act of labour in modern industry
and monopoly capitalism – two main terms adopted in Friedman’s writing – as
individual acts and organised collective acts.
In research on resistance, there has been a tradition of dividing acts of
resistance into two forms: collective/organized resistance (for example,
Edwards 1979, Friedman 1977, Bodnar 2006); and individual/routine
resistance (for example, Scott 1985, Fiske 1992, Fleming & Spicer 2003,
Prasad & Prasad 2000, Knight & McCabe 2000, Fleming & Sewell 2002). The
former usually happens in the form of ‘unions, strikes and coordinated output
restrictions’ (Fleming & Spicer 2003: 159). The latter frequently materializes in
forms of sabotage or ‘careful carelessness’ (ibid.). Scott’s research into
peasant resistance in Malaysia focuses on the latter form of resistance, as the
subtitle of his book indicates: Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of
peasant resistance (1985). Here, Scott emphasises the individual and covert
resistance of subordinate groups. He argues that subordinate groups
frequently resist in ways that ‘require little or no coordination or planning’,
‘represent a form of individual self-help’, and ‘avoid any direct symbolic
confrontation with authority or with elite norms’ (p. 29). The act of ‘avoiding any
direct symbolic confrontation with authority’, is understood as a form of
negotiation rather than resistance in this research, as I explain later.
More recently, as Prasad and Prasad (2000) claim, the main focus of
workplace resistance research has shifted from formal and collective
resistance to informal and routine resistance. But these concepts of everyday,
routine and informal forms of resistance cannot explain all forms of small-scale
resistance, especially in the context of Chinese society, where resistance is
complex. In the Chinese context, it is hard to find large-scale workplace
resistance. Rather, there is small-scale workplace resistance. For example,
Smith and Pun (2006) explore the collective protests carried out by Chinese
‘dormitory labour’, labourers who work in factories and live in factory dorms,
whose lives are thus dominated by their work. These protests usually take
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place in a single factory and focus on issues relating to the working conditions
in that factory, such as ‘plant closure, unpaid wages, bankruptcy or relocation’
(p.1468). None of these protests are ‘covert’ or ‘individual’, to use Scott’s terms,
but neither could they be defined as macro level resistance. Qiu’s (2009)
discussion of the resistance of subordinate groups in Chinese society is helpful
here, as he points out that group acts of resistance can be characterized as
small-scale, collective resistance, based on networks of families or small
communities of what he calls the ‘information have-less’. In other words, some
acts of resistance in the Chinese context are undertaken collectively, but are
small scale, not operating at a macro level.
However, some acts in the form of negotiation are ignored in most
research on worker agency. In Salaman’s research (1979) into control and
resistance in work organisations, he points out that workplace resistance and
bargaining is usually mobilised in subtle forms. Such subtle bargaining is
conceptualised here as a form of negotiation. In other words, I argue that the
indirect and subtle forms of bargaining need to be discussed as forms of
negotiation in certain cases. Negotiation here, is understood as workers’
indirect practices against particular working conditions, constraints or state
policies. I use the term negotiation to refer to both the discussion and
circumvention of particular working conditions. I distinguish negotiation from
resistance, as the former refers to covert and subtle acts in both workplace and
society that are practiced in an indirect way to bargain against constraints;
whilst the latter refers to subtle and visible acts in the workplace and society
that are used to challenge constraints.
As I stated earlier, the third issue that needs to be clarified in this section
is, where these acts of agency come from. Collinson (2003) emphasises the
necessity to recognise the ‘conditions, processes and consequences’ (p.529)
of autonomy. Choi et al. (2008) argue that worker autonomy is the ‘freedom
from constraint and control over one’s own actions at work’. It is shaped by
‘bureaucratic structure, production technology, and workers’ power’ (p.427).
They particularly highlight the organisational structure as a significant factor
shaping autonomy.
In contrast, some theorists argue that agency should be understood
through humanistic accounts of workers. For example, Knights and Willmott
(1989) argue that human subjectivity arises from ‘the condition of being at
once a part of, and apart from, nature’. This leads people to ‘seek security in
those social identities that are both available and valued in society’ (p.542).
Some active human agents are motivated by aims of realising ‘our personal
identities, our personal hopes and projects and longings, in the name of our
selves’ (p.537). Along with Foucault, they regard freedom, the ‘self-conscious
character of human beings’ (p.551), as a motivation for human subjectivity and
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‘a condition of human existence’ (p.553). It is the freedom that ‘provides for an
emancipatory potential and the permanence of resistance’ (ibid.).
However, such a Foucauldian framework has been criticised for
overemphasising the seduction of autonomy (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010:
46-50, Banks 2010: 256-257). For example, Banks (2010) points out that such
Foucauldian studies of cultural work understand autonomy, such as the
freedom stated above, as the camouflage for its real intentions – ‘to reduce
costs, to de-differentiate work and non-work environments, and to attenuate
the boundaries between the work and non-work self’ (p.256). Thus, this
Foucauldian framework tends to an attenuated view of a genuine agency – a
more humanistic account of persons.
As an alternative, Banks (2010) argues for a genuine agency coming from
an ‘open dialectic of creativity and constraint’, by utilising Bill Ryan’s work on
the ‘art-commerce relation’ (p.259). As I stated earlier, both Banks and Ryan
argue that worker agency is intrinsic to cultural production, as artistic freedom
enables commercial production. Capitalist production cannot fully divest
cultural workers of their agency, because employers’ attempt to reduce artists’
autonomy ‘runs the risk of a shoddy or mediocre and hence unsaleable
artwork’ (p.260). Therefore, cultural industries give workers latitude to express
themselves and to pursue their interests, which indeed is what the industries
sell.
To Banks, worker agency then arises structurally from the art-commerce
relation, including cultural workers’ desires to retain their autonomous artistic
ambitions and to survive with the best of the working conditions. A genuine
agency thus is agent working under structuring constraints that cannot be fully
controlled, but can be manoeuvred within. This agency is about a humanistic
account of persons/workers, which is a meaningful pursuit of plural forms of life,
work and free thinking that rests on a certain theory of personhood – about
what human beings are, what they consist in, and are capable of.
In this research, most acts of negotiation do not bring any direct and
immediate changes to difficult working conditions, nor do they completely
emancipate workers, but these acts still have a significant influence on the
long-term quality of working life: some of the acts of negotiation indicate that
workers are aware of their difficult working conditions, and are eager to change
such conditions through active responses, both individually and collectively.
These subtle activities show agents working under structuring circumstances
that are beyond their control. And these negotiating acts are motivated by the
pursuit of a certain theory of personhood – about what human beings are and
what it means to be free thinking human beings. This awareness and
motivation probably indicates a potential for improving working conditions
through internet workers’ long-term struggles and efforts. In addition, some
acts of negotiation relating to online freedom may not immediately force the
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state to relax its restriction, but such bargaining acts still indicate a potential for
realising a certain ‘internet idealism’ – to expand online freedom in Chinese
society. Banks claims that these subtle activities in relation to both external
and internal rewards are carried out by workers to pursue better working
conditions for their own individual existence and good/ethical standards and
frameworks of practices both in the workplace and society.
In this chapter, I argue that workers’ acts of resistance and negotiation
show that there is space to rebel, to express oneself, and to be autonomous
inherent in capitalism. This indicates a genuine agency – thoughts and actions
that are beyond the bureaucratic capitalist class’s control. Here, then, I show a
more hopeful aspect of autonomy than the highly comprised autonomy to
which I drew attention in Chapter Five.
In the next two sections, I identify the complex ways in which internet
workers interact with ordinary internet users in these acts of negotiation and
resistance, sometimes acting as users, sometimes mobilising their
professional knowledge to negotiate systems and structures in ways
unavailable to ordinary users without prior access to this knowledge. Most of
these acts are carried out by full-time workers, and sometimes by interns,
according to my fieldwork. I map out these acts by replying to two of my
research questions: what are the responses of workers to the state and
companies’ control? And why do workers work in the industries, despite the
difficult working conditions?
7.3 Agency in improving working conditions
As I discussed in Chapters Four to Six, internet workers suffer from
inequalities and injustice in their working lives, due to certain forms of
exploitation and domination. In this section, I address workers’ acts of
negotiation and resistance towards improving these difficult working conditions,
for example in relation to solving inequalities concerning working hours and
pay, and acts of negotiation with the aim of increasing levels of professional
autonomy. Some of these acts might not bring effective changes to the quality
of working life, but they still are important to internet workers. Some of these
issues might seem insignificant in other geographical contexts, such as the UK,
but they still highlight the plight of agents that rest on the pursuit of material
supports for individual existence.
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7.3.1 Resistance to inequalities in working life
Some scholars claim that workplace resistance, especially in the forms of
absenteeism, sabotage and strike, are the most popular forms of workplace
agency (for example, Salaman 1979, Edwards and Scullion 1982, Gill and
Pratt 2008: 6). One such example in my research is the absenteeism of interns
in Grand. As I stated in Chapter Four, Janet was forced to stay in her
internship, even though she asked to leave for her studies. After her
resignation was rejected by her team leader, she applied for a month’s holiday.
As she said, it was her way to show her discontent. This could be understood
as a resistant act of absenteeism at an individual level. It worked because it
temporarily released Janet from the unreasonable conditions of her internship.
According to my observations, there were other acts of resistance workers
used to show their discontent towards certain inequalities and injustices in their
working life. And some of these acts successfully brought effective changes to
their working life. One of these examples was from full-time workers in
Campus’s Open Platform Department: a department that encouraged internet
users and amateurs to create new products by providing them with an open
platform for designing. The staff in this department successfully forced the
company to change their department’s leader, who was seriously intervening
in their professional autonomy. For example, the leader, who was not a
technical professional, asked some workers to change the designs of their
products so they were based on his ideas. As a result, workers in the
department threatened to leave the company if their leader was not removed.
These workers expressed their discontent and sent several emails, which
explained the issue and contained the department workers’ signatures, to the
head of the company. Finally, they successfully achieved the goal and forced
the company to change their leader.
Another example came from the interns at Grand, who helped each other
to clock on and off in order to earn more money. Sometimes, some interns
could only work for half a day because of their university studies, but they were
usually paid for the whole day because they asked other interns to clock off for
them at the end of that day. This group act became an ‘under the table rule’
between all interns at Grand. As a part of this subordinate group in the
company, I myself also obeyed this ‘under the table rule’ by helping other
interns clock off, in order to build a relationship of rapport and trust with them.
As one intern said, it was their response to their unpaid overtime work.
In other words, this group act of clocking on and off for each other became
the interns’ resistance to exploitation from the company (such as unpaid
overtime work). This act arose from the interns’ pursuit of money, and also
their willingness to gain esteem at work – ‘a revenge for their unpaid overtime
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work’ by showing their ‘power’. This act might be subtle and more ‘under the
table’, compared to full-time workers threatening to resign from the company if
their requirement was not realised, but it was still effective to interns: interns do
receive the pay for their absent half days and feel a form of dignity by showing
their ‘power’ to the company. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, not
only do collective forms of resistance have effective results, but some
small-scale and ‘under the table’ acts of resistance also have significant results,
such as improving interns’ working life.
In another example, in December 2011, there was a new rule in Campus
requiring workers to arrive at work before 10am, replacing the flexible
work-time arrangements that had existed before. Meanwhile, free dinner for
people working overtime, the only reward for working overtime in the previous
system, was cancelled. Instead, a new rule was created, stating that only
people working over 12 hours per day could benefit from a free dinner. As a
result, a lot of workers showed their discontent by choosing to leave early after
coming to work before 10am, and give up their free dinner by working less than
12 hours per day. As Galeno says,
We leave earlier to show our discontent and resistance to it [the new
rule]… (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration Department at
Campus, 20th December 2011, interview)
This shows workers’ response towards the new rule, which damaged their
rewards for overtime and influenced their working hours; however, the acts did
not force the company to change the rule. These acts might not be considered
as influential as collective and organised forms of resistance (such as strikes),
because they did not bring a change of the rule, but they should not be ignored
in the Chinese context, where workers, especially in SOEs, are required to
obey rules. As Galeno further explains, it is not the small amount of money that
they are concerned about, rather, it is about their dignity at work – a free dinner
and flexible working hours that show the company respecting and appreciating
their work. In other words, such resisting acts come from workers’ desire to
gain recognition and esteem at work.
In both companies, there were groups of workers who resisted inequalities
in their working lives via resignation. For example, according to some of my
interviewees in Campus, some workers resigned because they did not receive
any of the stocks promised to them by the company after it was listed on the
US NASDAQ stock exchange. In Grand, more than twenty workers in the
online novel department resigned in 2013, because they felt that their
professional autonomy had been eroded by the company – these online
editors were required by the company, which wanted to cut some
services/products of the department, to give up some of their creativity, and
even stop some of their products. As a result, these workers chose to resign to
show their commitment to their own professional autonomy and show their
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discontent towards the company’s intervention. 62 These two cases both
indicate the direct methods adopted by workers to show their discontent
towards difficult working conditions. These acts also show one way in which
internet workers directly protest against inequality and injustice in their working
life. This can rarely be found in the experiences of other workers in the
Chinese context, such as SOE workers, who often completely accept
companies’ intervention, even if it affects their professional autonomy.
7.3.2 Negotiation as bargaining power
Some research argues that the act of bargaining is a significant means of
worker agency. For example, Edwards and Scullion (1982) highlight the
bargaining power in workers’ collective actions. As stated earlier, such
bargaining power can be seen as a form of effective negotiation in the context
of this research. I understand negotiation as subtle acts in the workplace that
are practiced in an indirect way to bargain with particular working conditions,
constraints or state policies, in order to improve certain working conditions.
Compared to workers’ acts of resistance, there are more examples of workers’
acts of negotiation aimed at improving the quality of working life.
For instance, workers in both companies bargain over some of the
conditions attached to their contracts. In both Campus and Grand, workers are
required to sign a special contract in addition to the normal work contract, one
that prohibits them from working in another internet company for six months
after resigning, due to concerns regarding trade secrets. Otherwise, these
employees need to withdraw the stocks they have been given as a part of their
pay, or are required to make a payment to the companies.
Workers’ reactions to this contract are varied, but most of them agree that
it is unfair and unreasonable. In Grand, a new employee raised this issue when
he was asked to sign the contract. He argued with HR that the contract was
unreasonable and against his benefits. By contrast, workers in Campus show
their disagreement in a more collective way:
It’s really unreasonable to ask us to sign this contract… The stocks given
to us are a part of our pay… We all signed the contract when joining the
company, although we think it’s unreasonable. But we do have our own
strategies: when we leave this company, we never let HR know the next
company we will work for. Some of us told HR that we were no longer
interested in working in the internet industries, while we just moved to another
internet company, so that we could still keep the stocks… [It works, because]
62 Shenzhen Evening Newspaper, 17th March 2013
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the company does not have the time to check our next employers one by
one… (Carl, technical worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus,
20th December 2011, interview)
This indicates a disguised and indirect way of bargaining: workers show
their discontent but avoid direct resistance to the company. Instead, they use
covert means to eliminate the effect of the unequal contract on their working
lives. This act may not directly release workers from the unfair contract, but it
does have effective influences on their benefits: most workers successfully
change to another internet company whilst still holding stocks from Campus or
Grand. In other words, this research finds that certain acts of negotiation can
successfully improve working conditions, and therefore the workers’ quality of
working life.
Some technical workers negotiate their professional autonomy with
companies. For example, workers bargain with their managers in order to gain
more free space to exercise their creativity.
[If the manager asked me to change my proposal] I would ask him to give
me acceptable reasons. I mean I do not simply accept requirements or
suggestions without any question. I need him to persuade me with reasonable
suggestions… It is a discussion process, which we call PK [Player Killing – a
term from an internet game referring to the act of two or more players
engaging in combat]… I design my project from the internet users’ perspective,
because I stand with them, [so], most of the time I win in the PK… (Wynn,
technical worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 24th August
2011, interview)
I need the ‘helpful’ suggestions from my boss, ones that really bring
positive effects to my project… If I don’t agree with his suggestions, I could
directly say no. It’s quite usual in our work… (Lee, technical worker in the
Product Administration Department at Campus, 27th August 2011, interview)
These examples indicate certain workers’ individual negotiation of
professional autonomy in their work, which creates a certain amount of
‘creative’ space in their projects. It indicates the potential to bring more
freedom into internet work. The negotiation to increase such freedom
distinguishes internet work from other jobs in the authoritarian Chinese context:
not all jobs in China have such space for workers’ negotiation.
As I stated in section 5.2, it is not only internet companies that intervene in
internet workers’ professional autonomy; the state also plays an important role
in workers’ creative autonomy. As a result, workers not only negotiate the
conditions imposed by corporations upon them in covert and subtle ways, but
also negotiate with the state for more freedom in their creative practices. For
example, as Figure 7.1 shows, workers wrote the names of the Ministry of
Culture and the State Administration of Radio Film and Television, who usually
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intervened in their creative practices (as discussed earlier in Chapter Five), on
the sandbag in the resting area at Campus. Workers who passed the sandbag
kicked it to show their discontent at the intervention from these two
departments.
Figure 7.1: Sandbag in workers’ resting area in Campus
Source: Xia (2012): 261
This can be seen as a collective form of negotiation amongst groups of
workers in Campus: workers use covert and subtle methods to contest control
and intervention from the state. Whilst such acts certainly cannot stop the state
from intervening in workers’ daily practices, it indicates internet workers’
intention to seek more freedom in terms of creativity. The struggle to realise
such freedom indicates what human beings consist in, forming a certain theory
of personhood, as I argued earlier.
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There is another example, in which workers also engage in indirect
bargaining in a collective form. In an Election Meeting of Candidates of the
National People’s Congress in Shanghai, which took place during my fieldwork,
representatives of workers in Grand expressed discontent about current
working conditions, and made a case for more work-related benefits. They
asked the local government to build a new kindergarten near the company in
order to benefit the workers with children. They also raised the issue of
overtime work in the industries. Moreover, these representatives questioned
whether their voices could be heard by the departments responsible for
bringing in changes via the Congress system. Since I left Grand two months
after this event, I do not know the result of such bargaining. But the voices of
the workers in this event again indicate internet workers’ struggle to improve
working conditions, aiming to support individual existence.
Here, workers’ collective discussions of issues relating to their working
lives are understood as a process of negotiation, aimed at improving their
quality of working life, rather than individual or collective acts of direct
resistance. This form of negotiation may not be so unusual in other
geographical contexts, such as the UK, but such direct questioning of authority
can hardly be found amongst workers in other industries in China, such as
SOE workers. Internet workers’ direct expression of discontent and their
questioning of authority mark a fundamental shift in attitudes towards worker
agency in the authoritarian Chinese context.
All the cases shown above demonstrate workers’ acts of resistance and
negotiation aimed at improving their working conditions. Some of these acts
might not bring effective changes to working conditions, but they still
demonstrate worker agency in the internet industries. From the traditional
Marxist approach, this might be the exploited and dominated class – the lower
middle class, resisting the exploiter and dominator class – the bureaucratic
capitalist class, through acts attempting to eliminate inequalities and injustice
in their working life. As Burawoy and Wright (2002: 474-475) argue, the
exploited classes tend to resist the appropriation of their labour efforts.
However, as I argued in the beginning of this chapter, such an approach has
the limitation of despising worker agency. Therefore, I argue that these acts of
negotiation and resistance in the workplace show how internet workers fulfil a
certain theory of personhood – about what human beings are and what human
beings consist in – via a meaningful pursuit of plural forms of work dignity, free
thinking and free choices.
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7.4 Agency of internet idealism
7.4.1 Negotiation for moral idealism
This section addresses the question: ‘why do workers work in the internet
industries, despite the difficult working conditions?’ Some scholars working in
the emergent field of cultural industries have answered this question by
acknowledging some of the rewards of working in this sector (Banks 2007,
Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010, Kennedy 2012). Hesmondhalgh and Baker
(2010), for example, create a model of good and bad work which characterises
good work as consisting of interest, involvement, autonomy, self-esteem, and
the production of products that contribute towards the common good. Banks
(2007, 2010) recognises internal rewards, such as good work, and external
rewards, such as money, power and status, as significant motivating factors for
performing cultural work.
All writers referenced here, argue for the need for a balanced critique (of
the difficult working conditions as described in this thesis from chapters Four to
Six) and hope (about the rewards for working in these sectors and the possible
outcomes of the labour undertaken) in studies of cultural and high-tech sectors.
Indeed, such ‘internal rewards’ attached to cultural work include the hope that
a certain idealism can be realised, which is explored in this section: internet
workers intend to create a good online space, that contributes to ‘the
standards of excellence and ethical frameworks of the practice in question’
(Banks 2010: 265). They hold on to the ideal of creating an open and
accessible medium for everyone, especially for the most vulnerable
communities.
The industries have developed for ten years, generating lots of technical
concepts, creating new commercial skills, as well as blowing so many bubbles.
Yet, we still ignore the demands of vulnerable communities. It’s a shame for us
as engineers that the screen reader was invented by a blind man… (Galeno,
technical workers in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 29th
June 2011, Self-observation)
Here, Galeno expresses a sense of shame that the screen reader, an
assistive technology used by people with visual disabilities to read out text
content from websites, was developed by a blind person, rather than a sighted
person sensitive to the needs of such ‘vulnerable communities’, as he
describes them. He expresses the hope that, in the future, able-bodied internet
workers will turn their attention to developing new assistive devices,
suggesting that his company might do so:
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I hope they [blind people] will be able to open their eyes online and
embrace the internet like other users in the future, as a result of our help…
(Galeno, technical workers in the Product Administration Department at
Campus, 29th June 2011, Self-observation)
However, as big internet companies usually focus on projects maximising
financial benefits, rather than paying particular attention to these moral
questions, then, setting up one’s own business becomes an alternative for
these idealists to realise their moral concerns.
Everyone in the industries has a dream of setting up their own business. I
am one of them. I’m just waiting for my pals, who are technical workers in other
internet companies. I will leave here [Campus] and start my own business as
long as my friends gain enough experiences in their areas… You cannot
identify yourself as a member in the internet industries if you have not started
to run your own business by your 30s. (Galeno, technical worker in the Product
Administration Department at Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
All my pals are doing different technical jobs in internet companies. We
plan to study in these companies for five years, then we will group together to
start our own business… I come here [Campus] just to learn all the things
necessary for starting my own business in the future… (William, technical
worker in the 3G Department at Campus, 26th August 2011, interview)
My dream company is Tencent, but I would still leave there after working
for a period, because my ambition is to run my own company. (Carl, technical
worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 27th August 2011,
interview)
Almost all workers interviewed from Campus indicated their dreams of
running their own businesses. For some, the motivation is financial, as William
puts it:
To be honest, one of my main motivations [for starting my own business]
is to earn more money than now. It is because of the common understanding
in Chinese society nowadays: you can get anything, such as social status and
respect from others, when you are rich. And I believe this situation will not
changd in the coming 30 years. So it forces me to be rich… (William, technical
worker in the 3G Department at Campus, 26th August 2011, interview)
Some research may understand these workers who hold the dream of
setting up their own businesses as conventional capitalists in waiting, because
of the financial motivation. But this is not the only motivation. Some reasons
relate to pursuing free space for professional autonomy, as I stated in section
5.3. A further reason relates to the ideal of creating an open medium,
accessible by everyone, in particular by vulnerable communities, which in turn
relates to professional autonomy. For example, William states that he wants to
‘control all the things by himself’ by setting up his own business. Both Walter
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and Galeno express a belief that running their own businesses could make it
possible for them to develop products that contribute to the common good,
which has been acknowledged in Hesmondhalgh and Baker’s model of good
cultural work (2010).
Galeno and Wynn speak more directly about the public benefits that might
result from the products they could develop in their own companies:
The most exciting thing to me is finally I would have a platform to realise
my dream of changing millions of people’s lives. (Galeno, technical worker in
the Product Administration Department at Campus, 26th October 2009,
Self-observation journal)
We are striving to create new products, new tendencies, and new fashions
in the industries. For example, I hope I could create a new product that would
benefit millions of people. I think that’s why the industries are developing so
fast now… (Wynn, technical worker in the Open Platform Department at
Campus, 24th August 2011, interview)
This moral idealism concerning vulnerable communities, then gives an
indication of why workers persevere in the industries, despite the difficult
working conditions they encounter. In these cases, the hope of creating an
open medium for everyone to access, especially for vulnerable communities,
motivates workers to run their own businesses, which, they say, would not
engage in pure commercial production. This might not be an alternative to the
capitalist production, such as ‘forms of non-capitalist economising’ that are
anticipated by Banks (2010: 265), because setting up one’s own business is
still a form of capitalist production. But it is necessary to figure out motivations
for such acts to distinguish these acts from existing forms of capitalist
production: workers show their free thinking and choices via moving to another
place – setting up their own businesses – to benefit vulnerable communities
and to contribute to the development of socially meaningful practices. These
workers may be capitalists in waiting, but at least, they are not ‘conventional
capitalists’, as they aim to contribute to the common good via more
morally-focused practices.
7.4.2 Worker agency originates from internet idealism
A second explanation of ‘why internet workers persist in the industries,
despite difficult working conditions’ relates to the ‘idealistic’ meanings attached
to the internet itself. For example, Kennedy (2012) introduces Berners-Lee’s
work in her book, whose original dream of the web when he invented it was
that it would be an open, interoperable and accessible medium, whose power
would be in its ‘universality’, and to which access by everyone was ‘an
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important aspect’ (Berners-Lee 2003). Kennedy argues that this vision often
orientates internet workers towards certain ideals and idealistic individuals
towards internet work.
Although this idealistic vision had its geographical home on the west coast
of the USA, its influence has had a global reach. As Galeno put it succinctly,
‘Most people working in the internet industries are idealists’. Banks (2007)
reminds us that cultural workers not only work to generate profits, but also to
create ‘concrete political interventions and social benefits’ (p.164). In the
Chinese context, such political interventions are enabled through workers’ acts
of negotiation and resistance, which aim to create an alternative space for
every Chinese person to speak out.
This could be understood in terms of the political struggles discussed in
Burawoy’s (1979) study of shop-floor workers. Burawoy distinguishes
shop-floor workers’ struggles as economic struggles, ideological struggles,
and political struggles, according to the objects of the struggles. For example,
he defines workers’ struggles, aiming to bargain effort with managers, as
economic struggles; and workers’ active reactions, aiming to improve the
relations in production, as political struggles. All acts of these struggles are
carried out in collective or individual forms, as traditional workplace resistance
research indicates. But, compared to the shop-floor workers’ political struggles,
internet workers’ acts of negotiation and resistance rest more on a certain
theory of personhood, which is a meaningful pursuit of plural forms of work,
free thinking and choices.
Internet workers sometimes act as internet users to negotiate with the
state, in order to criticise social injustice. In some cases, the workers mobilise
their professional knowledge to create online products, such as websites and
programs, which gives internet users a free online space, to negotiate with and
resist the state. And sometimes, workers co-work with other internet users to
organise large-scale collective resistance, both online and offline. According to
the categories defined above, in the following paragraphs I list examples of
workers’ acts, which negotiate with and resist the state and internet companies,
and which relate to what might be understood as internet idealism in the
Chinese context.
In some ways, internet workers are like ordinary internet users, since both
groups see the internet as an alternative public space in the authoritarian
Chinese context, and they both work towards shaping this space. But in other
ways, they are different, since the internet workers possibly contribute more to
the creation of such space, due to their greater skills and professional
knowledge. Below, Galeno shows internet workers’ knowledge of political
issues in the Chinese context, in order to indicate that internet workers
contribute more than internet users to the creation of an alternative public
space. For example, he states that ‘May 4th’– students in Beijing initiated an
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anti-imperialist, cultural and political movement on 4th May 1919, aimed at
criticising the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles
in World War I – is a political issue that could be talked on the internet space in
contemporary China, whilst June 4th – the Tian’anmen Square Protests in 1989
– cannot be mentioned in the online space.
We [workers in Campus] know where the bottom line of the state is, and
we know how to balance the requirements of the state against the creation of
free space for users. For example, we know that we could highlight May 4th,
but could not mention June 4th; we could criticise local governments, but could
not say anything about the central government… Admittedly, the Ministry of
Culture usually forces us to delete some issues, but if there were too many
users focusing certain issues, then the related departments would be pushed
to solve problems… Some recommended topics are planned by us [internet
workers] to push local governments in to being concerned about certain issues,
and demonstrate their abilities in solving problems… (Galeno, technical worker
in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December 2011,
interview)
Evidently, workers negotiate the limitations posed upon them by the state
in ways that are unavailable to ordinary internet users. According to Galeno,
these acts of negotiation do push some departments to solve certain social
problems in some cases. In addition, Carl and Galeno point out some cases, in
which the internet workers are empowered with their professional knowledge
to circumvent limitations imposed upon them by the key word filtering system.
We are the same as internet users in terms of posting sensitive content.
Sometimes our sensitive posts are also deleted by our own company. But
since we know more about how the filtering system works, we are more likely
to write acceptable posts. Acting creatively, we use indirect methods to discuss
issues… I like applying my creativity to post sensitive issues… It’s more about
personal choices and individual acts rather than collective behaviour… (Carl,
technical worker in the Open Platform Department at Campus, 27th August
2011, interview)
We are more skilled than most users so we can access many foreign
websites. Then we have more information about the ‘real China’ [compared to
the image of China produced by official Chinese media], and are more eager to
discuss the sensitive issues against the state… [We usually] discuss these
issues on Campus and using microblog platforms… (Galeno, technical worker
in the Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December 2011,
interview)
According to these quotes, both workers and users are actively concerned
with the most popular topics, especially the sensitive issues in society, so they
state opinions on their own pages, join discussions on public pages, and
create blog posts to call others’ attention to the issues. But internet workers are
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more likely to succeed in these acts, because of their professional knowledge
and greater skills at circumventing the limitations imposed upon them by the
key word filtering system. These acts can be understood as a form of
negotiation because they show internet workers’ indirect way of bargaining
with the state over limitations of their online freedom. They circumvent these
limitations using their professional knowledge and skills.
These acts of negotiation effectively respond to state-imposed limitations.
And, in some cases, these acts successfully push the state to relax certain
limitations. In other words, acts of negotiation can sometimes bring about
effective changes. Thus, it is apparent that internet workers work alongside
ordinary internet users in the creation of alternative spaces to discuss sensitive
topics, to negotiate the limitations imposed upon them by the state. Arguably,
they are more successful than ordinary users, because of their professional
knowledge and skills. Therefore, internet workers make a significant
contribution to the production of new forms of online freedom in contemporary
China, despite the fact that most of the existing debates, focus on the
contribution of internet users in these acts (Kenneth 2011, Lei 2011, Lu 2009).
Banks (2007) talks about a ‘“remoralized” future beyond capitalism’ (p.171)
created by the ‘existing and emergent forms of cultural production’ (ibid.). He
indicates that emergent forms of cultural production, which do not originate
from or aim to produce economic capital, would probably create new forms of
capital accumulation that lead to an alternative of capitalism. Based on his
argument, I argue that in contemporary China, it is internet workers who create
emergent forms of cultural products, which contribute to this ‘remoralised
future’, in the form of free online spaces. Here, the emergent forms of cultural
products refer to online products, such as websites and programs, that
encourage internet users to speak out.
For example, workers in Campus created a public page, named ‘King of
Status’, which focused on the most popular and sensitive issues, in order to
encourage internet users to freely discuss issues and present their opinions. In
the case of Google quitting the Chinese market in 2010, workers posted a
status to ironically comment on online censorship on the ‘King of Status’ page,
as shown in Figure 7.2. The status post caused 188 users to respond to the
issue on the same day. In this sense, workers make efforts to create free
public spaces for ordinary users, especially followers of ‘King of Status’ in this
case.
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Figure 7.2: Status about Google’s quitting of Chinese market on ‘King of Status’
page
Source: public page of ‘King of Status’
Since this public page was one of the most popular pages from 2010 to
2011, it attracted attention from both internet users and some official
departments, such as the Ministry of Culture. As a result, running the page
properly – maintaining internet users’ interest and avoiding it being stopped by
the Ministry of Culture – became quite complicated and risky: workers were
forced to encourage users join the discussion in an indirect and ironic way, so
that the company would not be punished, or even closed by the state.
These online products may not immediately cause the state to relax its
limitations, but they do draw the attention of Chinese internet users and the
state to certain issues that reflect social problems and tensions in
contemporary Chinese society, such as freedom of speech, as shown in the
Google case. Some of the attention has pushed the state to modify its
practices, as Galeno stated, which has enabled certain online spaces for free
speech to remain open. Some of the attention may facilitate future solutions to
certain social problems where the state may take action to solve problems that
are attracting a huge amount of internet users’ attention. This situation is
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somewhat different to the 1990s, when the Chinese internet industries had just
started. The contemporary online space has concentrated on more social
problems, due to the help of online products (such as microblog and the public
page service in Campus), created by internet workers.
Meanwhile, such acts of negotiation are also helped by some high level
workers within the internet industries, who have worked in liberal newspapers
before joining the sector, and are well known for their public positions against
the state, in relation to particular social problems. Some of them are said to
have joined the internet industries in order to create alternative spaces to give
a voice to diverse classes and opinions. As Galeno said:
A lot of executives in internet companies are opinion leaders and against
the state. For instance, Ho is a quite famous opinion leader, who is in Tencent
now,and takes charge of editing some online columns. Lots of workers in
liberal media choose the internet as a space to speak out and give voice to
different voices. (Galeno, technical worker in the Product Administration
Department at Campus, 20th December 2011, interview)
Galeno then went on to give a specific example of Netease, which is one
of the dominant and most liberal portals in China. According to Galeno, some
high level workers in Netease were opinion leaders from Southern Weekly –
one of China’s most popular newspapers, owned by the independently minded
Southern Daily Group, and regarded as one of China’s most influential liberal
newspapers. They moved to Netease, aiming to protest against the state in
certain social problems, and give voice to diverse social classes:
The most famous case is Netease, where plenty of famous opinion
leaders have gathered. Some of my net friends, who worked in Southern
Weekly before, moved to Netease. Then, you can see that Netease has been
created as one of the most influential liberal portals in China, and some of its
columns are quite critical and radical… (Galeno, technical worker in the
Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December 2011,
interview)
These workers do not resist the state in a direct way; rather, they tend to
join the internet industries to create online products, such as online columns
and online journals, in order to provide a space for ordinary internet users to
discuss social problems, and to push the state to solve these problems. These
acts then need to be conceptualised as a form of negotiation, rather than
resistance, because they show workers’ indirect and subtle ways of pushing
the state to solve social problems. Put simply, these acts of negotiation not
only provide space for internet users to discuss some social problems, but,
more significantly, they directly open up a space for the discussion of sensitive
topics, and build on increasing social tensions to gather users to directly
critique the state.
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In the case of Netease’s online report in 2011, discussed in section 6.3,
the report criticised problems in the Chinese education system, and its editors
concluded the report by directly critiquing the problematic development of the
Chinese education system and the related economic system. This critical
discussion may not immediately have pushed the state to make changes in the
education system and economic system, but it later lead to a number of critical
online discussions concerning the state’s economic and education system. In
the authoritarian Chinese context, such ironic and radical comments against
the state’s economic system and education system have significant meaning:
on the one hand, they push the state to relax certain limitations in terms of
online freedom of speech, and on the other hand, they open a space for
different classes to speak, such as working class internet users.
Admittedly, acts of resistance are usually a more direct way for the lower
classes – the lower middle class and the working class – to push against the
state, compared to acts of negotiation. And in certain cases, such acts bring a
more effective result, such as pushing the state to take action to solve certain
social problems. In the internet industries, as I stated in the beginning of this
section, internet workers sometimes co-operate with internet users in acts of
resistance. This cooperation can be seen in some of the cases I discussed
earlier, such as the cooperation between internet workers and users in the
case of ‘King of Status’, and the cooperation between workers and users in the
radical online report criticising the current Chinese education system. But there
are other examples that show a more direct method of such cooperation using
acts of resistance.
According to some interviewees, in some big media events internet
workers not only organise varied online activities, but also participate in some
offline resistant activities. The most significant case is activities on microblog
platforms concerning child abduction (weibo daguai), which were started by a
father whose three-year-old child had been abducted, leading him to post his
story on a microblog site and call for help from all internet users. Subsequently,
millions of internet users focused on the issue of abduction of children and
helped to find some children, including the child of the man who initiated the
action. In this event, a lot of internet workers helped circulate the issue,
creating a variety of online forms to encourage more users to join the activity,
and organised various online activities to support the event.
This resistant act shows the cooperation between internet workers and
users, which brought significant outcomes: many abducted children were
saved and child abduction has since become recognised as an important issue
in Chinese society. Such resistant acts may not be directly against the state in
terms of their opposition to political limitations, such as the limits on freedom of
speech, but they certainly show the important effects of workers’ and internet
users’ cooperating.
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Another example is the Xiamen PX protest. In November 2006, a new
plant, which would produce 800,000 tonnes of the chemical paraxylene
annually, was planned in Xiamen. The environmental and health dangers of
the plant were made public in March 2007 by a professor at Xiamen University,
who initiated the anti-PX factory protest. At the beginning of June 2007, tens of
thousands of citizens in Xiamen were organised through internet and mobile
networks to take part in an offline strike in the form of a stroll, which was called
the ‘stroll protest’ (sanbu kangyi), to express their strong disagreement to the
project. The strike alarmed officials in Beijing and eventually forced the local
government to suspend the construction of the PX factory.
Galeno’s friends, who had worked in some of the major internet
companies, participated in the Xiamen PX protest. As Galeno told me, some
internet workers purposefully organised online activities, such as producing
videos and organising internet users to post critical comments on some
government official websites. Some of them even organised and participated
in the ‘stroll protest’. These workers therefore played an important and
influential role in the online activities, because of their professional knowledge
and skills enabled them to use the internet for these purposes. As Galeno put
it:
In Mainland China, only a few people, mainly in the internet industries,
could give a voice to varied opinions and voices… (Galeno, technical worker in
the Product Administration Department at Campus, 20th December 2011,
interview)
In this case, internet workers and users cooperated with each other in
both online resistant activity and offline social movement – the stroll protest,
which might have been more peaceful than traditional social movements.
These direct acts of resistance, resulted in significant changes: internet
workers and users successfully pushed the local government to suspend the
PX project. Therefore, the collaborative resistant acts of internet workers and
users do not only create spaces both online and offline for varied voices to
speak out, but can also successfully push the state to modify its practices.
All cases shown in this section address workers’ acts of negotiation and
resistance aimed at realising internet idealism – that is, concern about
vulnerable communities, freedom of speech and social problems in the
Chinese context. Some resistant acts bring effective results, such as pushing
the state to modify its practices. But, more significantly, some acts of
negotiation, which have mostly been ignored in previous research on worker
agency, have significant influence in pushing the state to relax certain parts of
its limitations over online freedom; and sometimes indicate a potential from the
bottom to the top – for certain people in the authoritarian Chinese context to
realise their humanistic account – to obtain dignity at work, to benefit
vulnerable communities, and to have free thinking and choices, etc. In other
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words, internet workers’ acts of negotiation need to be discussed as a
significant issue in terms of evaluating worker agency in the Chinese context.
7.5 Conclusion: Worker agency as a potential of
possible transformation
In this chapter, I have addressed internet workers’ acts of negotiation and
resistance to exploitation and domination from the bureaucratic capitalist class.
As a way to support individual existence, improving the poor working
conditions, some of these acts aim to improve the quality of working life.
Meanwhile, workers also hope to realise internet idealism, with reference to
concerns about vulnerable communities and online freedom of expression, via
these acts of negotiation and resistance.
Some of these acts have effective results, such as improving certain parts
of working life and pushing government departments to solve social problems.
For example, via acts of negotiation, workers in Campus successfully kept
their stocks as part of their benefits when they changed jobs, even though
company rules prohibited this. In the Xiamen PX event, internet workers
cooperated with internet users to successfully force the local government to
suspend the PX project, via acts of online and offline resistance.
Some of these workers’ acts did not bring such effective results; however,
they still had significant influence on the industries and society. For example,
workers questioning the authority of the state in the Election Meeting of
Candidates of the National People’s Congress in Shanghai indicated that
people from the lower classes strived for free thinking and choices in an
authoritarian context. This then implies the potential that people in the lower
classes might collectively strive for free thinking and choices by resisting the
upper class in the future. This sort of autonomy is recognised as a positive
agency, in contrast to the negative autonomy shown in Chapter Five. This is
not only because such acts bring about positive results, such as solving some
social problems, but also because they rest on a certain theory of personhood
– to realise free thinking, free speech and choice.
Some effective acts are in the form of resistance, which has been
discussed in most research on worker resistance, but acts in the form of
negotiation are often ignored in research on worker agency. I argue that acts of
negotiation need to be identified as an important part of worker agency,
because they bring significant changes to the internet industries and Chinese
society. For example, internet workers create certain online products, such as
websites and programs, with their professional knowledge and skills, for the
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purpose of providing free online spaces to ordinary internet users. Such acts of
creation do not directly resist the state’s limitations towards online freedom;
rather, they indirectly push the state towards relaxing certain parts of its
limitations via encouraging internet users to speak out in the new space
created by these workers’ online products. In other words, these acts of
negotiation still bring significant change to internet industries and to online
freedom in the Chinese context.
Here, workers’ acts of agency indicate the potential that the lower middle
class may co-work with the working class, to initiate a transformation from the
bottom to the top in Chinese society, in order to realise free thinking and free
speech in an authoritarian context. It is apparent that some internet workers
strive to create an open and interoperable space that is accessible to every
Chinese internet user, which includes large numbers of ordinary Chinese
people – who I am calling the working class here. Such acts include
recommending sensitive topics to these users, increasing certain free space
for users to discuss these topics by creating new online products, and actively
engaging in these discussions with the users. These ‘standing together’ acts
then result in an effective cooperation between internet workers and internet
users: internet workers organise and participate in both online and offline
resistant activities with the users, aiming to push government departments to
solve certain social problems and modify their practices – a way to support
their own existence, to contribute to good work, and to enable free thinking,
speaking and choices, which ultimately form a theory of personhood.
In this way, I acknowledge the other side of the proletarianisation problem
of the lower middle class: the lower middle class in the internet industries not
only share similar poor working conditions with the working class, as I
discussed in the previous three chapters, but both classes also negotiate with
and resist the bureaucratic capitalist class via cooperating with each other. It is
not my intention to overemphasise such acts of negotiation and resistance,
because there is still much exploitation and domination in the internet
industries. Admittedly, some of these bottom-up acts result in effective
changes, such as improving certain parts of the quality of working life. But,
these acts have not yet brought a significant social movement that has
completely cleaned up all forms of exploitation and domination in Chinese
society, as the CCP defined as its ultimate aim.
Rather, with these acts, I identify the potential for transformation from the
bottom to the top in the Chinese context: the lower middle class in the internet
industries might cooperate with the working class to initiate a possible
transformation as a collective form in future Chinese society. This certainly
requires more theoretical discussion concerning social tensions in
contemporary Chinese society and possible transformation in future China to
clarify to what extent this potential could be acknowledged in the context of
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Chinese society. Thus, in the next chapter, the conclusion of this thesis, I will
further discuss this potential in the Chinese context, through which I anticipate
the possibility of a better China.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion
8.1 Structure of this chapter
This chapter concludes my arguments in previous chapters, reflects on
and points out some limitations of this thesis. In section 8.2, I summarise the
main arguments in this thesis. And I discuss the potential for transformation
from the bottom to the top in Chinese society, in order to develop the argument
of Chapter Seven. In section 8.3, I highlight what I think are the contributions of
this thesis to the broader debates in which it is situated. For example, this
thesis expands knowledge about social class, and enriches the research field
of cultural labour and Chinese society. In section 8.4, I reflect on the process of
conducting this research. In 8.5, I explain the limitations of this research in
terms of the representativeness of the cases and translation problems. In
section 8.6, I discuss some possible research in relation to this thesis that
could be done in future, such as comparative research about internet
industries in different geographic contexts. I summarise my arguments below.
8.2 Thesis summary and hopes in the internet
industries
This thesis began by identifying internet workers’ class position in the
Chinese context. I put the internet workers in a general social hierarchy in
order to understand their relationships with the upper and lower classes. I did
not produce a detailed stratification of the Chinese class structure, classifying
certain people as middle class, and some as working class. Instead, I analysed
internet workers, who are often highly educated and receive higher pay than
peasants and peasant workers, and categorised them as a part of the lower
middle class in Chinese society. I considered some general differences
between the bureaucratic capitalist class and the lower middle class in the
internet industries, aiming to highlight the inequalities between these classes.
By identifying the class position of internet workers, I was able to build a
framework, focusing on issues of exploitation and domination, to evaluate the
quality of these workers’ experiences in their industries. Here, I adopted a
neo-Marxist approach to identify various levels of exploitation resulting in the
different experiences of different kinds of internet workers in relation to working
life, and to explore certain non-economic practices that influence workers’
working-life experiences. Based on this framework, I pointed out that there
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were two aspects of the lower middle class problem of proletarianisation in the
Chinese context: the poor quality of working life in the internet industries, and
the agency or otherwise of workers.
I argued that exploitation in the Chinese context refers to the bureaucratic
capitalist class’s appropriation of the labour efforts and skills of the middle
class and the working class. I also argued that there is variety and disunity
amongst different types of internet workers.
Based on this specific understanding of exploitation, I highlighted three
aspects of working life to evaluate its quality: work intensity and pay, autonomy,
and risk. Using these issues, I examined internet workers’ empirical
experiences in their daily practices, and showed that internet workers suffered
from high work intensity with unreasonable pay, low-level freedom in terms of
workplace autonomy and professional autonomy, and high levels of risk and
insecurity. In other words, I claimed that the internet workers experienced a
low quality of working life, and that they were seriously exploited by the
bureaucratic capitalist class. But discussion of these aspects of working life did
not ignore worker autonomy; rather, I pointed to certain affective concerns and
agentic desires that could be identified, even though these sometimes drove
workers to self-exploit, albeit on different levels. I emphasised certain agents
working under structural constraints that could not be fully controlled, though in
a negative direction, such as workers ‘choosing’ to work themselves extremely
hard.
Internet workers in Chinese internet companies I studied are generally
compelled to work overtime without reasonable pay, and suffer from high work
intensity. Most workers experience a low level of workplace autonomy and
professional autonomy in their daily work. Some workers, such as
self-employed workers, enjoy a high level of autonomy in their creative
practices, but such freedom is based on high work intensity and unrewarded
overtime, which can ultimately be seen as a form of exploitation. Meanwhile,
most internet workers experience high levels of risk and insecurity in their work:
they are forced to be responsible for their lives after retirement, which was
previously the responsibility of the state; some are pushed to experience
karoshi (death from exhaustion), due to the high financial pressures in their
work and lives; and some of them lack benefits, such as social insurance,
which should be guaranteed by the state and internet companies. Thus, I
argued that the internet workers’ working-life experiences indicate that the
Chinese internet industries are sweatshops of the new media era, where
workers experience widespread precariousness.
The second point I argue here is that such difficult working conditions
distribute unevenly amongst different forms of internet workers. For example,
interns are forced to pour in to the internship market, in order to cover their
living expenses and pay back the debt caused by the high tuition fees.
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However, the employment difficulties in recent years put these interns under
extremely high pressure, and even results in some students’ committing
suicide. Therefore, these interns are keen to do the work in the industries with
accepting all precarious experiences, such as unguaranteed work positions
after internships. Agency labourers sometimes experience excessive working
hours because of full-time workers’ bully. These different experiences thus
suggest that difficult working conditions are experienced differently by different
groups of workers.
The third point I addressed as the other part of the lower middle class
problem of proletarianisation, was worker agency. I argued that acts of
negotiation, which have often been ignored in research on worker agency,
need to be considered as an important part of the issue. These acts might not
always bring about effective results, such as improving the quality of working
life, but they are still a significant part of internet work and the internet
industries. For example, some acts of negotiation push the state to relax
certain limitations over online freedom of expression in an indirect way. This
marks a fundamental shift in attitudes towards acts of worker agency in the
authoritarian Chinese context. Most acts of resistance and negotiation
discussed in Chapter Seven were recognised as a positive agency, in contrast
to the negative autonomy discussed in Chapter Five, because they rested on a
certain theory of personhood – supporting individual existence, obtaining
dignity at work, benefiting vulnerable communities, and having free thinking,
speaking and choices, etc.
Therefore, in this research, I argued that there are many negative things
about the conditions of internet work, and a lot of the time, this can be
understood in terms of structural exploitation, as I defined it. However,
exploitation is not the only useful way of understanding these poor conditions -
some need to be understood in different ways, such as domination and the
practices of guanxi. And, not only is exploitation useful (but not enough) to
understand poor conditions, but there are also things to be more hopeful about,
specifically the acts of agency I discussed in Chapter Seven.
Such significant acts of negotiation and resistance indicate a potential for
reform from the bottom to the top in contemporary Chinese society: it is
possible that the lower middle class might cooperate with the working class, to
realise the humanistic account of persons – such as pursing freedom, and
initiate a transformation from the bottom to the top in future Chinese society.
But this potential needs to be framed in the context of existing research on
Chinese society, which I will address in the following sections.
A transformation could hardly be anticipated that overcame conflicts and
antipathies arising from the variety and disunity between different forms of
internet workers. However, Ross (2008) argues that precariousness beyond
the creative industries can become a catalyst for solidarity between different
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groups in society. Banks (2010) also argues that the albeint-limited autonomy
of cultural workers may catalyse social actions, as long as it serves as ‘a
foundational normative principle for aesthetic and creative cultural practices,
and a structural precondition for capitalist cultural production’ (p.266). In other
words, Banks indicates a potential in social actions initiated by worker
autonomy, a genuine agency to pursue the humanistic account of persons.
Collinson (2003) argues that resistance, understood as a form of worker
agency in this research, may become ‘a catalyst for social and organisational
change’ (p.541). Thus, research indicates a possibility of organisational and
social transformation initiated by workers’ autonomy. Such autonomy is a
meaningful pursuit of plural forms of work, life, free thinking and choices that
may overcome disunity between different forms of internet workers and
possibly become a catalyst for social change.
Writing about control and resistance in work organisations, Salaman
(1979) argues that power distribution in the organisation needs to be related to
power distribution outside the organisation, because power only makes sense
in the context of the society in which it is operating. For Salaman, ‘inequalities
of organisation reflect the inequalities of the host society’ (p.112). Therefore,
worker agency in Chinese internet companies, to some extent, reflects
processes in wider Chinese society. And the transformation in online China,
brought about by workers’ acts of creating open and accessible spaces for
Chinese people to speak out, could be seen to indicate a possible
transformation in offline China, characterised by dynamics from the bottom to
the top in the social hierarchy, which I will discuss later in this section.
Some scholars have contributed to the discussion about the future of
Chinese society by asking the question: ‘what is the best route to a better
China?’ Zhang (2001) points out that the difference between these various
approaches to understanding future Chinese society comes from variations in
understanding ‘the most effective way to achieve the best economic result with
the least social cost and political risk’ (p.11). Generally, there are three routes
suggested by scholars as the most effective to achieving a better China:
liberalising the market; self-reforming the state; and transformation from the
bottom. I deal with each of them in turn, in order to discuss the potential of
internet worker agency in the context of Chinese society.
8.2.1 Liberalise the market?
Liberal economist Huang (2008) criticises the intervention of Chinese
state policies in the market, because they bring about unequal regional
development and urban bias. In comparison, he praises market principles,
which he regards as a ‘good mechanism for [correcting] income disparities’
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(p.257). He regards the inequalities caused by the free market, as a natural
and reasonable result of capitalist development. He suggests that China
further liberalise the market and weaken the influence of the state in the
market, to gradually ‘deepen the path to capitalism’ (p.90), in order to solve the
social tensions caused by state intervention in contemporary Chinese society.
Huang’s work has been questioned by many theorists because of his
overemphasis on the autonomy of the market. For example, Andreas agrees
with Huang that contemporary Chinese social development is problematic
because of the large social problems, but he questions Huang’s explanation of
the forces behind these social problems. For example, Huang (2008)
understands that the force behind the urban bias is politics, whilst Andreas
(2010) argues that the bias is the natural result of the expansion of capitalism
in Chinese society. It is because the free market, which originated in the 1980s
when China opened its market to the Western capitalist system, deepens the
role of capitalism in Chinese society. He argues that capitalism ‘intrinsically
has an urban bias’ (p.70): capitalism drives the ‘rapid expansion of [the] private
sector at the expense of the public’, which naturally results in urban bias. As a
result, Andreas argues that further liberalisation of the Chinese market, as
suggested in Huang’s work, will only make the problem worse.
As an alternative, Andreas suggests that the main social problem in
contemporary Chinese society is that ‘wealthy and corrupt officials are lording
it over a hard-working population’ (p.85). The problem can only be solved
when the state makes efforts to stop the exploitation of workers and small local
companies by the powerful capitalist companies, who are cooperating with
corrupt officials – the bureaucratic capitalist class. In other words, Andreas
believes that the state needs to guide, control and modify the market with its
policies in order to benefit vulnerable groups, including workers and small local
companies – who represent the working class and the lower middle class.
The arguments between Huang (2008, 2010) and Andreas (2010) then
raise a question about future China: ‘was the crisis of the reform caused by the
incompleteness of the market where the only way out would be further
privatization and global linking?’ (Chun 2006: 97). Chun answers this question
by arguing that some modern social problems are the result of market
liberalisation, such as ‘industrial pollution and the ecological hazard of
urbanization’ (p.272). She also argues that over-liberalisation of the market
only destroys ‘social commitment and its welfare foundation’ (p.267) in
socialist countries, such as China. As an alternative, Chun suggests the only
way of solving contemporary social problems is by relying on self-reform of the
state.
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8.2.2 Self-reform of the state?
Wang (2001) points out that less government intervention does not always
lead to a higher level of welfare. He argues that state intervention is necessary
in the market economy, as it remedies market irrationalities. Indeed, it is
impossible to organise market institutions without the support of the state, and
China currently faces some challenges that cannot be solved by the market
itself. But he does not believe that state intervention is always desirable;
instead, he suggests that the state needs to modify its intervention by
narrowing its intervention, and also by changing its policy instruments.
Chun (2006) argues that the Chinese state continues to be a central
part of social development as it guides the direction of development with its
policies. She states:
‘It was not the leadership of the proletariat, nor the power of a
worker-peasant alliance, but the state project of national development that had
been the foremost preoccupation of Chinese socialism’ (p.130).
Chun (2006) argues that the aim of the Chinese transformation should not
be completing the ‘western style democracy’ (p.201), which excludes groups of
‘unemployed workers, sweatshop labourers, and poor farmers’ (p.217). As an
alternative, the aim of Chinese transformation should be recapturing the state
from its alliance to the party-state. The transformation does not rely on the
independence of the market from the state’s intervention; rather, it centres on
‘what the state does (performance), aims to do (nature), and can accomplish
(capacity)’ (p.221).
Practically, Chun points out that the state has already rethought the
transformation because market liberalisation has brought intensification of
traditional and modern dilemmas. And the state has made some promising
changes, such as introducing the notion of ‘Green GDP’, improving workplace
safety by revising its policies, helping workers retrieve unpaid wages,
cancelling agricultural tax, and protecting migrants, etc. (p.275). Chun believes
that the only way to solve social problems and tensions is to form a
government that is ‘politically and financially capable of managing the market
transition’ (p.283), and a public that is ‘equipped to hold the government
accountable and the market socially beneficial’ (ibid.). In other words, Chun
places great hopes for the transformation on the state’s self-reformation.
I agree that Chinese transformation needs a supportive government to
guide its direction. However, on the one hand, effective policies not only
depend on how the state designs them, but, more significantly, they also rely
on how the state practices them. What’s more, this transformation cannot
succeed without the practices of ordinary Chinese people. The state needs to
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modify its policies, but workers and peasants also have a crucial role to play in
the transformation.
8.2.3 Hope from the bottom?
Zhao (2011) argues that the Special Economic Zones, which were set up
in the early 1980s to encourage the export of goods and increase employment
opportunities, resulted in unequal regional development, tensions between
classes, and divisions between different ethnicities. In order to reduce such
inequalities and injustices, she claims that transformation cannot only rely on
the self-reform of the state, but also depends on ‘elite and popular
communication politics’ (p.562). She believes that bottom-up power, which
refers to the ongoing social struggles, is the future of the Chinese
transformation. Zhao acknowledges the importance of these social struggles
and resistance from peasants and workers. She regards these practices as the
‘agencies and alternatives’ (p.559) that will bring an advanced Chinese society.
Put simply, Zhao is more radical about the transformation than Chun, because
she identifies practices ‘from the bottom’ as an alternative for future China.
The idea of bottom-up power in Zhao’s work has been developed by Qiu
(2009). Qiu investigates the experiences of subordinate groups, ‘the
information have-less’ in his terms, in their ‘daily struggles and participation in
the class-making and history-making process’ (p.18). Among the daily
struggles, new media events, to which the information have-less make a
significant contribution through their practices in the high-tech sector, are
regarded as playing a significant role in the transformation in China because
they are ‘an important harbinger of change’ (p.226). These new media events
provide opportunities for ordinary Chinese people, the information have-less,
to discuss ‘the reality they experience’ (ibid.) before bringing about possible
social change by taking effective and influential action. As Qiu argues, a new
working-class is emerging and is being empowered through the development
of these new media events, and this would hopefully bring Chinese society into
a new era via large-scale social transformation. Put simply, Qiu believes that
bottom-up power, which is mobilised by subordinate groups’ online and offline
resistant acts via new media events, is an effective and significant route to
social transformation, and a route to a better China.
Such bottom-up power is similar to the potential of worker agency that I
have described in this research: as I argued in Chapter Seven, internet
workers’ cooperation with internet users indicates a cross-class coalition – a
coalition between the lower middle class and the working class, which forms a
bottom-up power to fulfil a certain theory of personhood. In other words, I
argue that, in a possible transformation in Chinese society, internet workers’
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acts of agency will play an important role in the form of cooperating with other
people in the lower classes, through such ‘bottom-up power’ of the ‘information
have-less’, as shown in Qiu’s work.
But, I also argue that such bottom-up power might not be the only force
behind social transformation in Chinese society. As an alternative, this future
transformation may also include the self-transformation of the state. Recently,
the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has initiated self-reform of the Party in
Chinese society. One significant issue focused on in this self-reform is
anti-corruption, which indeed is an important factor in most social problems
and tensions in contemporary Chinese society. Xi promised to crack down on
corruption from central government to local governments. This
self-transformation of the state may not guarantee an effective solution to the
current social problems and tensions, but, it indicates the possibility that the
state will improve some of its practices in the future through acts of self-reform,
such as the anti-corruption movement.
What’s more, as some cases in Chapter Seven showed, the state is
pushed by internet workers’ acts of negotiation and resistance to improve its
practices, such as allowing internet users greater online freedom of expression.
Thus, it is possible that a future social transformation, which solves social
problems and reduces social tensions in contemporary Chinese society, will
include acts of negotiation and resistance from the lower classes, and the
self-reform of the state.
8.3 Contributions of the thesis
This thesis contributes to the field of cultural industries studies in three
ways. First, it expands knowledge about social class. In Chapter Two, I made
extensive use of Eric Olin Wright’s (1985, 2009) work on social class. My
research builds on his work, in particular his discussion of ‘the middle class
problem’, and applies his theory to the Chinese context. My research provides
a deep understanding of forms of exploitation in the Chinese context, where I
distinguish exploitation from domination. My research explores ‘the lower
middle class problem’ in the Chinese context, which involves the issue of
worker agency.
Based on Wright’s theories, I characterise the model of exploitation in the
Chinese context as constituted by causal relationships between three social
classes: the bureaucratic capitalist class, the middle class, and the working
class. The bureaucratic capitalist class owns the means of production, and has
both the political and economic power to allocate these resources, in order to
appropriate the labour efforts and skills of the lower classes. The middle class
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needs to be divided into the upper middle class and lower middle class. The
upper middle class has close relationships with the bureaucratic capitalist
class, which it uses to dominate the lower middle class. Generally, the middle
class possesses skills – some own certain means of production, as do the
upper middle class – but lack the power to allocate these resources. As an
alternative, people in the middle class need to sell their skills in the capitalist
market, where the state plays a significant role in the Chinese context, in order
to survive. The working class sells the labour power it owns in order to survive.
The important issues here are: the bureaucratic capitalist class appropriates
labour efforts and skills of the middle class and the working class; and the
upper middle class stands with the bureaucratic capitalist class in certain
cases, in order to dominate the lower middle class and working class.
I use the concept of exploitation as a mechanism by which to understand
inequalities and injustice in internet workers’ working-life experiences. It partly
explains why the internet workers suffer from difficult working conditions. This
concept also leads to an exploration of ‘the lower middle class problem’ in the
Chinese context, proletarianisation.
My research expands Wright’s work on ‘the middle class problem’ in the
Chinese context, whereby worker agency is acknowledged as another part of
the problem. According to Wright’s thesis, the lower middle class problem is
understood as deteriorating working conditions, which results in a lower quality
of working life for internet workers. However, I identify worker agency in the
Chinese context, where the lower middle class stand with the working class to
realise the humanistic account of persons, as the other part of the lower middle
class problem, proletarianisation.
Second, this research enriches the research field of cultural labour and
creative labour with empirical data from Chinese internet workers. My findings
indicate that Chinese internet workers in the companies I studied suffer from
inequality and injustice in terms of work intensity, pay, and risk. For example,
compared to SOE workers and civil servants, who are in the upper middle
class, internet workers, a part of the lower middle class, receive unreasonable
pay for their hard work. They are forced to be responsible for their lives after
retirement, which was formally the responsibility of the state and internet
companies. In contrast, SOE workers and civil servants’ working lives are
completely guaranteed by the state. I investigated these difficult working
conditions in two companies, but given what I observed and heard in the
industries, these conditions are likely to be replicated in other internet
companies.
Some of my work points to the limited applicability of concept from existing
research on cultural/creative labour to the Chinese context, and to the need to
attend to the specificities of that context in making sense of the working
experiences of Chinese internet industry workers. For example, in Chapter
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Four, I explained why Chinese internet workers worked excessive hours with
reference to certain Chinese characteristics, such as Chinese work ethic and
local contingency – the one-child policy. Here, the Chinese work ethic referred
to Chinese people’s belief that hard work could improve the material well-being
and ensure security of their families. Based on the existing literature on the
Chinese work ethic, I argued that this traditional Chinese work ethic had been
directed into service of the interests of the bureaucratic capitalist group, which
were to build a moderately prosperous society. This political subsumption of
Chinese work ethic partly resulted in Chinese internet workers’ excessive
working hours. Some theorists had explored how Chinese one-child policy
influenced Chinese cultural labour’s working life (Qiu 2009, Ross 2005). I
further argued that the one-child policy increased a sense of competition
amongst internet workers and pushed internet companies to recruit non-local
workers, who were more likely to work excessive hours. This ultimately
resulted in Chinese internet workers’ excessive working hours.
In Chapter Five, I highlighted the important role the CCP played in internet
workers’ experiences of autonomy. I illustrated how the CCP entangled with
internet companies, which shaped a special context for Chinese internet
workers to pursue their autonomy. In this chapter, I also pointed out that
Chinese internet workers experience different levels of autonomy, due to
certain Chinese non-economic factors mobilising within the working life. For
example, I argued that some workers experienced a high level of workplace
autonomy, partly because of the way that guanxi operated in the company.
Inequalities and injustices surrounding Chinese internet workers’ working
lives indicate that the precarious working life, which has been criticised in
some research into cultural labour and creative labour in the high-tech
industries (Ross 2005, 2007) and cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh and
Baker 2010, Banks 2007), has spread worldwide, such as to contemporary
Chinese society, where working life was guaranteed by the state in Mao’s era.
this research identifies different levels of precariousness between different
forms of workers, and recognising certain non-economic practices that operate
within this variety. For example, some agency labourers experience excessive
working hours because of the tensions between agency workers and full-time
workers. This research thus contributes to the research on cultural labour and
creative labour in Western academia, with working-life experiences in the
Chinese internet industries, by assessing the quality of Chinese internet
workers’ working lives.
Moreover, the low quality of working life in the Chinese internet industries
suggests a necessity to criticise exploitation in the high-tech industries in the
new media era. Given the rapid growth of internet industries in the world,
urgent attention needs to be paid to the struggles of ordinary Chinese internet
workers, who are part of this rapid growth. It is important to recognise that such
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rapid growth of the industries is based on exploiting the labour efforts and skills
of a large number of ordinary workers, in particular in the Chinese internet
industries, which have become a new type of sweatshop in the new media era.
To fully understand this kind of exploitation, there is a need to explore the
quality of working life in the internet industries in developing countries, such as
India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, which could be seen as a vulnerable
part of the world’s high-tech production system because of the widespread
high-tech outsourcing services based on cheap labour in these areas. Put
simply, it is possible that the low quality of working life in the Chinese internet
industries is shared by workers in other developing or emergent economies’
internet industries. Thus, this research suggests the possibility of connecting
the Chinese context to other developing countries, by exploring workers’
experiences in internet industries in these other locations.
Third, some of my findings enrich research about Chinese society. As I
argued in section 8.2, worker agency in the internet industries indicates a
potential for reform ‘from the bottom’ in contemporary Chinese society, which
might initiate a possible transformation in society. These acts of negotiation
and resistance echo the bottom-up power shown in Qiu’s work (2009): the
internet workers’ acts of resisting the state’s control of online freedom of
expression, especially their acts when cooperating with internet users, indicate
a cross-class coalition: the coalition between the lower middle class – the
internet workers who create online products, encourage internet users to
speak out, and co-work with users, aiming to increase online expression
freedom – and the working class, the ‘information have-less’ in Qiu’s research.
It is possible that the lower middle class in my research and the working class
in Qiu’s work can be seen as forming a bottom-up power by cooperating with
each other to initiate a possible transformation in Chinese society. But, as I
argued in Chapter Seven, this bottom-up power cannot be overemphasised,
due to the exploitation and domination in the internet industries that still exists.
Rather, this power needs to be understood as a potential for future
transformation in Chinese society.
Moreover, this idea of bottom-up power does not negate the importance of
the state’s self-reformation. As I stated in section 8.2.2, some theorists of
Chinese society claim that the Chinese state’s self-reform will be a solution for
social problems and tensions in contemporary Chinese society. Here, my
research expands upon Qiu’s work, by claiming that the possible
transformation may also involve the self-reform of the Chinese state, such as
the anti-corruption movement under the new leadership of the President Xi
Jinping. Therefore, my research indicates a possible solution to social
problems in contemporary Chinese society as social transformation initiated by
the bottom-up power and self-reform of the state. This enriches the discussion
about Chinese society, in particular in relation to a route to a better China,
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where workers would be rewarded in a reasonable way, to reflect their labour
efforts and skills.
8.4 Reflections
As stated in Chapter Three, this research began from my MA research,
when I started to pay attention to internet workers. At that time, I was surprised
by the difficulties and struggles of workers conducting their work in the face of
intervention from the state and their companies. I only recognised how difficult
the working conditions were when I conducted my fieldwork in the industries
for this PhD research, one year after the MA project. During my observation, I
was surprised by workers’ struggles and unequal experiences, such as their
unrewarded overtime, unguaranteed lives after retirement and cases of
karoshi (death from overtime). In particular, I was struck by interns’ struggles in
the industries and universities, where they became victims of the Chinese
education reform and economic reform. These empirical cases pushed me to
rethink and ask: should these experiences be understood as exploitation?
As a student who was lucky enough not to have many experiences of
internships in China, I did not find out how problematic internships were in
contemporary Chinese society until I spent time with interns in Grand. Only
then did I hear lots of examples about how these interns struggled in
universities and how they survived in internet companies. I was surprised by
their experiences, which were caused by the problematic education reforms; I
was shocked by suicide cases, resulting from employment difficulties; and I
was impressed by their attitudes when they were left facing a difficult,
seemingly hopeless and helpless working life. As a result, I felt a sense of
responsibility to discuss these struggles and criticise these difficulties via my
academic work – this thesis and other future publications based on the
empirical data – in order to draw the attention of readers both inside and
outside of the internet industries to these problems.
But, at the same time, I was also struck by workers’ acts of negotiation
and resistance. This indicated a hope both in the industries and in society:
workers did not accept the inequalities and injustices surrounding their
working-life experiences; instead, they chose to fight for their rights and
benefits in either a direct way, such as through acts of resistance, or an
indirect way, in the form of acts of negotiation. This then gave me a sense of
hope that workers might succeed in fighting for their rights and benefits, by
improving some of their working conditions and increasing their online freedom
of expression in the future, using active acts of resistance and negotiation. In
other words, amongst all the difficulties and struggles workers were
experiencing, I still recognised a certain hope that might bring about changes
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in the internet industries and Chinese society. Thus, on the one hand, I found
that the Chinese internet industries had become sweatshops in the new media
era, in which internet workers suffered from difficult working conditions.
However, on the other hand, I also acknowledged that there was a bottom-up
power, initiated by the internet workers, which brought hope to both the
internet industries and Chinese society.
8.5 Limitations
There are three possible limitations in this research. First, the issue of
representativeness of the two internet companies I chose. I noted that
microblog became a popular example in the research about Chinese internet
industries in recent years, because it became an incubator for social events,
where internet users used microblog discuss social problems and organise
online activities. It seemed to be a good case for my research to discuss
worker agency. However, microblog was not the dominant social network
service at the time when I initiated this research (2010); instead, Campus was
an important website where lots of internet users gathered to discuss social
problems. As I stated in Chapter Three, the difficulty of access in most Chinese
internet companies, including microblogging services, made it hard to carry out
participant observation in these companies. Instead, it was more possible for
me to conduct fieldwork in Grand and Campus, because I had friends working
there. However, given what I heard and observed, I believe that workers’
practices in both companies are representative of large numbers of workers’
activities in the internet industries.
Second, the transcription and translation of raw data, collected from
in-depth interviews, participant observation and self-observation, may not
accurately show participants’ views. In Chapter Three, I stated that I
transcribed all raw data and translated most parts of the data by myself,
because of my proficiency in both English and Chinese. Due to the large
amount of data, I chose to translate part of the data after discussions with my
supervisors and reading some references. However, I do not claim that the
data from interviews and observation journals were translated in an accurate
way, due to the different cultural meanings and variations of the two languages.
However, the translation generally shows the original meaning of interviewees
and participants.
Third, the generalisability of this research becomes another potential
limitation. This research focuses on two internet industries in the Chinese
context, which raises the issue of its transferability and applicability in other
geographical and political contexts. Because of the different social contexts in
other areas, such as Europe, USA and Southeast Asia, it is possible that some
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of the findings in this research cannot be applied to these areas. But, as
globalisation proceeds in the internet industries, through processes such as
the outsourcing services that Chinese internet companies are providing to the
world, there is a possibility that most of my findings can serve as a model for
und erstanding internet workers’ working lives in different countries, to varying
degrees. For example, one of my PhD colleagues, who had worked in the
censorship department of a Malaysian TV station for seven years, told me that
the Malaysian government intervenes in TV production in a similar way to the
Chinese government, because of the similar cultural and political contexts.
This suggests a possibility that certain findings about Chinese internet
industries in this research, such as the state’s intervention in the internet
industries, can serve as model for understanding the situation in the Malaysian
internet industries.
8.6 Thoughts on future work
The low quality of working life of internet workers indicates a possibility for
future work to focus on the working life of cultural workers in other industries in
the Chinese context, such as workers in the hardware high-tech industries that
provide outsourcing services to the world (for example, the Apple factories in
mainland China). This would develop our understanding of the well-being of
people in the lower classes, such as the lower middle class and the working
class, in the Chinese context. It would also develop our understanding of social
problems and social tensions in Chinese society, as this research indicates.
Given this research is a general assessment of working life in two Chinese
internet companies, it is also possible for future work to construct comparative
research projects, which compare the Chinese situation to other Asian
countries, as I stated in the last section. Because of similarities between
certain Asian countries (such as between mainland China and Hong Kong) the
similar political context between others (such as mainland China and Vietnam)
and similar production models in others (such as mainland China and Thailand,
both serving as the cheap labour factories in the world capitalist system), it
would be possible to construct certain research to compare working life in the
internet industries in these different countries, in order to create a general
model of working life in the Asian internet industries, which might be different
to the working life in the Western internet industries. This would certainly
strengthen our understanding of the other parts of the global internet
production system. As I argued in section 8.3, it is possible that the low quality
of working life in the Chinese internet industries explored in this research,
would be representative of a tendency in other developing countries: a new
240
type of sweatshop in the global internet production system, where internet
workers are exploited.
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Appendix A
Interview Guide
1. What is the main work of the interviewees?
2. What are the backgrounds of interviewees? (such as academic
background, career background, and reasons of choosing the
companies)
3. How about the working situations in the companies? (such as
working hours, working stress, working overtime, and payment
etc.)
4. What are the social networks between workers in the companies?
(such as relationships between different departments, working
relationships between labourers, private social networks between
colleagues, and forms of communication between workers etc.)
5. What is the motivation of creating in the working process?
6. How do all the creativities come and work in the interviewees’
work?
7. How about the lives of the interviewees? (including both work and
life experiences)
8. What are the rules in the companies?
9. What are the restrictions in the labourers’ work, especially in the
terms of creativity?
10. What are the restrictions/rules from state, such as departments of
Ministry of Culture and General Bureau of Radio, Film and
Television, to the work of interviewees, especially in terms of
creative autonomy?
11. How do companies reply to the restrictions/rules from state?
12. How do interviewees reply to the restrictions/rules form state?
13. How do interviewees feel when their creativities restricted by the
companies and state?
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Appendix B
Information Sheet
Labour in the Chinese Internet Industries
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and
discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or
if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish
to take part. Thank you for reading this.
This project is to explore the macro social change in contemporary China via a
micro discussion of workers’ dynamics in the Internet industries. The project
will last for three years where more than fifty workers in Internet companies will
be involved. Workers in the companies, who are interested in the program and
eager to talk about their working experiences, are invited to participate in the
project.
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part
you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent
form. You can still withdraw at any time in any way. You do not have to give a
reason.
The whole project will last for three years, while the participants will only be
involved in the interviews. During the process, participants are required to
answer some open questions related to their working experiences.
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the
project, it is hoped that this work will contribute to the research of labour in
Chinese Internet industry.
All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research
will be kept strictly confidential. For example, you will be fully anonymous in the
research and the final report. You will not be able to be identified in any reports
or publications.
In order to explore the labourers’ dynamics in the industry, the working
experience and social networks of these labourers will be investigated. The
audio and/or video recordings of your activities made during this research will
be used only for analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and
lectures. No other use will be made of them without your written permission,
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and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original
recordings.
The results of the research project are likely to be written up as a PhD thesis in
the end of 2013, when you will receive a copy of the final results. In any related
results of this research, you will be fully anonymous and will not be identified.
If you have any further enquiries, please contact to:
Bingqing Xia
Telephone number: 07772296358
Email address: csbx@leeds.ac.uk
Address: Institute of Communications Studies, Clothworkers’ Building North,
University of Leeds, Leeds, West Yorkshire, UK. LS2 9JT
You will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form to
keep. Thank you for your participation in the project.
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Appendix C
Participant Consent Form
Title of Research Project: Labour in the Chinese Internet Industries
Name of Researcher: _____Bingqing Xia________
Initial the box if you agree with the statement to the left
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet (02, MAR,
2011) explaining the above research project and I have had the
opportunity to ask questions about the project.
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any
negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any
particular question or questions, I am free to decline. (Contact number of
researcher: ).
3 I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my
anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with
the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the
report or reports that result from the research.
4 I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research
5 I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the
principal investigator should my contact details change.
__________________ ________________ ___________
Name of participant Date Signature
(or legal representative)
____________ ___________ ______________
Name of person taking consent Date Signature
___________________ ________________ __________________
Lead researcher Date Signature
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Appendix D
Check List of Self-observation
Categories of workers Things to record
Technical workers Main work
Working situations, such as working hours,
strength of work, and situation of overwork etc.
Forms of communicating with colleagues both at
work and after work
The atmosphere or environment of work
Workers’ creativities in terms of production
Entertainment after work
Dynamics with other categories of workers
Managements of their creativities from companies
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Appendix E
Research Support
3 Cavendish Road
University of Leeds
Leeds LS2 9JT
Tel: 0113 343 4873
E-mail: j.m.blaikie@adm.leeds.ac.uk
Bingqing Xia
Communication Studies
University of Leeds
Leeds, LS2 9JT
PVAR Faculty Research Ethics Committee
University of Leeds
11th August 2011
Dear Bingqing
Title of study: Labour in the Chinese internet industries
Ethics reference: PVAR 10-057
I am pleased to inform you that the above research application has been
reviewed by the Arts and PVAC (PVAR) Faculty Research Ethics Committee
and following receipt of the amendments requested, I can confirm a favourable
ethical opinion as of the date of this letter. The following documentation was
considered:
Document Version Date
PVAR 10-057 researcher's response 2.txt
(email) 1 10/08/11
PVAR 10-057 Revised
Ethical_Review_Form.docx 1 24/07/11
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PVAR 10-057 Appendix 4 Check List of
Self-observation.docx 1 24/07/11
PVAR 10-057
ICSHouldsworth20110518122750.pdf 1 18/05/11
PVAR 10-057 Appendix 1 Information
Sheet.docx 2 24/07/11
PVAR 10-057 Appendix 2
Participant_Consent_Form.doc 2 24/07/11
PVAR 10-057 Appendix 3 Interview
Guide.docx 2 24/07/11
Please notify the committee if you intend to make any amendments to the
original research as submitted at date of this approval. This includes
recruitment methodology and all changes must be ethically approved prior to
implementation.
Please note: You are expected to keep a record of all your approved
documentation, as well as documents such as sample consent forms, and
other documents relating to the study. This should be kept in your study file,
which should be readily available for audit purposes. You will be given a two
week notice period if your project is to be audited.
Yours sincerely
Jennifer Blaikie
Research Ethics Administrator
Research Support
On Behalf of Professor Chris Megone
Chair, PVAR FREC
